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Abstract
This thesis investigates the behaviour of politicians and voters in local elections. The first
paper studies the effects of campaigning when public funding covers a sizeable share of spend-
ing. It develops a probabilistic voting model and a causal, instrumental variable, empirical
analysis using a novel database of political campaigns from the Portuguese Constitutional
Court. The second paper is a field-experiment that evaluates the impact of the information
conveyed by the media to the voters on their political perceptions and voting behaviour. In
the last, I use the fact that mayors increase spending in election years to estimate the local
economic impacts of increased expenditure.
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Introduction
Governments and politicians play a pivotal role in society, in at least three ways. They define
the overall priorities and goals of the government, establish the general guidelines and policies
to attain such goals and lastly, they create the rules that regulate (and eventually punish)
the behaviour of the social actors. No other society member has such a broad influence in
social and economical developments. Political scientists, sociologists, anthropologists and
economists have devoted much of their attention to studying and analysing politicians and
the several layers of government where they act.
Nowadays, the rise of populism, even in countries which are generally considered mature
democracies, has reignited the debate about the relevance of political agents and institutions
in the maintenance of a free, prosperous and developed society. The recent cases of the
Swedish and Italian general elections illustrate how political polarisation has increased, both
as a result and a symptom of a society that is increasingly divided. This is also clear
when we look at the ideological positions and the policy platforms proposed in some of the
recent elections, e.g., in Brazil in 2018 or the United States in 2016. More generally, across
Europe, for instance, candidates closer to the extremes of the political spectrum (mainly
from nationalist or far-right parties) or from outside the traditional party system altogether
have gained more visibility and gathered more votes in almost all countries.
Political economy is the branch of Economics that studies the relationship between politics
and the society. The meaning of "political economy" is now substantially different from the
seminal definition of Adam Smith. According to Weingast and Wittman (2008), "political
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economy is the methodology of economics applied to the analysis of political behaviour and
institutions. As such, it is not a unified approach, but a family of approaches".
Citizens choose politicians to represent them in large scale elections, which are thus the
mechanism that links the will of the citizens to the decision makers. Elections are held
under asymmetric information between the voters and the candidates. The informed party
(the politician) sends a message to the uninformed one (the voter), to gather his vote in
hope of being elected.
In this context, a micro level analysis of elections can provide very important insights.
Local elections provide a good laboratory to perform research in the context of political
economy. Although the scope of action of local governments throughout the world is diverse,
these government bodies where the link between the decision maker and the voter is closer.
Generally, local governments aim at improving the well-being of inhabitants, promoting
social and economic development, managing territorial planning and providing local public
goods. Thus, the actual impact of local politician decisions is very clear to the electorate.
In this thesis, I study the behaviour of politicians and voters and its relation with economic
activity in a series of three essays. The first two evaluate two dimensions that can affect
electoral outcomes: campaigning by politicians in elections and the impact of information
conveyed by the media on voting decisions. In the last, I evaluate the local economic impacts
of increases in local expenditure in election years.
In Chapter 1, I propose a theoretical model and an empirical exercise that aims at finding
whether local campaign spending affects local electoral outcomes. Research on the effects of
campaign spending is broad, both in theoretical and empirical contributions. However, the
results found are often mixed, as some studies argue that campaign spending has no effects
of election outcomes, like Levitt (1994), while others argue that it matters, as Gerber (1998).
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Most studies, are based on the US context, where private donations play a pivotal role in
campaign financing. However, in Europe, for instance, most countries have tight regulations
about private donations for political campaigns, while almost all of them provide some kind
of direct or indirect public support to pay for campaigning in elections. Surprisingly, there
is very little information about how public funding affects campaign spending decisions and
how in turn that spending affects election outcomes.
I propose an approach centred on the role of public funding for local elections. I start by
formulating a probabilist voting model with two candidates and two periods, which includes
campaign spending decisions. Campaign spending is assumed to boost the popularity of
candidates, by increasing their exposure, which in turn positively affects their probability of
being elected. Campaign spending is financed through (costly) private contributions and a
statutory allowance provided by the central government, that is only determined after the
election, depending on electoral results.
In the model, candidates differ in terms of ideology, which cannot be credibly changed for the
election, in terms of ex-ante popularity and in terms of their access to party contributions
to finance campaigning. We show that, depending on the volatility of the voters’ ideological
bias, and the total amount of statutory allowance available to be distributed between in
the candidates in the local election, these candidate differences entail different equilibrium
behaviours. Consequently, the most disadvantaged candidate may or not be able to use
campaign spending to overcome his disadvantage and increase the probability of winning
the election.
I then conduct an empirical study using a rich database of campaign revenue and spending
compiled based on the reports that candidates must submit to the Portuguese Constitutional
Court, since 2005. The database includes detailed information about campaign spending and
funding sources covering 308 Portuguese municipalities and all the 12 parties/candidates
Bruno Carvalho 3
that ran for local office in the 2005, 2009 and 2013 local elections. The goal of this empirical
exercise is, on one hand, to validate our theoretical design and in the other to provide
empirical support to our theoretical findings.
To address the simultaneity issues of estimating the effects of campaign spending election
outcomes, I use an instrumental variable technique that is nested in the theoretical modelling
assumptions and on the legal rules in place in Portugal. I compute the expected statutory
allowance that candidates might receive after the election based on the rules in place at the
moment of the election and on the best proxy available to measure their electoral success in
the forthcoming election. Results show that the expected statutory allowance has a strong
positive correlation with campaign spending and that campaign spending indeed matters for
election results.
From the perspective of the top contenders for office, the winner and the runner-up of the
election, I find that the campaign spending of the runner-up provides a significant boost
to his vote share while reducing the vote share of the winner. The average challenger,
campaign spending accounts for around 8pp of his vote share. The spending of the winner,
on the other hand, seems to have little effect, which can be explained, as discussed in our
theoretical model, by a very high ex-ante popularity advantage (provided by incumbency
advantage), that provides direct benefit in terms of the probability of being elected. Even
so, as the model suggests, winners still spend on average more than the runner-ups.
An analysis focused on the four biggest parties running for local elections in Portugal (PS,
PSD, CDS and PCP), on the other hand, unveils that the campaign spending of the two
biggest national parties (PS and PSD) affects their vote shares in the election. For the
average candidate of these two parties, estimates show that campaign spending accounts for
6 to 9pp of their vote share. As suggested by our theoretical model, smaller parties, who
might face higher restrictions in the access to party contributions to fund the campaign tend
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to spend less and that spending has virtually no effects on the vote share.
Although these results show that the actions of politicians prior to the election can affect
local election outcomes, they focus only on the amount of money spent in campaigning and
ignore the impact that the specific information provided entails. Jointly with my co-authors,
I explore the role of information conveyed by the media in election outcomes in the following
Chapter.
In Chapter 2, we implement a randomised experiment to check whether positive and negative
information conveyed by mass-media outlets can affect local election results. Specifically, we
answer to two questions. First, whether positive and negative (truthful) information about
the central government can affect (in the same way) the perception about the performance
of the central government in the proximity of local elections. Second, whether that updated
perception affects local voting behaviour.
We exposed 1800 students of two business schools in Lisbon to a bundle of positive or negative
information about the central government in power at the time of the 2017 local Portuguese
election, held on October 1st. The experiment was implemented in two phases. The first,
in the weeks before the local election, where we collected a set of socio-demographic and
political information about respondents and implemented the treatment; and the second,
in the week after the local election, where we gathered information about actual voting
behaviour in the election.
The treatment included 12 different surveys, half of which conveyed positive information and
the other half negative information. Each survey included two news articles from credible
media outlets, as well as a graph and a picture associated with the subject of the news. The
news selected encompassed several policy areas, namely: public finance, pensions, youth
employment, national health service, road safety and education. The selection was done
so that for each area comparable positive and negative articles where available, from the
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same news outlet. Therefore, each positive information bundle, of the six created, had
a comparable negative bundle. The control group was assigned to a 13th survey, with
information related to a Portuguese, not endangered, dog breed.
Regarding our first question, we find that although positive and negative information affect
(in the expected direction) the perception of respondents in the specific policy areas of the
information they received, only negative information has a significant effect on the general
perception of government performance, post-treatment. These findings are in accordance
with other research showing that negative information is more impactful than positive infor-
mation, which is commonly known as negativity-bias. Such findings are observed not only
in the field of psychology (Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Finkenauer, and Vohs, 2001), but also
in experimental economics contexts, like in James and John (2007) and Olsen (2015). Our
findings are robust to several specifications and controls.
Regarding our second question, i.e., the impact of that updated performance about the
central government performance on local election behaviour. The rational for this spillover
effect is, in our view, due to three reasons. First, voters can see the party system as a
selection mechanism for candidates running in local elections, as discussed by Geys and
Vermeir (2014). Second, voters may expect increasing benefits from a mayor closely related
with the central government (Fiva and Halse, 2016). Finally, local elections can also be seen
as second order elections, through which voters send a message to the central government
(Marien, Dassonneville, and Hooghe, 2015). We find no average treatment effect in terms of
changes in the propensity to vote in the local elections, for the candidates aligned with party
that is in power in the central government when the local election occurs. Which might
indicate that, on average, information about central government perception does not affect
local voting decisions, or that we are facing a treatment dilution problem.
Still, the strong findings related with our first question support the idea that news, and
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potentially fake news can affect voter perception, as discussed in Allcott and Gentzkow
(2017) and King, Schneer, and White (2017).
In the last chapter, my co-authors and I conduct an empirical study to evaluate the local
economic effects of increases in local government spending. There is an extensive literature
about political business cycles establishing that political candidates spend more just before
the elections in an attempt to increase their electoral success. Local governments in Portugal
are no exception, as shown in Coelho, Veiga, and Veiga (2006) and Veiga and Veiga (2007).
We use the fact that local elections in Portugal are held in fixed four-year intervals to isolate
exogenous spikes in local current and investment expenditure. We compute a local fiscal
multiplier, i.e., the impact of local public spending on private economic activity, using the
wage bill of private firms in the municipality. We also explore state-dependent local fiscal
multipliers, by analysing the influence of the government spending cycle, the size of the
municipality and political cycle on the fiscal transmission mechanism.
Our comprehensive database covers expenditure and revenues of 278 Portuguese mainland
municipalities, between 1986 and 2014. We show that municipal spending spikes lead to
a positive change in the local wage bill. This effect, albeit statistically robust, is small in
magnitude. Increasing spending per capita by 1% leads to a boost between 0.09 and 0.14%
of the contemporaneous wage bill. The effect is driven by local employment, which increases
between 1.5 and 1.7%, on average, in response to investment and current expenditure, re-
spectively. We also show that this effect is influenced by contextual factors. Multipliers are
substantially higher in bigger municipalities and lower in municipalities where the mayor has
been in power for more than 3 terms. We also find some evidence multiplier asymmetry, as
the effects of spending increases and decreases seem to differ.
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Chapter 1
Campaign Spending in Local Elections:
The more the merrier?
1.1 Introduction
The practice of campaigning to inform the voters and hopefully gather their votes is as old
as the Roman empire, as discussed in Morstein-Marx (2012). Pompei conserves many wall
paintings – the so-called dipinti, nothing less than the ancestors of modern political outdoors
– of the elections held one month before the Vesuvius erupted, with plenty of messages
about the honour of the candidates and electoral promises of “good bread”. In those days
candidates had to be wealthy, not the least because the political office did not entail any
wage and usually funded their own campaings, which mostly included rallies and dipinti.
However, private money in politics may come with strings attached (Kalla and Broockman,
2016, Stratmann, 1991, ?), or it may limit competitiveness in elections, as discussed by
in Jacobson (1978) or Abramowitz, Alexander, and Gunning (2006).1 In this context, the
support for some sort of public financing for political activities has been amply debated, for
instance by Theodore Roosevelt, that stated: “the need for collecting large campaign funds
1Morton (1992) and Stratmann (2005) provide discussions about the role of private money in politics and
discuss the real world (and research) implications.
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would vanish if Congress provided an appropriation for the proper and legitimate expenses
of each of the great national parties, an appropriation ample enough to meet the necessity."2
Modern democracies vary in the extent to which public funding is used by political candi-
dates. In Europe, according to an European Parliament (2015) report all the 28 member
states of the European Union, except from Malta and recently Italy, provide some kind of
direct public funding to parties.3 The vast majority also provides some sort of direct or
indirect funding to elections. In the United States, by contrast, currently only 14 states
provide (optional) public funding for political parties.4 Opting for public funding restricts
the amount of donations candidates can collect and generally establishes campaign spending
limits. Surprisingly, there is very little theoretical and empirical evidence about campaign
spending when part of the funding comes from public sources, with the notable exceptions
of Jones (1981) and Malhotra (2008) for the U.S case.
We contribute to this literature by explicitly modelling the candidate’s strategic campaign
decisions which is partly funded from public sources. We setup a model where candidates
strategically use campaign spending to influence their popularity level and thus affect the
probability of being elected. We then test the model with a new dataset constructed for the
purposes of this research, based on the reports of campaign spending (and funding sources)
of candidates in local elections in Portugal. Since 2005, parties and independent candidates
are required to submit a comprehensive report of campaign funding and expenditures to
the Portuguese Constitutional Court. These reports should reflect as accurately as possible
the geographic allocation of spending and are then audited and certified by the court. This
previously unused dataset covers 308 municipalities, 3 local elections (2005, 2009 and 2013)
2Theodore Roosevelt’s Seventh State of the Union Address, December 3rd 1907.
3Malta is implementing measures towards providing public funds, while Italy is moving towards a com-
pletely private system.
4According to the National Conference of State Legislatures, an NGO that represents local and state
government in the US.
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and includes the 12 national parties that typically run (at least in some municipalities)
in local elections, as well as all the coalitions between these parties and the independent
candidates.
There is an extensive literature on the effects and funding of campaign spending, including
both theoretical and empirical contributions, with mixed results. In some cases, like Gerber
(1998) or Morton and Myerson (1992), studies argue that campaign spending matters, while
in others it seems to have no effect (Levitt, 1994). Some authors even suggest that banning
spending could be welfare improving (Prat, 2002).
In a theoretical framework, Coate (2004) develops a political competition model where (pri-
vate) campaign contributions help voters produce more informed choices and provide parties
with an inventive to select the best candidates and thus contribution limits only increase
welfare of members of interest groups. In Meirowitz (2008), candidates select levels of effort
and the marginal asymmetries in costs of effort explain why advantaged candidates, like
incumbents, often get elected, which is reinforced by very tight campaign or effort limits.
Wittman (2008), on the other hand, derives the optimal behaviour of voters not targeted by
campaign advertising and shows that the effect of campaign spending could be negligible for
electoral outcomes. From another perspective, Herrera, Levine, and Martinelli (2008) shows,
by including turnout in a model of electoral competition, that increases in the volatility of
voter preferences lead to increases in polarisation and campaign spending.
Empirical studies about the effects of campaign spending face essentially three issues. First,
available data may be incomplete or inaccurate, as parties may have an incentive not to
fully disclose information. Second, even if data is available, in many cases, for subnational
elections, it is not geographically disaggregated, which requires that assumptions are made
about the allocation of expenditures. Finally, there is an endogeneity issue to be addressed
when estimating causal impacts of spending on electoral results. In fact, if higher spending
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can lead to higher vote shares, it may also be the case that spending is higher (or lower)
precisely because the political capital of the candidates is higher ex-ante.
Researchers have either taken advantage of the institutional features of the elections (re-
peated elections, proportional systems) or used instrumental variable approaches to deal
with this endogeneity issue. Silveira and Mello (2011), for instance, perform an empirical
analysis to show that there is a large causal effect of TV advertising on election outcomes
in repeated Gubernatorial elections in Brazil. Fink (2012) finds mixed support for the effec-
tiveness of campaign spending in the proportional representation system of German federal
elections. Ben-bassat, Dahan, and Klor (2015), on the contrary, argue that campaign spend-
ing is unable to affect substantially electoral outcomes, based on an empirical study for
repeated elections in Israeli municipalities.
On the other hand, Green and Krasno (1990), for instance, isolate exogenous campaign
spending decisions using lagged campaign spending as an instrument. Other instrumental
variable approaches include: using candidate quality (Gerber, 1998 and Green and Krasno,
1988), the tightness of the race (Erikson and Palfrey, 2000) or the population size of the
constituency (Gerber, 1998).
Most studies are conducted in the context US (congress) elections. Aside from the afore-
mentioned studies, other exceptions include Palda and Palda (1998) in France, Maddens,
Wauters, Noppe, and Fiers (2006) in Belgium, Benoit and Marsh (2008) in Ireland, Samuels
(2001) in Brazil, or ? and Rekkas (2007) in Canada, for the case of general elections and
Benoit and Marsh (2003) in the local Irish election of 1999. Several studies also cover
United Kingdom elections (Foos and de Rooij, 2017, Johnston, Cutts, Pattie, and Fisher,
2012, Pattie, Denver, Johns, and Mitchell, 2011), particularly in exploring the role of local
campaigning in affecting general election outcomes like in Pattie, Johnston, and Fieldhouse
(1995), Whiteley and Seyd (2003), Fisher, Cutts, and Fieldhouse (2011), Fieldhouse and
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Cutts (2009) and Fisher, Fieldhouse, Johnston, Pattie, and Cutts (2016).
We propose a two-period probabilistic voting model, following Persson and Tabellini (2002),
in which campaign spending is funded through (costly) party contributions and a statutory
allowance provided by the central government. Before the election, candidates decide how
much to spend in campaigning, however the amount of the statutory allowance depends on
election results and thus is only determined after the election. Candidates differ on their
ideology, on their access to party contribution funds to finance campaigning and on their
ex-ante popularity.
We show that campaign spending decisions depend crucially on the rate at which candidates
expect to get funds from the central government, which in turn depends on the variance of
voter’s ideological preferences. If that rate is low, the candidate with an ex-ante popularity
advantage spends more than the disadvantaged candidate and wins the election with higher
probability. The result is the opposite if campaign spending entails a high potential statutory
allowance. Similarly, the candidate with a higher cost to access party contributions to fund
campaigning will only spend more (and win with a higher probability) if he believes campaign
spending will entail a higher portion of statutory allowance after the election.
To provide validation to these findings, we perform an empirical analysis using local elections
in Portugal. Our empirical exercise has twofold objective. First, to check whether our
theoretical modelling assumptions are realistic and second to evaluate whether our main
theoretical findings are validated empirically.
We analyse the data in two perspectives, i) the winner and runner up perspective, which
emphasises the two biggest contenders in each municipality, and ii) the individual party
level, focusing on the four biggest local parties in Portugal, irrespective of their placement in
the electoral race. This dual analysis encompasses the approaches of other empirical studies.
Most studies focus on electoral contests between the two top contenders, irrespectively that
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is the incumbent and challenger (Ansolabehere and Gerber, 1994, Banaian and Luksetich,
1991, Moon, 2006) or the winner and the runner-up in the first stage of an election, as
Silveira and Mello (2011) or Ben-bassat et al. (2015). Others, like Fink (2012), Rekkas
(2007) or Fisher et al. (2011) use the individual party perspective to evaluate to identify
specific patterns across different parties.
We deal with the potential endogeneity using an instrumental variable approach. The choice
of the instrumental variable is framed by the legal restrictions in place in Portugal. In fact, as
donations are very limited, public funding is a key determinant of campaign spending. Thus,
we instrument campaign spending with the expected statutory allowance that candidates
think they may receive after election, which we compute based on the rules in place at the
moment of the election and their best guess about their performance in the election.
Results show that campaign spending actually matters. In the winner/runner-up perspective
we find that a 1 000e increase in spending of the runner-up leads to a increase of 0.14pp
of his vote share and a decline of 0.35pp of the winning margin. Although a 0.14pp impact
may seem small, for the average runner-up, who spends around 58ek, this accounts for
8.12pp of the vote share. Winner spending, seems to be less efficient, particularly when we
account for incumbency advantage, which has also been observed in comparable literature.
For the individual party perspective, we find that an increase of spending of 1 000e leads to
a increase in the vote share between 0.08 and 0.19pp for the two biggest Portuguese parties.
Again, for the average candidate of these parties this accrues to an impact between 6 and
9pp. These findings are robust to the exclusion of campaign spending outliers and flagship
municipalities, where the campaign spending decisions could be driven by non-local factors.
The empirical results support our theoretical conclusions and stress that campaign spending
is actually a relevant tool to affect electoral results. In fact, it is reasonable to assume that
candidates use spending to increase their visibility and overall popularity, which conveys
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information to voters and in turn affects voting decisions.
This paper is structured as follows. We start by presenting our model in Section 3.4, where
we discuss the formulation and the baseline predictions. The following section describes the
legal framework of local campaigning in Portugal. The data used is described in Section 3.3.
We then discuss the estimation issues and present our OLS estimates. Section 1.6 discusses
our identification strategy and Section 1.7 implements it, presenting our main results and
robustness checks. Finally, Section 1.8 concludes.
1.2 A model of strategic campaigning decisions
We follow Persson and Tabellini (2002) and develop a two-period probabilistic voting model
to evaluate the role of campaigning in electoral competition, in a context where public
funding is the main revenue source of campaigning. The set-up is stylised and provides the
baseline framework for the empirical discussion that follows.
In our model, voters decide on whom to vote based on the welfare derived from the exogenous
political platforms proposed by two candidates (W (gj)), on their individual ideologicy (σi)
and on the overall popularity shock of the election (δ). The uniform distributions of the
random variables σi and δ are common knowledge.
Each candidate decides his campaign spending, which increases his exposure and therefore
has a positive impact on his popularity. Campaign spending in financed through party
contributions (PCj) and a public statutory allowance (SAj), provided by the central gov-
ernment. We impose that the campaign budget is balanced, meaning that when spending
exceeds the statutory allowance, it must be paid off by the party supporting the candidate.
The novelty of our approach is that we explicitly model campaign funding obtained throught
public resources. Most literature about campaign spending effects is framed, as discussed,
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on the US context, where private donations assume a pivotal role.5
Although the rules that determine the statutory allowance each candidate receives are pub-
licly known, the actual value depends on electoral results and thus can only be determined
after the election occurs. In this context, candidates decide campaign spending strategically
based on its expected effect on their probability of winning, and their expectation about the
statutory allowance to be received in the next period.
Candidates differ in their ideology, which cannot be credibly changed for the purposes of the
election. However, we assume that one of the candidates may have an ex-ante popularity
advantage (x). This popularity wedge could be because the candidate is better known in
the municipality (maybe he held local office before) or because voters in the municipality
traditionally favour candidates from a given party. We also allow for differentiated access
of candidates to the resources from the parties backing them in the election (kj). In reality,
some parties have deeper pockets and even if that is not the case, they need not give the
same priority to all municipalities.
1.2.1 Set-up
Timing of the game. Our model has three phases that occur in two periods. (i) In t = 1,
knowing voters’ preferences and the distributions of σi and δ, candidates decide simultane-
ously the level of campaign spending (CA and CB). (ii) At the end of t = 1, the actual value
of δ is realised and the election takes place. (iii) In t = 2, uncertainty about the vote share is
realised, pinning down the statutory allowance (SAj). Then, parties spend PCj to balance
the budget.
5There is an extensive literature about political competition when campaigning if financed through party
contributions. Recent examples include Meirowitz (2008) or Chamon and Kaplan (2013).
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Voters. The economy is populated by a continuum of citizens, with identical preferences over
the policy platforms implemented by local governments (gj), that provide welfare W (gj).
These policy platforms are general enough to include a vector of spending and taxes, as well
as non-fiscal policies such as affirmative action or environmental protection.
Voters must decide on whom to vote in the upcoming election, i.e., we do not model absten-
tion. A voter i, with ideology σi, supports candidate A if
W (gA) > W (gB) + σ
i + δ (1.1)
where σi represents voter i’s ideology and δ is the popularity shock.
Ideological bias (σi). The ideological bias can be positive or negative, depending on whether
the voter favours candidate B or A, respectively.
We let σi ∼ U
[
− 1
2φ
, 1
2φ
]
, with φ > 0, i.e., fσi = φ > 0 is the density function.6 If φ is higher,
the distribution gets narrower, reducing the dispersion of the ideological bias. The following
graph illustrates the density functions for φ˜ > φ:
Figure 1.1: Density function of voter ideology for φ˜ > φ.
6Note that E[σi] = 0, so the ideological bias is centred around zero.
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Popularity shock (δ). The shock can be positive, neutral or negative, depending on whether
candidate B is respectively more, equally or less popular than candidate A. We introduce an
ex-ante popularity wedge, x, which provides candidate B a popularity advantage, whenever
x > 0, which may result from candidate B being well-known in the municipality, due to a
previous political or entrepreneurial career, for instance. It may also be the result of the
candidate being supported by a party which is typically strong in the municipality.
Campaign spending decisions affect the overall ex-post popularity of the candidates. Specif-
ically, we assume that the campaign spending gap, ∆C = CA − CB, changes the upper and
lower bounds of the the distribution of δ, i.e., when A spends more than B, the distribution
shifts in favour of candidate A. The following distribution of δ incorporates these effects:
δ ∼ U
[
− 1
2ψ
−∆C + x, 1
2ψ
−∆C + x
]
,
where ψ > 0 is a measure of the dispersion of the popularity of candidates. Notice that
E(δ) = −∆C+x, i.e., we allow the campaign to overcome the ex-ante popularity advantage.
Figure 1.2 illustrates these impacts:
Figure 1.2: Effect of campaign spending and popularity wedge on overall popularity.
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Candidates. Candidates chose the amount of campaign spending (Cj) to boost the prob-
ability of being elected, knowing that all campaign spending not covered by the statutory
allowance has to be paid off using party contributions (PCj). In practice, candidates choose
the amount of campaign spending to maximise their payoff, i.e.,
Uj = pjχ− kjE [PCj]
2
2
where χ is a (positive) ego rent, pj is the probability of candidate j being elected and
PCj is the amount of the party contributions (or the candidate’s own resources) used in
campaigning. We assume a quadratic cost for PCj for tractability, with candidate B, without
loss of generality, facing a higher marginal cost of own funds, i.e., we assume kB = k > kA =
1. The budget constraint of political campaigns is
Cj = PCj + SAj
Each candidate is entitled to a public statutory allowance (SAj) determined after the elec-
tion, proportional to his vote share, i.e., in t = 2, candidate j receives SAj = pij T , where T
is the total amount of public funds available to all the candidates in the municipality.7
In this set-up, candidates decide the level of campaign spending in t = 1 based on their
expectation of the statutory allowance to be received in t = 2, i.e., E [PCj] = Cj − E [SAj]
1.2.2 Equilibrium
We solve the model backwards. (i) In t = 2, based on the realisation of δ candidates find
out SAj and PCj. (ii) In t = 1, the election period, candidates choose Cj to maximise their
payoff.
7By definition,
∑
j pij T = T .
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Our equilibrium is characterised by a swing voter who is indifferent between the two candi-
dates, which, using (1.1) satisfies σS = W (gA) −W (gB) − δ = ∆W (g) − δ. All voters with
σi ≤ σS (resp., σi > σS ) vote for candidate A (resp., B), as depicted in Figure 1.3.
Figure 1.3: Swing voter and vote shares.
Thus, the vote share of candidate A, piA, is
piA =
∫ σs
− 1
2φ
φdu = φ
(
σs +
1
2φ
)
= φ
(
∆W (g)− δ + 1
2φ
)
(1.2)
where the last equality is obtained using the definition of swing voter, σS. Notice that as
σS depends on the realised value of δ, piA is also a random variable. Since the statutory
allowance obtained by the party is given by piAT , it is instructive to use the expectation of
δ to write the expected vote share,
E[piA] = φ
(
∆W (g) + CA − CB − x+ 1
2φ
)
(1.3)
It follows from (1.3) that, for each euro invested in the campaign, the expected statutory
allowance increases by φT .8 Intuitively, φT is the marginal financial return of getting one
8In fact for candidate j it holds that: ∂E[pij ]∂Cj = φT .
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voter through campaign spending, as φ is the density function of voters’ ideological bias and
T the total amount of statutory allowance available in the municipality. Notice also that φ
governs the limits of the ideological bias of voters, therefore, for a given T , a lower φ leads
to higher dispersion in voter ideology. We assume hereafter that φT < 1, in order to rule
out the unreasonable case in which campaign spending is over-compensated by the central
government contribution.
The probability of candidate A winning the election can be obtained from equation (1.2)
and is given by:
pA = P
(
piA ≥ 1
2
)
= P (δ ≤ ∆W (g)) = ψ (∆W (g) + ∆C − x) + 1
2
(1.4)
where the last equality is obtained using the cumulative distribution function of δ.9
The probability of A wining the election is increasing in the voters’ welfare derived from
the candidates’ policy platforms, and his own campaign spending, and decreasing in the
campaign spending of B and the ex-ante popularity wedge.
Given that the statutory allowance is only determined after the election, we solve the model
starting in t = 2. After the election, δ is realised and thus the vote share of A, piA, is
determined.
Therefore, using the amount of total statutory allowance available, T , the amount of party
contribution for campaigning, PCA is given by:
PCA = CA − SAA = CA − piAT = CA −
[
φ
(
∆W (g)− δˆ + 1
2φ
)
T
]
(1.5)
where δˆ is the realised value of δ, and we use the vote share of candidate A in (1.2).
9Given the distributional assumptions of δ, the cumulative distribution function is given by Fδ =
ψ (δ + ∆C − x) + 12 .
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Using the value of PCA, from equation (1.5), and the probability of A winning the election,
pA in (1.4), the optimal level of CA solves
ψχ−
[
(1− z)2CA + (1− z)zCB + (1− z)z(x−∆W (g))− (1− z)T
2
]
= 0
where z = φT < 1.
Conversely, the first order condition for candidate B is
ψχ− k
[
(1− z)2CB + (1− z)zCA − (1− z)z(x−∆W (g))− (1− z)T
2
]
= 0
The first term is the marginal benefit of investing in campaign and is proportional to the
ego rent χ. The term in square brackets represents the marginal cost of campaign spending,
which results from its impact on the expected statutory allowance, compound with the
quadratic formulation of the cost of party contributions. The behaviour of the marginal cost
is related to the expected vote share of candidate A, piA. The campaign spending of party
B increases the marginal cost of CA because it has a negative impact on the vote share, piA,
and therefore forces A into a higher party contribution. The same is true for x − ∆W (g),
the exogenous advantage of candidate B.
Notice also that the impact of own spending on the marginal cost is (1− z)2, while the cross
impact is (1−z)z. Therefore, when z < 1
2
, own spending has a higher impact on the marginal
cost that the opponent candidate’s spending, while the reverse happens when z >
1
2
. As it
will become clear, this fact plays an important role in the nature of the equilibrium.
The best response of candidate A is given by:
CA =
ψ
(1− z)2χ−
z
1− zCB +
z
1− z [∆W (g)− x] +
1
2(1− z)T (1.6)
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Solving the maximisation problem of Candidate B, we obtain the best response
CB =
ψ
k(1− z)2χ−
z
1− zCA −
z
1− z [∆W (g)− x] +
1
2(1− z)T (1.7)
The best responses show that the equilibrium depends on the sign of the overall exogenous
advantage of candidate B, ∆W (g) − x; therefore, we simplify matters by assuming that
∆W (g) = 0.
The equilibrium levels of spending solve equations (1.6) and (1.7):
C∗A =
(1− z)k − z
k(1− z)(1− 2z)ψχ−
z
1− 2zx+
T
2
C∗B =
(1− z)− zk
k(1− z)(1− 2z)ψχ+
z
1− 2zx+
T
2
As a result the equilibrium campaign spending gap, ∆C∗, is given by:
∆C∗ = C∗A − C∗B =
k − 1
k(1− z)(1− 2z)ψχ−
2z
1− 2zx (1.8)
Replacing equation (1.8) on equation (1.4) yields the equilibrium probability of A being
elected:
p∗A = ψ
(
k − 1
k(1− z)(1− 2z)ψχ−
1
1− 2zx
)
+
1
2
(1.9)
It follows that when x = 0, the party making the highest campaign spending wins the election
with a higher probability; however, with, say x > 0, it is possible that B is the favourite
even if he spends less than A.
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In order to better grasp strategic effects, we shut down in turn the ex-ante popularity wedge,
x, and the difference in the measure of tightness in access to party contributions to finance
campaigning, k.
We start by assuming that both candidates have the same access to their respective parties
contributions to fund campaigning, i.e., k = 1. In this case, the sign of equation (1.8)
depends on the value of x and z. Results are summarised in Proposition 1.
Proposition 1. Suppose that both candidates face the same marginal cost of contributions,
i.e., k = 1 and that one of the candidates enjoys an ex-ante popularity advantage, i.e. x 6= 0;
then
i) If 0 < z < 1
2
, the candidate with an ex-ante popularity spends more and wins with a
higher probability.
ii) If 1
2
< z < 1, the candidate with an ex-ante popularity spends less and wins with a
lower probability.
In order to understand the result in Proposition 1, let us concentrate on the case x > 0, when
candidate B has an ex ante popularity advantage, which makes him face a lower marginal
cost of campaign spending than his opponent. When z <
1
2
, the own effect on the marginal
cost of spending is smaller than the cross effect and we have the expected result that the
candidate with an a priori advantage outspends the other. Conversely, when z >
1
2
, recall
that the cross effect is more important than the effect of own spending on the marginal cost.
That is, each candidate has a very productive tool to manipulate his opponent’s marginal
cost, more so than the opponent’s own tool. This allows the under-dog candidate A to spend
a very high amount, with a sizeable impact on the marginal cost of B, such that it becomes
too costly for B to outbid him. Notice that it is not optimal for B, the a priori favourite
candidate, to follow a similar strategy, since given A’s a cost disadvantage, the value of CB
Bruno Carvalho 24
On the behaviour of voters and politicians: Municipal elections and the economy.
needed to cause a similar increase in A’s marginal cost would be lower, and therefore A could
more easily outbid it.
Proposition 2, on the other hand, summarises the results for the case of no ex-ante popularity
difference, and different costs of party contributions.
Proposition 2. If none of the candidates enjoys an ex-ante popularity advantage and can-
didate B bears a higher cost of party contributions,
i) If 0 < z < 1
2
, then candidate A spends more and wins with a higher probability.
ii) If 1
2
< z < 1, then candidate B spends more and wins with a higher probability. .
This result resembles that of Proposition 1 in that the candidate with an exogenous disadvan-
tage – which in this case stems from the cost of contributions, instead of popularity – outbids
the other when z <
1
2
, i.e., when the cross effect is stronger than the own contribution one.
Based on the model, all our empirical specifications include the following controls. The
dispersion in voters’ ideology, φ, is proxied by measures of the competitiveness of the election,
such as the number of parties running or the size of the municipality. Ex-ante popularity
advantages, x, on the other hand, are controlled for using a dummy that is equal to one
whenever the incumbent is running for reelection, a variable that accounts for the number
of terms the mayor has been in power, or a dummy for alignment of candidates with the
central government. Finally, the benefit of winning the election, χ, which can be different
across time and municipalities, can be accounted for with fixed effects at the municipal level
or time dummies.
The empirical analysis will also allow us to establish the validity of our theoretical model by
testing the following assumptions.
Hypotesis 1. Own campaign spending increases own vote shares and opponents campaign
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spending decreases own vote share.
Hypotesis 2. Campaign spending is positively correlated with the expected statutory al-
lowance to be received from the central government.
Hypotesis 3. Ex-ante popularity advantages increases vote share.
Finally, and most importantly, we can also test the following results in Propositions 1 and
2.
Hypotesis 4. Candidates with an ex-ante popularity advantage spend more in campaigning
than their opponents and win the election with higher probability, whenever the expected
financial return of campaigning is low (or the voters are ideologically disperse).
Hypotesis 5. Candidates that face higher restrictions in access to party contribution funds
spend less in campaigning, whenever the expected financial return of campaigning is low (or
the voters are ideologically disperse).
1.3 An application to Portuguese municipalities: back-
ground
The Portuguese territory is organised into three administrative layers. The first level com-
prises the continental territory and the Autonomous Regions, the islands of Azores and
Madeira. The second layer includes 278 mainland municipalities and 30 municipalities in
the Autonomous Regions. Municipalities are then divided in a total of 3092 Parishes.
The central government is responsible for the general policy in the country and it is the high-
est body of public administration.10 Regional governments, from the Autonomous Regions,
are hierarchically below the central government, although they possess legislative autonomy
10Constitution of the Portuguese Republic.
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in specific pre-defined areas.
Local power is split between the municipal and the parish level, with the overall goals of im-
proving the well-being of inhabitants, promoting social and economic development, managing
territorial planning and providing local public goods.11 Local government representatives are
elected in all the 308 municipalities simultaneously in a nationwide local election, that occurs
every four years.
At the municipal level, the representative bodies are the Town Council and the Municipal
Assembly. Town Council is the executive branch and its members are elected using the
d’Hondt method, depending on the number of votes of each list. The lead candidate in the
list with most votes is appointed as the Mayor. The Municipal Assembly, the deliberative
branch, is composed of members directly elected by the voters and by the presidents of the
Parish councils. The Parish councils, in turn, are also elected directly by voters in the same
election. Therefore, voters are asked to cast three separate votes in each election, one for
each representative body.
As all local policymakers are elected in the same day, the attention and effort of political
agents regarding these elections is very sizeable. The political campaign period officially
starts two weeks before the election date and ends two days prior to the election, as defined
by the Law 1/2001, that regulates the electoral procedures for the local government bodies.
Between pre-campaign and campaign actions political candidates seeking office spend a sub-
stantial amount in campaigning. In the 2005 election, for instance, the five main parties
spent 62 223 511e in campaign spending, or around 7.04e per eligible voter in that elec-
tion. Such figures include administrative/logistical costs associated with campaigning, but
also the amounts spent in political promotion events, outdoors, flyers and merchandise.
11As defined by Law 159/99.
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The baseline rules that currently regulate the funding of political parties, as well as funding
and spending in electoral campaigning are defined by Law 19/2003.12 This law enforced
strict limits on revenue sources (namely private donations) and expenditure levels for each
type of election. Section A.1.1, in Appendix A.1, details this legal framework and provides
additional information about the spending limits in place in the elections included in our
analysis.
Law 19/2003 also implemented tighter regulatory mechanisms. Since then, candidates are
required to submit a comprehensive report of campaign funding sources and spending ac-
tivities to the Portuguese Constitutional Court. This report is evaluated by an independent
body that assesses any deviations from the rules, supporting the Constitutional Court which
can then sanction the political agents.
The regulatory framework and the detailed information available (both in terms of funding
and spending) for the panel of 308 municipalities in 3 elections (2005, 2009, 2013) makes
Portugal an interesting case study for the impact of spending on election outcomes. More-
over, as the Portuguese political party system is dominated by five parties that run both at
central and local level, it is relatively easy to track campaign spending and election outcomes
across time and municipalities.13
1.3.1 The Public Statutory Allowance
The most important sources of funding in campaigning in Portugal are Statutory Allowances
(SA) paid by the central government and determined, based on the electoral results, after
12Law 19/2003 was subsequently altered by Law 64-A/2008, Law 55/2010, Law 1/2013 and Organic Law
5/2015, however these were mostly incremental changes.
13Independent candidates running for local elections have gained increased relevance across time, but they
still represent a relatively small share of overall mayor appointments. In 2001, Independent candidates
gathered a total of 84 010 votes in the Town Council election, while in 2017 this figure amounts to 351 327
(6.79% of all the votes). Even so, out of 82 candidates to the Town Council in the 308 municipalities, only
17 independent candidates managed to be elected as mayors.
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the election. In the 2005 election, for instance, the five main parties reported a total revenue
of around 59eM associated with the election, of which 16.9% came from donations and
fundraisers, 23.7% from party contributions and 59.3% from the statutory allowance.
The amount of the statutory allowance (SA) to be received by each candidate depends on the
total allowance available for the municipality, TMSA, and the performance of candidates in
the current election. The procedure to determine its amount is shown in Figure 1.4.
Figure 1.4: Statutory allowance for local election campaigning.
The total allowance available per municipality (total municipal statutory allowance - TMSA)
corresponds to 150% of the spending limit (SL) defined for the municipality, determined as
shown in Table A.1, in Appendix A.1.1. To be entitled to a portion of TMSA, a candidate
must run for both the Town Council and the Municipal Assembly and manage to either elect
one candidate or get, at least, 2% of votes in both bodies. The TMSA is then distributed
for the candidates in the municipality that fulfil these criteria: 25% is distributed equally
between candidates, while the remaining 75% is distributed in proportion to the electoral
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results for the Municipal Assembly (MA).
In practice, assuming that the criteria are fulfilled and taking the adequate TMSA, the
statutory allowance (SA) received by party j, in municipality i, in period t is given by:
SAj,i,t = fixed_componentj,i,t + variable_componentj,i,t
=
1∑
j partiesj,i,t
× 0.25× TMSAi,t + vshare_MAj,i,t∑
j vshare_MAj,i,t
× 0.75× TMSAi,t
(1.10)
The statutory allowance received, SAj,i,t, depends positively on the total allowance available
for the municipality, TMSAi,t, and on the vote share of the party at the Municipal Assembly.
On the other hand, if more parties run in the municipality (and fulfil the qualification
criteria), every party gets a smaller portion of the fixed component of the SA. Nonetheless,
the SA is capped by the actual amount spent in campaigning, so that parties cannot keep
any portion of the SA that was not effectively spent.
The rules of SA attribution imply that candidates do not know ex-ante, with certainty, the
amount of statutory allowance that they are entitled to. Parties can use their own resources
to fund the campaign before receiving the SA. However, in principle they would want to
spend a value close to their expected SA, to avoid spending their own money.
As we discuss on Section 1.6, in this work we isolate exogenous changes in campaigning
spending taking advantage of the particularities in the allocation of the TMSA amongst the
parties running in a municipality. In particular, we use a modified version of equation (1.10)
to construct our instrumental variable.
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1.4 Data and statistical evidence
To test our theoretical findings we resort to data on campaign expenditure of the parties
running for office in local elections in Portugal in 2005, 2009 and 2013.
This database was compiled using the reports submitted by parties and independent can-
didates to the Accounts and Political Funding Entity, an independent auditing body of the
Portuguese Constitutional Court. An example of the information available in such reports
is presented in Figure A.1 and A.2, in Appendix A.1.2. Based on the reports, we built and
compiled a new database that comprises a total of 20 variables regarding actual and fore-
casted revenue, and expenditure items associated with campaigning in local elections. We
cover three nationwide elections, in 308 municipalities and for all the parties running in each
municipality (between 2 and 10 parties per municipality).
We also gathered a set of political variables, associated with election results, using data
provided by the National Elections Commission: vote shares, number of seats won per party
and number of eligible and actual voters, per municipality, for each municipal body. Based
on these variables we also constructed a set of control variables that are relevant for our
analysis, namely whether the incumbent mayor decided to run for reelection, for how many
terms has the current mayor been in power (a proxy for incumbency advantage), how many
parties are running in that election (a proxy for contestability of the election), dummies for
the political spectrum of the candidates/winners and dummies of alignment with the central
government (to capture eventual spillovers between central and local voting behaviour).
Although our database comprises a lot of information, using it to estimate the effects of
campaign spending in local elections raises some technical issues. The data about a candi-
date/party can only be effectively used if the party runs for office, in the same circumstances,
in the same municipality for the three elections.
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However, this is not always the case. First, parties, particularly small parties, may decide
not to run in a municipality in a given year. Second, it may be that the party runs in
the municipality, but in a coalition. Coalitions of parties are commonly decided locally,
in a case-by-case fashion. If in a particular municipality there is a contender expected to
have a high vote share in the election (perhaps the incumbent), parties that previously run
separately may decide to join efforts and enter a coalition. In such cases, spending and vote
shares are reported for the coalition, so it is impossible to follow the individual parties across
time. Finally, following independent candidates, which candidacy is not supported directly
by a party, is generally not possible, as there is no municipality where the same independent
candidate runs for the whole time span of our analysis.
In the end, these limitations condition greatly the actual number of usable observations for
estimation purposes. To minimise this issue and to enrich our anaylysis, we organise the
database in two ways: i) the winner/runner-up perspective and ii) the individual party
perspective.
Focusing on the top contenders for office is very common in the literature. In some cases
they are the incumbent and the challenger, as in Jacobson (1978), Gerber (1998) or Moon
(2006), in others they are the top contenders in the second stage of a repeated election, like
in Levitt (1994) or Ben-bassat et al. (2015). The winner/runner-up perspective restricts the
analysis to the candidates that finished the electoral race in first and second places, which
are likely to be the ones that compete the most in terms of campaign spending. As in this
case we focus on the position in the race and not the party, we can virtually include all
municipalities in our analysis, which allows for a high the number of observations effectively
used. Moreover, in this set-up we can also include independent candidates, smaller parties
and coalitions, provided that they are representative enough to end the electoral race in the
top places, in a given municipality.
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The individual party perspective, as in Fink (2012), Rekkas (2007) or Fisher et al. (2011),
allows us to follow spending patterns of the same party across time. In this approach, we can
distinguish campaign spending effects of parties, irrespective of their placing in the electoral
race. This is important as some parties may spend different amounts, in a different way, and
may even be better at converting campaign spending in votes. We restrict the analysis to
the four main Portuguese parties. This selection includes the two biggest national parties,
the Socialist Party (PS), which is the main centre-left party in Portugal, and the Social
Democratic Party (PSD), the centre-right analogue. The other two are further away from
the centre of the political spectrum, one is the Portuguese Communist Party (PCP), left-
wing, and the other the People’s Party (CDS), right-wing.14
Table 1.1 shows descriptive statistics of the main variables used. Panel A shows that the two
main parties (PS and PSD) have a consistently higher vote share than the other two, both in
the Town Council and the Municipal Assembly. Panel B provides similar information, while
focusing on the winner/runner-up in the election. Notice that the average winning margin
(difference between the vote share of the winner and the runner-up in the Town Council)
is 19.75pp, although it can go as high as 72pp. Left wing parties represent 51% of winners
while only 2% are independent candidates. Coalitions of parties win in 16% of the cases
covered by our sample.
Table 1.1: Descriptive Statistics
Obs. Mean S.D. Min. Max.
Panel A: Election Results - Party Level
vshare_TCPS 1 211 39.47 13.75 5 76.6
vshare_MAPS 1 209 38.8 11.89 6.7 71.6
vshare_TCPSD 946 39.99 17.9 1 83
Continued on next page
14We exclude the Left Bloc (BE), a left-wing party that was founded only in 1999. Although the national
relevance of this party has been increasing throughout time, its local importance is still relatively small.
Besides, there are several municipalities in our sample where BE ran in one year and not in the others, which
makes it harder to perform an analysis across time.
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Table 1.1: Descriptive Statistics
Obs. Mean S.D. Min. Max.
vshare_MAPSD 942 39.08 16.09 2.3 75.9
vshare_TCCDS 688 6.06 8.52 0.4 64.4
vshare_MACDS 603 7.4 8.56 0.5 61
vshare_TCPCP 1 199 11.06 15.49 0.1 67.7
vshare_MAPCP 1 203 11.71 14.58 0.3 64.8
Panel B: Elections Results - Rank in election
vshare_TCwinner 1 232 52.1 8.68 26.8 83
vshare_AMwinner 1 232 49.44 7.99 26 75.9
vshare_TCrunner−up 1 232 32.35 8.13 9.6 48.9
vshare_AMrunner−up 1 232 32.81 7.37 12.6 48.4
win_margin 1 232 19.75 13.97 0.02 72.04
D.CM_winner_left 1 232 0.51 0.5 0 1
D.CM_winner_right 1 232 0.46 0.5 0 1
D.CM_winner_coalition 1 232 0.16 0.37 0 1
D.CM_winner_independent 1 232 0.02 0.15 0 1
Panel C: Campaign Spending Variables
crevenue_totalPS 916 74 993.72 66 695.22 646.7 565 893.5
cspending_totalPS 916 73 644.52 67 206.66 1 081.6 557 111.8
crevenue_totalPSD 679 41 409.54 51 776.89 1 230.5 609 284.2
cspending_totalPSD 679 48 623.99 55 528.4 1 417.2 555 526.1
crevenue_totalCDS 494 11 159.54 19 328.41 0 268 204.7
cspending_totalCDS 493 9 574.39 19 168.58 0 307 758.7
crevenue_totalPCP 902 21 287.7 39 991.52 0 418 164.6
cspending_totalPCP 904 15 189.82 27 384.27 0 211 409.1
crevenue_totalwinner 915 72 287.61 70 656.36 1 525.8 609 284.2
cspending_totalwinner 915 74 404.4 72 098.96 1466 638 744.5
crevenue_totalrunner−up 908 60 818.5 98 275.04 503.3 232 5565
cspending_totalrunner−up 912 58 563.57 65 303.84 1202.9 557 111.8
cspending_gap 905 15 740.52 41 803.91 -176 390 223 957.7
cspending_marketingmunicipality 924 137 047.5 145 031.9 11 450.4 1 198 516
cspending_othermunicipality 924 23 186.52 42 460.08 889.7 734 993.4
cspending_totalmunicipality 923 159 152 171 994.5 16 163.5 1 842 405
Panel D: Controls
population 1 232 33 984.48 55 298.99 418 564 657
Continued on next page
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Table 1.1: Descriptive Statistics
Obs. Mean S.D. Min. Max.
D.incumbent_running 1 202 0.72 0.45 0 1
D.incumbent_reelected 1 202 0.61 0.49 0 1
incumbent_num_terms 1 202 2.45 1.72 1 10
TC_aligned_cgov 1 160 0.53 0.5 0 1
TC_num_parties 1 232 4.24 1.11 2 10
AM_num_parties 1 232 4.08 1 2 9
Monetary values in euros (constant prices - 2010), shares in a scale of 0-100.
Panel C summarises the variables related to the campaigning revenues/spending. Notice
that the higher spender is the Socialist Party with an average of 75ek. Standard deviations
are very high in general, stressing that spending varies significantly across municipalities.15
The winner spends on average 15ek more than the runner-up, although the variability
of spending is higher for the runner-up. The average total spending in campaigning per
municipality is 159ek, of which 137ek are directly associated with marketing expenditures
(billboards, flyers, events, etc.).
Finally, Panel D describes some of the controls used. In 72% of the cases incumbents in
power run for reelection, and in 85% of the cases they are reelected. The average number of
terms that the incumbent is in power in our sample is 2.45. The number of parties running
for office varies between 2 and 10, with an average of 4.
To get further insight from the data, we can check whether some of the hypothesis defined
in the end of section 1.2.2 have support in our descriptive analysis.
First, as stated in Hypothesis 1, we want to explore whether there is a relationship between
campaign spending and the electoral results. Figure 1.5 plots the gap between the vote
shares of the winner and the runner up (winning margin), against the gap between their
15The Social Democrat Party (PSD) seems to spend less than the Socialist Party, however the former often
runs in a coalition with the People’s Party (CDS), which may bias the average of this variable downwards.
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campaign spending (campaign spending gap).
Figure 1.5: Campaign spending gap versus winning margin
The positive correlation is clear, meaning that outspending your competitor is associated
with a higher winning margin.
Second, we want to evaluate if there is empirical evidence that campaign spending across
competitors in the same municipality is correlated. Figure 1.6 plots the campaign spending
per capita of the winner and the runner up of the election.
Figure 1.6: Campaign expenditure of Winner and Runner-up
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There is a strong positive correlation between the levels of spending of the top political
competitors, meaning that when/where the winner spends more, the runner-up also spends
more. Therefore, there is evidence that when deciding the level of campaign spending,
politicians consider the expected spending of their competitors. The positive relation is
not surprising, as several determinants of campaign spending decisions are common to both
candidates, like the ego-rent (χ), the total amount of statutory allowance available in the
muncipality (T ), or even the volatility of the popularity and voter ideology distributions (δ
and σi).
Third, we also want to investigate the descriptive evidence that a higher ex-ante popularity
advantage could drive both the campaign spending decisions and the probability of being
elected. As shown in Table 1.1, around 61% of the mayors in our sample are reelected
incumbents, this could be evidence in support of the assumption stated in Hypothesis 3,
if we take incumbency advantage as a measure of ex-ante popularity advantage. However,
this does not mean that incumbents running for reelection spend less in campaigning. In
fact, a means test on the campaign spending of the winner rejects the null that campaign
spending of incumbents that are reelected is smaller than the campaign spending of first-
time winners at 5% significance level. If advantaged candidates spend more in campaigning
and win elections more often there is preliminary empirical support for the result stated in
Hypothesis 4.
Finally, we want to explore whether potential restrictions in the access to party contributions
to fund campaigning activities may condition spending decisions. According to Table 1.1,
the two biggest parties, PS and PSD, spend on average more than the two smaller parties
considered, PCP and CDS. If bigger parties (who have on average higher vote shares) have
deeper pockets, then this higher level of spending can provide preliminary evidence that
Hypothesis 5 established in our theoretical model holds. Note however, that the lower
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average campaign spending levels comes with a higher standard deviation (in relative terms)
of campaign spending for the smaller parties. The coefficient of variation for CDS and PCP
is above 1.8, meaning that these parties actively spend in campaigning, but target specific
municipalities (where voter ideological dispersion might be smaller).
1.5 Estimating campaign spending effects
To evaluate the effects of campaign spending in local elections, we would like to find the
elasticities of an election outcome variable (vote share, probability of winning or probability
of being reelected) with respect to a variable measuring the level of campaign spending of
the candidates.
In a two party set-up (j = A,B) and focusing on the vote share of candidate A, this would
be equivalent to estimating the following equation:
vshareA,i,t = β1cspendingA,i,t + β2cspendingB,i,t + ηXi,t + εi,t (1.11)
where β1 and β2 are the coefficients of interest and cspendingj,i,t is the total amount spent
in campaigning by candidate j, in municipality i, at time t, Xi,t is a vector of controls and
εi,t is the error term.
Based on the results of our theoretical model and on the preliminary statistical evidence
presented earlier, we would expect that the vote share of candidate A is positively affected by
candidate A’s campaign spending (β1 > 0) and negatively affected by candidate B’s spending
(β2 < 0). In fact, when candidate A spends more, he increases his average popularity and
by consequence he decreases the average popularity of his opponents.
The estimation of such coefficients, however, is cumbersome because of endogeneity issues,
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that could lead to biased OLS estimates. From a theoretical perspective, the bias could arise
in two confounding directions. If a politician that already thinks he is going to win (lose)
decides to spend a lot (very little), the bias would be upwards. If on the contrary, he is so
confident about the victory that he finds it useless to spend in campaigning, or if he spends
a lot because he is afraid to lose, the bias would be downwards. This bias could be even
more severe when considering that in a local election political parties may allocate campaign
spending funds strategically across municipalities, by focusing their efforts in municipalities
where they believe they could win.
Even so, OLS estimates can deepen our understanding of the relationship between campaign
spending and the vote shares. In the next sections we present these results for the two
empirical approaches: the winner/runner-up and the individual party perspectives.
1.5.1 OLS estimates: winner and runner-up
In this scenario, we formulate a variant of model (1.11), following Ben-bassat et al. (2015),
where the outcome variables are the vote share of the winner, the vote share of the runner-up
and the winning margin. If the outcome variable is the vote share of the winner we estimate:
vsharewinner,i,t =β1cspendingwinner,i,t + β2cspendingrunner−up,i,t + ηXi,t + εi,t (1.12)
where cspendingwinner,i,t is the campaign expenditure of the candidate that won the elec-
tion, in thousand euros, and cspendingrunner−up,i,t is defined analogously and εi,t is the error
term. The vector of controls, Xi,t includes municipal fixed effects, time dummies and a set
of political controls, as well as the population level and variable to account for the total
campaign spending of parties that ran in the municipality but ended up in third place or
lower, cspendingmun,i,t. Results are shown in Table 1.2.
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Table 1.2: OLS estimates, using spending of winner and runner up.
vsharewinner vsharerunner−up win_margin
(1) (2) (3)
cspendingwinner 0.015 -0.005 0.020
[0.011] [0.009] [0.016]
cspendingrunner−up -0.035∗∗∗ 0.055∗∗∗ -0.090∗∗∗
[0.009] [0.011] [0.018]
cspendingmun -0.021∗∗ -0.017∗∗∗ -0.004
[0.008] [0.005] [0.010]
N 903 903 903
R2 0.288 0.174 0.179
F 19.723 11.211 11.897
p 0.000 0.000 0.000
Campaign spending variables in thousands. All regressions include fixed
effects, time dummies and controls. Robust and clustered standard errors
at municipal level. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
In the first column, we see that although the spending of the winner has virtually no effect
on its vote share, the spending of the runner-up has a negative effect. On the contrary,
column (2) shows that the spending of the runner-up seems to affect positively his vote share,
while the effect of the spending of the winner is not significant. In both cases, campaign
spending of other parties has a negative effect on the vote shares. The effects of spending
in the winning margin are analogous. In terms of magnitudes, an increase of 1000 euros in
campaign spending of the runner-up leads to a boost of 0.06pp in his own vote share and a
decline of 0.04pp in the vote share of the winner. Therefore, particularly for the runner-up
the assumptions embodied in Hypothesis 1 seem to have empirical support.
Notice that this approach covers virtually all the 308 municipalities in the three elections
(308 × 3 = 924). Table A.5, in Appendix A.2, shows that contestability reduces both the
vote shares and the winning margin, as in the party level specification. When the incumbent
mayor runs for reelection the vote share of the winner increases, with a corresponding re-
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duction the vote share of the runner-up. The number of terms that the incumbent has been
is power seems to have a relatively small effect on the vote share. Together, these findings
provide support to our model assumptions, namely as stated in Hypothesis 3.
1.5.2 OLS estimates: individual parties
When analysing the campaign spending effects of individual parties, following Fink (2012),
for each of the four main parties we estimate:
vshareA,i,t = β1cspendingA,i,t + ηXi,t + γi + λt + εi,t (1.13)
where cspendingA,i,t represents total campaign spending of party A, measured in thou-
sand euros. The vector of controls is defined as before, including a variable that accounts
for the total amount spent in campaigning in the municipality by parties other than A,
cspending_muni,t. Results are shown in Table 1.3.
All the coefficients in the main diagonal are positive and statistically significant, meaning that
each party’s own spending is positively correlated with its vote share. Campaign spending
of other parties in the same municipality, in turn, decreases the vote share of the party
analysed. Again, the correlation of campaign spending and vote shares supports Hypothesis
1.
Notice that, in this case, by construction, our estimates include only municipalities where the
party which vote share we use as outcome variable runs individually, with no pre-electoral
coalition with another party in the three elections. Consequently, in Table 1.3 the number
of included observations for each regression ranges between 464, for CDS, and 914 for PS.
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Table 1.3: OLS estimates, using spending by 4 biggest parties.
vsharePS vsharePSD vshareCDS vsharePCP
(1) (2) (3) (4)
cspendingPS 0.083∗∗∗
[0.015]
cspendingPSD 0.090∗∗∗
[0.022]
cspendingCDS 0.135∗∗
[0.061]
cspendingPCP 0.057∗∗∗
[0.020]
cspendingmun -0.046∗∗∗ -0.059∗∗∗ -0.007 -0.016∗∗∗
[0.007] [0.019] [0.006] [0.004]
N 914 675 464 892
R2 0.141 0.353 0.120 0.107
F 10.837 20.579 3.376 7.010
p 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000
Campaign spending variables in thousands. Each column represents a
separate regression, where the vote share of each of the four biggest party
is used as outcome variable. All regressions include fixed effects, time
dummies and controls. Robust and clustered standard errors at municipal
level. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Instead of using the total spending of other parties in the municipality, cspending_muni,t, we
could explore the interactions between the campaign spending of these four parties separately.
Table A.4, in Appendix A.2, shows these effects. Again, the coefficients in the main diagonal
show a positive effect of own campaign spending on the vote shares. Also, the off-diagonal
elements show that spending of competitors negatively affects your own vote share.16
Tables A.3 and A.4 detail the effects of the controls included in the regressions. In both
16We prefer the former specification because the number of observations included is considerably higher,
particularly for the bigger parties. In fact, by assessing the individual effects of spending of all parties in
the vote shares, we are constraining the sample to include only municipalities where the four parties run
individuallydiria and simultaneously in the three election episodes.
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cases, the set of controls seems to tell the same story. Contestability (a higher number
of candidates) reduces the vote shares. Incumbency advantage also matters, although the
direction of the effect seems to differ depending on the party. Finally, the alignment of the
mayor in power before the election with the central government seems to have mixed effects.
Although these estimates seem to support that campaign spending is relevant, it is important
to address potential endogeneity issues. If they are present, the coefficients may be biased
and, as discussed, the direction of the bias is not obvious.
1.6 Identification Approach: Expected Statutory Allowance
Literature has dealt with the inherent endogeneity of estimating the effects of campaign
spending on electoral results mainly by using the particularities of the elections or by re-
sorting to instrumental variable estimation. Silveira and Mello (2011) and Ben-bassat et al.
(2015) focus on repeated elections, while Fink (2012) argues that the characteristics of a par-
tisan proportional representation system minimise the simulaneity issues. Green and Krasno
(1990), on the other hand, use lagged campaign spending as an instrumental variable to
access the contemporaneous effects of campaign spending. Other instrumental variables in-
clude candidate quality (Gerber, 1998 and Green and Krasno, 1988), the tightness of the
race (Erikson and Palfrey, 2000) or the population size of the constituency (Gerber, 1998).
In this work, we follow an instrumental variable approach, based on the exogenous rules that
govern local political campaigns in Portugal, described in Section 1.3.1 and in Appendix A.1.
Particularly, we focus on the value of the statutory allowance candidates expect to get from
the central government.
The choice of the instrument is framed in our theoretical model and justified by its suitable
properties. On one hand, being the main source of funding for political campaigns, its value
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(or the expectation of it) is likely to be a key determinant of the actual amount spent in
campaigning. On the other hand, the rules that determine the exact amount of SA received
are out of the scope of candidates’ control is several dimensions. This is apparent upon closer
inspection of equation (1.10).
First, candidates do not know how many opponents they are going to face in each election,
nor whether these opponents are going to fulfil the criteria to be entitled to public funding,
which affects directly the fixed component of the SA received. Second, they do not know
how well they are going to perform, compared to the other candidates, which influences
directly the variable component of the SA. Finally, the actual amount of money available to
be distributed as the SA, the TMSA, also varies across elections, depending on the spending
limit threshold where the municipality is placed and the actual indexing value used to convert
these thresholds into a spending limit in euros.17
In principle, a candidate would be willing to spend exactly the amount of the public spending
that he is entitled. Otherwise, either he spends more and will need to find additional resources
(like party contributions) to cover the campaign costs, or he spends less and will be "wasting"
potential campaigning resources he could be entitled to.
Our approach is precisely to compute the expected statutory allowance (ESA) each candidate
anticipates to get in a given election. If the election occurs at t, the ESA is determined
considering the rules in place at t and the figures that describe the electoral competition
stance from the previous election, in t − 1 (which includes the electoral results and the
number of parties running for office in t− 1).
In particular, we adapt the statutory allowance (SA) formula, given by equation (1.10),
17The number of eligible voters that defines the spending threshold of a municipality is published by the
Ministry of Internal Affairs in the months prior to the election, this could affect the campaign spending
decisions, particularly for municipalities near the threshold limits. Additionally, the indexing value in place
in every election is defined by the central government and its value changed throughout our sample, leading
to different spending limits for municipalities in the same threshold across time (as shown in Table A.2).
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to reflect the best possible information available when candidates are deciding the level of
campaign spending. For party j, in municipality i, in period t the ESA is given by:
ESAj,i,t = fixed_componentj,i,t + variable_componentj,i,t
=
1∑
j partiesj,i,t−1
× 0.25× TMSAi,t + vshare_MAj,i,t−1∑
j vshare_MAj,i,t−1
× 0.75× TMSAi,t
Notice that by using the TMSA of period t we assume that candidates known the legal
framework in place when they define the campaign spending level for the election. To
account for the political stance, we assume that the best guess for each individual candidate
is to assume what happened in the previous election. This justifies the use of the number of
parties that ran in t−1 (∑j parties) and the Municipal Assembly vote shares of the previous
period (vshare_MA).
To illustrate, consider the case of the Socialist party (PS), in the municipality of Aveiro in
the 2009 election. The data necessary to determine the ESA is given in Table 1.4.
Table 1.4: ESA for PS in the 2009 election.
year SL TMSA num_parties vshare_TC vshare_MA
∑
vshare_MA
2005 370 934e 556 401e 4 29.81% 31.2% 94.5%
2009 385 867e 578 801e 5 34.65% 33.99% 96.3%
Values at constant prices (2010).
The ESA is obtained based on the TMSA for Aveiro in 2009 and the electoral results of the
2005 election in Aveiro. The fixed component is obtained dividing the fixed proportion of the
TMSA of 2009 by the number of parties that fulfilled the criteria to receive the allowance in
the 2005 election [4]. The variable portion of the TMSA that PS receives receives depends
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on the vote share (in the Municipal Assembly) that PS got in the 2001 election [31.2%] in
Aveiro, as a proportion of the share of total valid votes in the election [94.5%]. Using the
formula, the ESA amounts to 179 497e.18 In reality, the Socialist party spent in the 2009
election 178 492.71e in campaigning and received a statutory allowance of 175 463.14e
from the central government.
Note that our main outcome variable of interest is the vote share in the Town Council, as
this is what determines who is the Mayor of the municipality. The instrument, although, is
calculated according to the votes casted for the Municipal Assembly in the prior election (as
these are the results used to distribute the statutory allowance in reality). Although these
shares are strongly correlated, they do not coincide in most cases.19
We use the ESA to instrument campaign spending in a two stage least squares set-up:
(1st stage) cspendingj,i,t = θ1ESAj,i,t + ηXi,t + vi,t
(2nd stage) vsharej,i,t = β1cspendingj,i,t
∧
+ ηXi,t + εi,t
(1.14)
where vharej,i,t may refer, depending on the specification, to the vote shares of the winner/runner-
up or the vote shares of the four main parties in municipality i and time t. Xi,t is a set of
controls, that include municipal dummies, time dummies, political and demographic vari-
ables, as well as measures of campaign spending done by other parties in the municipality.
Again, we construct the instrumental variable to encompass the two perspectives of our
analysis. First, we create a variable to measure the ESA for the winner and the runner-
up of the election. Second, we proceed similarly for the four most relevant parties in local
Portuguese elections (PS, PSD, CDS and PCP).
18That is, ESAPS,Aveiro,2009 = 14 × 0.25× 556401 + 31.294.5 × 0.75× 556401 = 179497
19The correlation for the four main parties is above 0.98. However the difference between the vote share
obtained in the Town Council and the Municipal Assembly differs depending on the party and spans between
-7.9 and 21.6 for the Socialist Party, for instance. More details about the difference in the vote shares are
available in Table A.6.
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The summary statistics for our instrumental variables are presented in Table A.7, for both
approaches described. The expected statutory allowance computed shows the relative differ-
ences between the parties, with the two biggest parties having significantly higher average
values. The averages for the winner and the runner-up are also high. It is also important
to note that the variability of the instrumental variable is high, shown by high standard
deviations (in particular for the smaller parties, relative to the average) and by the large
ranges in all cases.
1.6.1 ESA: winner and runner-up
To compute the ESA in the winner and runner-up perspective we start by identifying the
top two contenders in the election occurring in t. We then use the electoral results of the
election in t−1 as their best possible guess about their performance in t. Importantly, when
we look backwards for the electoral results, we use the one’s corresponding to the parties
identified in the first step, irrespective of their ranking in the prior election. If, for instance,
party A won the election in t, but ended in third place in the prior election, this is the vote
share that we use to compute the ESA (not the vote share of the winner in t− 1).
Figure 1.7 exhibits the high correlation between our expected statutory allowance and the
actual campaign spending, for the winner and the runner-up.
As discussed before, an important advantage of this approach is that it includes coalitions
of parties and independent candidates, whenever they end up in the top two places. As
a result, the computation of this variable is somehow complex, requiring a set of technical
assumptions when we measure backward performance. These assumptions are presented in
detail in Appendix A.3.1.
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Figure 1.7: ESA vs. actual campaign spending (winner and runner-up).
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1.6.2 ESA: individual parties
In the individual parties’ specification, as discussed, we focus on the four biggest local parties
running for local office. Recall that in this approach we are, by construction excluding all
parties that do not run consistently in a municipality. Consequently, tracking the record of
those parties is relatively simple, which is reflected on the construction of the ESA.
To compute the ESA for each party in election t, we use the rules in place at t, while using
the lagged performance of the party in the previous election as the best possible guess of its
performance in the election at t.
In Figure 1.8 we show the correlation of the ESA of each party with their actual spending
in campainging.
Again, there is a clear positive correlation, particularly for the Socialist party and for the
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Figure 1.8: ESA vs. actual campaign spending (PS, PSD, CDS and PCP).
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cases where both campaign spending (and the ESA) are lower (excluding the top outliers).
The positive correlations found both in Figures 1.7 and 1.8 highlight how the expectation
about the amount of public statutory allowance to be received influences spending, which
supports both our theoretical modelling assumptions (as stated in Hypothesis 2 ) and our
empirical identification.
1.7 Causal Effects of Campaigning
1.7.1 IV estimates: winner and runner-up
In the winner and runner-up perspective we estimate the model described by equation (1.12),
using the 2SLS method, as shown in equation (1.14). Depending on the specification, we
instrument campaign spending with the ESA, computed as explained in Section 1.6.1, for
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the winner, the runner-up, or both. Table 1.5 shows the results.
Table 1.5: Campaign Spending effects on vote shares, winner and runner-up. (IV Estimation)
vshare_TCwinner vshare_TCrunner−up win_margin
1st Stage 2nd Stage 1st Stage 2nd Stage 1st Stage 1st Stage 2nd Stage
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
cspendingwinner 0.036 0.069 -0.015 0.198
[0.026] [0.068] [0.012] [0.147]
ESAwinner 0.548∗∗∗ 0.518∗∗∗ 0.169
[0.136] [0.144] [0.113]
cspendingrunner−up 0.090 -0.038∗∗∗ 0.139∗∗∗ -0.350∗∗
[0.088] [0.009] [0.045] [0.168]
ESArunner−up 0.448∗∗∗ 0.302∗∗ 0.441∗∗∗
[0.095] [0.131] [0.096]
cspendingmun -0.031 -0.019∗∗ 0.001 -0.018∗∗∗ -0.040 0.007 0.009
[0.065] [0.009] [0.030] [0.006] [0.062] [0.033] [0.019]
N 903 903 903 903 903 903 903
R2 0.283 0.282 0.220 0.066 0.300 0.226 -
F 11.021 18.927 12.848 9.562 12.956 14.060 7.993
p 0.000 - 0.000 - 0.000 0.000 -
F-test excl. 16.31 - 22.10 - 13.27 11.8 -
p 0.000 - 0.000 - 0.000 0.000 -
Campaign spending variables are measured in thousand euros (at 2010 prices), vote shares are between 0-100 and the winning
margin is measured in percentage points. All regressions include fixed effects, time dummies and controls. Controls include the
population level, a dummy variable equal to 1 if the incumbent is running for reelection, the number of terms that the mayor in
power at the time of the election has been in power, as well as a variable that accounts for the number of candidates running
for the election. We also include a dummy whenever the candidate is aligned with a party in the central government. Standard
errors are robust and clustered at municipal level. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
In columns (1) and (2) the outcome variable is the vote share of the winner candidate. The
first stage, in column (1), shows that the expected statutory allowance is a good predictor
of the level of campaign spending of the winner and that the spending of the runner-up has
positive (albeit not significant) impact on the spending of the winner. Even so, only the
spending of the runner-up (and to a smaller extent the spending of the remaining parties in
the municipality) seem to affect the vote share of the winner. The coefficient of the spending
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of the winner has the expected sign, but it is not statically significant.20
A similar specification is applied using the vote share of the runner-up as the outcome
variable, reported in columns (3) and (4). The first stage shows that the expected statutory
allowance explains fairly well the campaign spending level, with both the spending of the
winner and of the remaining parties in the municipality having a positive (not significant)
effect. In this case, the second stage shows a strong effect of the instrumented campaign
spending (of the runner-up) in his own vote share. An increase of 1 000e leads to an increase
of the vote share of 0.14pp, this effect is significant at the 1% level. Although this effect may
seem small, for the average runner-up, who spends 58ek, this effect means that campaign
spending accounts for 8.12pp.
Finally, we evaluate the impact of campaign spending in the winning margin. We do so
by instrumenting both the spending of the winner and the runner-up with their expected
statutory allowance. The results of the corresponding first stages are consistent with the
previous specifications. In the second stage, we observe that the spending of the winner
increases the size of the winning margin, while the opposite happens for the spending of
the runner-up (significant up to the 5% level). In practice, an increase of a 1 000e of the
spending of the runner-up has a combined effect over the vote share of both the winner and
runner-up that translates to the reduction of the winning margin by 0.35pp.
In all cases, the F-test for excluded instruments is above 10 meaning that our instrument
is relevant in explaining the campaign spending decisions of the winner and the runner-up.
The under identification test and the multivariate test of excluded instruments also point
in the same direction. The exogenous variation in spending that we capture with our IV
approach seems to indicate that the OLS estimates, shown in Table 1.2, have a downward
bias.
20In this specification we only instrument the spending of the winner with the corresponding expected
statutory allowance. The spending of the runner-up is not instrumented.
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Overall, Table 1.5 seems to show that while most of the coefficients of campaign spending
have the expected signs, only the spending of the runner-up can have actual effects on the
vote share. Several studies, like Jacobson (1990), Palda and Palda (1998), Moon (2006) or
Benoit and Marsh (2008), showed that incumbent (the majority of our winners) spending
may have smaller effects than spending of challengers (the majority of our runner-ups).21
In our case, as Table A.8 in Appendix A.4 shows, campaign spending of the winner affects his
vote share in a significant manner up to the introduction of the political controls. Specifically,
the coefficient of the dummy variable that is equal to one whenever the incumbent is running
for re-election seems to affect the vote share in an important manner, both in terms of size
and statistical significance. Interestingly, this does not mean that the winner spends less
in campaigning.22 The same variable is also significant in explaining the amount spent in
campaigning, as it is clear from the estimation of the first stage equation shown in column
(7), of Table 1.5.23
Thus, a possible explanation for the lack of significance of the winner’s campaign spending
may be associated with some particularly high incumbency advantage.24 As discussed in
Magee (2012), campaign spending of the incumbent is relevant mostly when he feels threat-
ened by strong challenger, thus a high incumbency advantage may be associated with a lower
effect of winner’s spending.
At this point, it is useful to revisit our theoretical Hypothesis, defined in the end of Section
1.2.2 to check which of those have empirical support in our empirical exercise.
First, in all cases, the expected statutory allowance has a strong positive correlation with
21In fairness, the debate about the relevance of incumbent vs challenger is long lasting, and there is also
evidence in that spending of incumbent also matters Gerber (1998), Erikson and Palfrey (2000), Samuels
(2001) and Benoit and Marsh (2003).
22As shown in Section 3.3 he actually spends more.
23The details about the impact of the controls in the case of the runner-up are also provided in Table A.9.
The point estimate of the effect of runner-up spending in is own vote share is stable across specifications.
24Recall that in our sample in 61% of the cases the winner of the election is an incumbent seeking reelection.
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campaign spending decisions, which supports Hypothesis 2. Second, regarding the effects of
campaign spending on the vote shares, all the coefficients of the runner-up have the expected
sign: a positive sign for own spending and a negative for competitor’s spending. This
supports Hypothesis 1, at least for the runner-up.
The role of the ex-ante popularity wedge, x, is particularly evident for the case of the winner,
if we take incumbency advantage as a proxy for a positive popularity wedge. As discussed,
although incumbency advantage drives the campaign spending of the winner upwards it also
affects directly directly the vote share in a sizeable manner reducing the scope of effectiveness
of campaign spending per se, which supports Hypothesis 3 and partially supports Hypothesis
4.
Finally, in this set-up it is not clear how the tightness in access to party contributions to
fund campaigning, kj, affects spending decisions and the vote shares. However, given that
the top contenders for office in local Portuguese elections are often the two biggest parties
in our sample, this approach may not be the best to evaluate our theoretical claims from
Hypothesis 5. In fact, if the availability of party resources is correlated with party size, these
two parties (and their candidates) would have similar kj.
1.7.2 IV estimates: individual parties
The approach followed in the previous section does not allow for a discussion about campaign
spending effects depending on the parties involved. In reality, different parties may spend
in campaigning in a different manner, and that spending may affect vote shares in different
ways. The individual parties’ perspective enables this kind of analysis, particularly given
that our sample covers four parties of different sizes, that encompass a good portion of the
political spectrum.
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Table 1.6: Campaign spending effects on vote shares, party level. (IV Estimation)
vshare_TCPS vshare_TCPSD vshare_TCCDS vshare_TCPCP
1st Stage 2nd Stage 1st Stage 2nd Stage 1st Stage 2nd Stage 1st Stage 2nd Stage
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
cspendingPS 0.082∗∗∗
[0.031]
ESAPS 0.600∗∗∗
[0.110]
cspendingPSD 0.188∗
[0.110]
ESAPSD 0.483∗∗
[0.191]
cspendingCDS -0.055
[0.211]
ESACDS 0.404∗∗
[0.157]
cspendingPCP 0.157
[0.106]
ESAPCP 0.356∗∗
[0.137]
cspending_mun 0.086∗∗ -0.047∗∗∗ 0.069 -0.112∗∗∗ -0.034 -0.008 0.032 -0.022∗∗∗
[0.036] [0.009] [0.045] [0.024] [0.042] [0.011] [0.019] [0.008]
N 890 890 568 568 188 188 604 604
R2 0.260 0.1296 0.320 0.3550 0.213 0.069 0.106 0.057
F-stat 12.696 7.822 14.895 17.806 4.220 1.762 4.030 4.331
p 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.090 0.000 0.000
F-test excl. 29.64 - 6.42 - 6.57 - 6.74 -
p 0.000 - 0.012 . 0.012 - 0.010 -
Campaign spending variables are measured in thousand euros (at 2010 prices), vote shares are between 0-100 and the winning margin is
measured in percentage points. All regressions include fixed effects, time dummies and controls. Controls include the population level,
a dummy variable equal to 1 if the incumbent is running for reelection, the number of terms that the mayor in power at the time of the
election has been in power, as well as a variable that accounts for the number of candidates running for the election. We also include a
dummy whenever the candidate is aligned with a party in the central government. Standard errors are robust and clustered at municipal
level. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
In this case, we estimate the model described by equation (1.13) , using the 2SLS method,
as shown in equation (1.14). Table 1.6 summarizes the results of our IV estimation, where
the columns (1), (3), (5) and (7) present the estimation of the first stage equations and the
remaining the corresponding second stages.
In all cases, the expected statutory allowance has a positive effect on the actual spending in
the election, at least at 5% significance level. The difference in the coefficients across parties
is mostly associated with the variability in spending across the different parties (Panel C of
Table 1.1).
In the second stage, we find a positive effect of the instrumented spending in the vote share
for PS, PSD and PCP, although this effect if not statistically significant for the latter. For
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the Socialist Party, for instance an increase of 1000e in campaign spending increases the
vote share by 0.08pp, which for the average Socialist candidate accounts for around 6% of
his vote share, which is a relatively sizeable portion of the Socialist party’s sample average
vote share (39%). On the other hand, as expected, the spending of other parties in the
same municipality has always a negative (generally significant) effect on vote shares. For
the Social Democrat party (PSD), the point estimate is even higher (suggesting an impact
of campaign spending on the the vote share of the mean PSD candidate of aronnd 9pp).
The F-test of excluded instruments is only above 10 for the Socialist Party, however for the
remaining parties the instrument is significant at the 5% level. It is important to notice
that the amount of observations captured in this approach varies significantly across parties,
which may affect the significance of the results for other parties aside from the Socialist
Party. In Appendix A.4 we provide more detailed tables per party, reporting the effects of
our control variables.
The results of this specification can also be connected to our theoretical assumptions and
findings. For the two biggest parties, own campaign spending increases vote shares and
competitor’s campaign spending reduces it (as stated in Hypothesis 1 ). For all parties, the
expected statutory allowance seems to have a high impact on campaign spending decision
(Hypothesis 2 ).
Finally, in this set-up it seems clear that bigger parties, with perhaps deeper pockets not
only spend more, but are more able to spend in a way that it influences the vote shares.
This shows that in fact the tightness in the access to party funds, kj, to finance campaigning
matters for spending decisions and spending efficiency, as stated in Hypothesis 5.
Combined, our two specifications seem to support the choice of our empirical strategy and to
provide empirical support for our modelling assumptions and main theoretical prescriptions.
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It is important to note that, given the nature of our identification strategy, we are capturing
effects of campaign spending that could be seen as a lower bound of the overall effects. As
we are instrumenting spending with the expected statutory allowance based on prior election
results, our first stage captures mostly the spending levels that are necessary to keep the
same vote share that was obtained in the last election (consolidation spending). In our set-up
we are not targeting changes in campaign spending strategies that could make a runner-up
of a former election become a winner of the current election, for instance. In such cases,
campaign spending effects could be even higher.
1.7.3 Excluding flagship municipalities
An important robustness check for our results is to guarantee that our findings are not driven
by a small subset of municipalities.
To that extent, we replicate Table 1.5 and Table 1.6 removing the 18 district capitals and the
capitals of the Autonomous Regions. In reality, the electoral results in these municipalities
are more visible at the national level and spending in such municipalities could be driven by
non-local reasons. Removing these flagship municipalities could thus increase the confidence
in our estimates.
Results associated with the winner and runner-up perspective are quantitatively similar, as
shown in Table 1.7. In this case, the spending of the runner-up still appears to be more
relevant in affecting both the vote share of the winner and of the runner-up (columns (1) to
(4)).
When we use the winning margin as outcome variable, however, the significance of the results
disappears upon excluding the flagship municipalities. Even so, the size and the sign of the
coefficients remain.
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Table 1.7: Campaign spending effects: winner and runner-up (No flagship municipalities)
vshare_TCwinner vshare_TCrunner−up win_margin
1st Stage 2nd Stage 1st Stage 2nd Stage 1st Stage 1st Stage 2nd Stage
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
cspendingwinner 0.058 0.010 -0.010 0.331
[0.039] [0.087] [0.015] [0.371]
ESAwinner 0.449∗∗∗ 0.398∗∗∗ 0.165
[0.126] [0.132] [0.133]
cspendingrunner−up 0.034 -0.041∗∗∗ 0.140∗∗∗ -0.471
[0.098] [0.011] [0.051] [0.380]
ESArunner−up 0.461∗∗∗ 0.315∗∗∗ 0.431∗∗∗
[0.090] [0.116] [0.093]
cspendingmun 0.041 -0.031∗∗ 0.050 -0.027∗ 0.018 0.059 0.014
[0.065] [0.014] [0.046] [0.014] [0.054] [0.049] [0.037]
N 845 845 845 845 845 845 845
R2 0.291 0.283 0.196 0.093 0.318 0.206 -
F 10.173 17.816 9.973 8.446 12.717 10.709 5.878
p 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
F-test excl. 12.73 - 26.30 - 14.59 13.58 -
p 0.000 - 0.000 - 0.000 0.000 -
Campaign spending variables are measured in thousand euros (at 2010 prices), vote shares are between 0-100 and the winning
margin is measured in percentage points. All regressions include fixed effects, time dummies and controls. Controls include the
population level, a dummy variable equal to 1 if the incumbent is running for reelection, the number of terms that the mayor in
power at the time of the election has been in power, as well as a variable that accounts for the number of candidates running
for the election. We also include a dummy whenever the candidate is aligned with a party in the central government. Standard
errors are robust and clustered at municipal level. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 1.8 shows that the results for the individual party specification, excluding flagship
municipalities, are very similar to our baseline specification. In that, the instrument seems
to work even better, as the F-test of excluded instruments is above 10 for PCP and closer
to 10 for PSD.
In this case, the campaign spending of PS, PSD and PCP have a positive effect on the vote
share, while competitors’ spending reduces the vote share. The magnitude of the effects is
also very similar, if not higher.
The fact that our baseline results survive the exclusion of the municipalities where campaign
spending may be driven by different factors, supports our main conclusions. On one hand,
the instrument still captures the exogenous movement in campaign spending and on the
other hand, it identifies a statistically significant effect of campaign spending to ensure the
consolidation of vote shares across elections.
We also conducted an additional robustness check by excluding campaign spending outliers.
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Table 1.8: Campaign spending effects on vote shares, party level. (No flagship municipalities)
vshare_TCPS vshare_TCPSD vshare_TCCDS vshare_TCPCP
1st Stage 2nd Stage 1st Stage 2nd Stage 1st Stage 2nd Stage 1st Stage 2nd Stage
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
cspendingPS 0.102∗∗
[0.048]
ESAPS 0.520∗∗∗
[0.111]
cspendingPSD 0.156∗
[0.087]
ESAPSD 0.574∗∗∗
[0.187]
cspendingCDS 0.084
[0.453]
ESAPS 0.205
[0.133]
cspendingPCP 0.197∗
[0.108]
ESAPCP 0.375∗∗∗
[0.108]
cspendingmun 0.100∗∗∗ -0.055∗∗∗ 0.055 -0.111∗∗∗ 0.022 -0.015 0.026 -0.026∗∗∗
[0.037] [0.013] [0.043] [0.023] [0.033] [0.015] [0.020] [0.009]
N 834 834 538 538 168 168 553 553
R2 0.269 0.129 0.349 0.367 0.161 0.156 0.163 0.078
F 12.105 7.001 14.184 16.992 2.571 1.473 4.251 3.691
p 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.010 0.1760 0.000 0.000
F-test excl. 22.10 - 9.41 - 2.35 - 12.01 -
p 0.000 - 0.003 - 0.1302 - 0.000 -
Campaign spending variables are measured in thousand euros (at 2010 prices), vote shares are between 0-100 and the winning margin
is measured in percentage points. All regressions include fixed effects, time dummies and controls. Controls include the population
level, a dummy variable equal to 1 if the incumbent is running for reelection, the number of terms that the mayor in power at the
time of the election has been in power, as well as a variable that accounts for the number of candidates running for the election.
We also include a dummy whenever the candidate is aligned with a party in the central government. Standard errors are robust and
clustered at municipal level. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Given the high variability of our data, these observations could be skewing our results.
Removing mild and severe outliers does not change the baseline conclusions also.25 As this
robustness check is highly correlated with the one presented (high levels of spending typically
occur in the most important municipalities), we chose to present the former.
25We define outliers as observations that lie outside the following intervals. i) an observation is a mild
outlier when xi /∈ [Q1 − 1.5(Q3 − Q1);Q3 + 1.5(Q3 − Q1)] ii) an observation is a severe outlier when
xi /∈ [Q1 − 3(Q3 −Q1);Q3 + 3(Q3 −Q1)]. In practice, we calculated the boundaries of these intervals for all
spending variables and then re-estimated the equations removing all the observations outside these intervals.
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1.8 Conclusion
This paper contributes to the literature on campaign spending in a context where public
funds cover a substantial part of the total spent by the political candidates.
Our theoretical model is a stylised two-period probabilistic voting model, expanded to include
the effects of campaign spending. In a two party world, we assume candidates chose cam-
paign spending levels, while trying to take as much advantage as possible from the expected
statutory allowance provided by the central government. We allow candidates to differ in
terms of their ex-ante popularity level and their access to private (party contribution) funds
to finance campaign spending.
Campaign spending can be used to influence the average popularity of the candidates in a
given municipality. We argue that spending increases exposure and thus affects positively
the candidate’s popularity. Differences in terms of ex-ante popularity and access to party
contributions to fund campaigning lead to different equilibrium outcomes.
We then conduct an empirical exercise using a novel database that we construct based on
the campaign spending reports submitted by candidates to the Portuguese Constitutional
Court. Our database includes local campaign expenditures for all the parties running in the
Portuguese local elections of 2005, 2009 and 2013, covering all the 308 Portuguese munici-
palities.
Our empirical exercise is grounded on the theoretical part in that we use the expected statu-
tory allowance candidates think they might receive after the election as an instrumental
variable for the campaign spending.
We perform the analysis from two perspectives. First, in the winner and runner-up perspec-
tive, we focus on the two biggest contenders for office and find that, while spending of the
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runner-up increases his vote share and decreases the winners’ vote share, campaign spending
of the winner seems to be less relevant, particularly when we control for incumbency advan-
tage. In practice, for the average runner-up campaign spending accounts for around 8pp of
his vote share.
Second, we focus on the spending patterns of individual parties, by evaluating the impacts
of the campaign spending by the four biggest parties in Portugal. In this case, we find that
campaign spending effects are more robust (and sizeable) for the two biggest parties. For
the average Socialist party candidate, for instance, campaign spending accounts for around
6pp of his vote share.
Our results are more robust for bigger parties and for the runner-up of the election and are
robust to the exclusion of twenty flagship municipalities, where spending decisions could be
driven by non-local factors.
Finally, we contribute to a nascent literature on the campaign spending effects on local
elections. Most research so far has been done for general or state elections, both focusing
on national and local level campaigning. To the best of our knowledge, except for Benoit
and Marsh (2003) and Ben-bassat et al. (2015) there are no other local election studies
available up to this point. However, the study of campaigning in local elections, provided that
the information available is reliable, could enrich substantially the knowledge of campaign
spending effects.
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Chapter 2
Central Government Performance and Lo-
cal Election outcomes: A randomized ex-
periment 1
2.1 Introduction
The recent debate about how the so-called fake news may have influenced, e.g., the U.S.
2016 presidential election, the Brexit vote or the recent 2018 Brasilian election has sparked a
renewed interest about the role of information on electoral outcomes (Allcott and Gentzkow
2017, King et al. 2017). Pre-electoral periods are abundant in official campaign coverage,
interviews, op-eds, and other stories where political agents either self-promote or attack other
candidates. It is of crucial importance to understand how people react to this information
when shaping their perceptions and making voting or other political participation decisions.
In this paper, we analyse the role of information about the central government incumbent on
the voter’s perception about the central government and electoral choices in local elections.
We perform a randomised experiment that exposed 1800 students of two business schools
1This chapter was written in co-authorship with Diogo Mendes, Cláudia Custódio and Susana Peralta.
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in Lisbon to a bundle of information, based on mainstream newspapers, about the central
government in power during the 2017 Portuguese local election, held on October 1st. News
were selected to encompass several subjects of the central government action, in several policy
areas, raging from more aggregate level (Public Finance, Pensions and Youth Employment)
to fields where central government policy has a closer connection with local politics (National
Health Service, Road Safety and Education). Importantly, we selected two news stories
from the same news outlet, conveying a negative and positive message about the central
government action in the same policy area.
The treatment was comprised 12 different questionnaires, with 6 versions conveying positive
information, and the remaining 6 comparable negative information about the same policy
areas. Each questionnaire included a bundle of information with two news articles adapted
from mainstream national media outlets, a graph and picture.2 The control group was
subject to neutral information about a Portuguese, not endangered, dog breed. We collected
a set of socio-demographic and political information in a baseline survey, and implemented
the treatment in the two weeks prior to the election episode. In the week after the election a
follow-up survey was implemented, to gather information about the actual voting follow-up
in the 2017 election.
Our main result is that only negative information has a significant effect on the general
perception of government performance; by contrast, when asked about their perception of
central government performance on the specific policy area covered in the news story, both
positive and negative news matter. These findings are in accordance with other studies,
that find evidence of information negativity bias in non-political contexts. Baumeister et al.
(2001) discuss the reasons why negative information/experiences have stronger effects in a
2The graph was produced with actual data to support/strengthen the information conveyed by the article,
in a way that graphs associated with corresponding positive and negative articles were visually similar. The
picture was the same for each subject, irrespective of the tone of the information.
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broad range of psychological phenomena. In experimental economics, Olsen (2015) assesses
whether satisfaction and dissatisfaction equivalent measures have similar effects on the eval-
uation of Danish hospital services. James and Moseley (2014) performed a field experiment
in two British municipalities, showing that information about low absolute performance on
waste recycling services lowers citizen satisfaction (with no corresponding effects for positive
information).
Some strands of literature also frame negativity bias within the context of political behaviour.
James and John (2007) study the impact of performance information publication and elec-
toral support for incumbent, finding that incumbents with low performance are punished in
the polls. In a theoretical and empirical work, Lockwood and Rockey (2015) show that voter
loss aversion affects electoral competition and outcomes.
Our second research question pertains to voters using their local vote to punish or reward the
central government. The link between the perceived performance of the central government
and local voting behaviour can happen due to at least three reasons. First, voters can see the
party system as a selection mechanism for local candidates (Geys and Vermeir, 2014), hence
if the party in power at the central level is performing well, local candidates politically aligned
with the central government can be perceived as more competent and capable. Second, voters
may expect to benefit from having a mayor with close relations with the central power (Fiva
and Halse, 2016). Finally, local elections can be seen as second order elections, hence voting
behaviour in such elections can be a channel to send a message of approval/punishment to
the central government (Marien et al., 2015).
We explore the effects of the information on the intention to vote for Socialist Party, the
head of the government in power at the central level when the election occurred. Overall,
we find no evidence of average treatment effects, possibly due to treatment dilution Angrist
(2006), i.e., unobserved characteristics, like prior exposure to external information, may
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imply non-compliance or protocol deviations. As a result, the treatment administered in
our paper may be an intent-to-treat. We explore this avenue with a two-stage least square
analysis as suggested by Angrist (2006). In the first stage, we instrument the performance
perception about the central government on the treatment dummies (which corresponds to
our first question) and then use the fitted values of this first equation to estimate the impact
on the voting behaviour towards the Socialist Party. We find that an improvement in the
perception about the central government performance might increase the likelihood of voting
for the Socialist party. The results, however are not robust to all specifications.
This work contributes to several strands of the literature. First, the role of information
as an election outcome determinant has focused primarily on the impacts of performance
information (economic voting). In a seminal paper, Kramer (1971) uses aggregate data
to evaluate whether national economic conditions (and the perceived perfomance of the
incumbent party actions) affect voting behaviour for the U.S. House of Representatives. More
recently, James (2011) evaluates the impact of published information measures on citizens,
showing that information influences performance perception and satisfaction, particularly
when partisan effects are present. In a more aggregate perspective, Taniguchi (2016) evaluate
whether economic indicators can act as a determinant of upper house elections in Japan, while
Kappe (2018) uses UK data to evaluate reference-point-dependent behaviour in economic
voting. From a theoretical standpoint, Ashworth, Bueno de Mesquita, and Friedenberg
(2018) show that voter rationality can be reconciled with the effects of exogenous shocks
(outside of the control of politicians, like natural disasters) can affect the probability of
reelection of an incumbent.
Additionally, our work relates with literature about media coverage impact and bias. Soroka
(2006), DellaVigna and Kaplan (2007), Garz (2014), Eberl, Boomgaarden, and Wagner
(2017) and Haselmayer, Meyer, and Wagner (2017) evaluate empirically the media coverage
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(in some cases, specifically negative news) and their impacts on election outcomes.
As we are looking for the feedback of central government performance perception on local
voting behaviour, our work is also close to others regarding second order elections. Clark and
Rohrschneider (2009), Schakel and Jeffery (2013) evaluate the relationship between voting
behaviour in European elections and national developments and Marien et al. (2015) studies
the relationship between voting in local and federal elections in Belgium.
Finally, as we implement the surveys in a period of electoral campaigning, our work is also
related with studies that evaluate the messages conveyed during the campaigning period, ei-
ther about candidates’ valence or ideology. The first work about negative campaigning effects
was developed by Ansolabehere and Gerber (1994), where the authors show that negative
campaigning reduces voter turnout, in an survey experiment in California. Lau, Sigelman,
and Rovner (2007) provide a meta-analytic analysis of the effects of negative campaigning.
More recently, in a field experiment around the 2004 US presidential election, Arceneaux
and Nickerson (2010) show that personally delivered messages can influence voting prefer-
ences. Fridkin and Kenney (2011) conclude that uncivil and relevant negative information
affect voting behaviour, based on published news and on a survey conducted during the
US Senate election of 2006. Kendall, Nannicini, and Trebbi (2015) performed a large scale
experiment in an Italian municipality, during the 2011 local elections, concluding that infor-
mation treatments (particularly about candidate valence) have impact on actual vote and
individual vote declarations. Finally, in a relatively new branch of literature that explores
citizen heterogeneity and its influence of campaigning effectiveness, Galasso and Nannicini
(2016) conducted a survey and a natural experiments in two municipal elections in Italy,
finding that females react more to positive information, while males to negative information.
The remaining of the paper is organised as follows. We start by providing some background
on the political organization in Portugal. Then we describe in detail our experimental design
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and discuss the main features of the data collected. In section 5 we present the main results
and we conclude in the following section. In appendix we provide samples of our treatment
information and other relevant details about the experimental design. Access to the full set
of surveys is available upon request.
2.2 Experimental Design and Methodology
2.2.1 The Portuguese Institutional Background
The Portuguese territory is administratively organised in three layers. There are two au-
tonomous governments in the archipelagos of Azores and Madeira. The second layer is con-
stituted by 278 mainland municipalities and 30 municipalities in the Autonomous Regions.
Municipalities are then divided into a total of 3092 Parishes. Local power is split between
the municipal and the parish level, with the overall goals of improving the well-being of
inhabitants, promoting social and economic development, managing territorial planning and
providing local public goods.3 Local government representatives are elected in all the mu-
nicipalities and parishes simultaneously in a nationwide local election episode, that occurs
every four years. The municipal government is composed of an executive branch – the Town
Council – , and a legislative one – the Municipal Assembly. Both are directly elected, with
seats allocated proportionally using the d’Hondt method, according to the number of voters
of each (closed) electoral list. The first ranked candidate of the most voted list for the Town
Council becomes the Mayor. Besides the directly elected members, the Municipal Assembly
also includes the presidents of the Parish councils, which are also directly elected by voters.
Central legislative elections are held every four years, differing from local ones by a two-
3As defined by Law 159/99.
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year period. With this calendar, the central incumbent is in the middle of its term when
local elections are held, hence voters have had enough time to build up a belief about the
central government’s performance. The last legislative election occurred in 2015, followed by
a local one in 2017, which is the object of our experiment. In 2015, the centre-right coalition
incumbent earned the highest vote share, but failed to secure a majority in the parliament,
leading the the runner-up centre-left Socialist Party to form a government, supported by its
left-wing counterparts in the parliament.4 The October 1st, 2017 local election was won by
the Socialist Party (PS), who managed to appoint 159 out of the 308 mayors, while the main
centre-right party appointed a total of 98 mayors.5
The Portuguese political party scene is dominated by 5 main parties, which are represented
in the Portuguese Parliament. Together, either running alone or heading a coalition in a
given municipality, these parties gathered 85,95% of all the votes for the Town Councils in
2017. This low fragmentation of the political market allows voters to more easily connect
central and local policy outcomes through the (mis)alignment of local and central government
elected officials, thus creating room for spillovers between central government performance
and local political outcomes.6
4The centre-right coalition, formed by two parties – the Social Democratic Party (PPD-PSD) and the
People’s Party (CDS) –, obtained 38,49%, while PS, the Left Bloc (BE) and the Portuguese Communist
Party (PCP) obtained 32,32%, 10,19% and 8,25%, respectively.
5PPD-PSD run in most of the 308 municipalities, either alone or in coalition with other smaller right
wing parties.
6Independent candidates running for local elections have gained increasing relevance across time, but
they still represent a relatively small overall share of mayor appointments. In 2001 Independent candidates
gathered a total of 84 010 votes in Town Council elections, while in 2017 this figure amounts to 351 327
(6,79% of all the votes). Even so, out of 82 candidates to the Town Council in the 308 municipalities, only
17 independent candidates managed to be elected as mayors.
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2.2.2 Experimental Setup
The purpose of our experiment is to test the impact of news articles with recent factual
information about specific policy areas on (i) the subjects’ perception about the central
government performance, and (ii) the impact of the perceived performance on local election
voting behaviour. The latter hinges on the individuals using their local votes to punish or
reward the party in power at the central level. The underlying hypothesis is that central
government performance can be perceived as an “exogenous” determinant of local voting
behaviour. This may happen for several reasons. As in Geys and Vermeir (2014), the party
can be seen as a selection mechanism for local candidates, so if the central government
is performing well, the local candidates from the same party could be perceived as more
competent or reliable. It may also be that local elections may be seen as second order
elections if voters use them as an opportunity to send a message to the central government
(Marien et al., 2015).7
To this purpose, we design and implement a randomised field experiment at the time of the
2017 local election, between September 18th (baseline) and October 6th (post-election sur-
vey), using 2500 undergraduate and graduate (master-level) students in two Lisbon business
schools. Our experiment consists in randomly presenting eligible and non-eligible voters with
factual information about central government policies and performance in the week before
the 2017 local Portuguese elections. All surveys were administered in-class, to a total of 71
classes. This section describes in detail the experimental design, the timeline of implemen-
tation and the structure of the survey administration process. By the end of the section, we
present the main methodology used to analyse results.8
7Fiva and Halse (2016) shows that voters expect to benefit from a mayor with close relations with the
central governmentfollow-up, perhaps because she will obtain more funding for local investments. While this
mechanism may also play a role in our case, it is not influenced by the subject’s perception about central
government performance.
8This experiment was registered at the American Economic Association, the information submitted can
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The experimental design encompassed three different survey rounds.9 The baseline survey
was implemented two weeks before the election and aimed to collect baseline data such as
sociodemographic context and political preferences, awareness and motivation. Respondents
were also asked about their planned voting decisions in the local election taking place within
two weeks. The treatment survey took place in the week before the election and it consisted
in randomly exposing participants to an information bundle about central government per-
formance. The follow-up survey was implemented in the week following the election, with
the purpose of collecting self-reported voting behaviour, not only in terms of participation,
but also the chosen party, for the voters who cast a vote.
As in Galasso and Nannicini (2016), the treatment is administered in the final of the two-week
official political campaign period, when politicians tend invest a greater effort in campaigning
through a number of political rallies, fact disclosing, and advertising themselves in diverse
ways and platforms.10 Therefore, it is very likely that participants were exposed to other
external information. The exogenous treatment is thus a marginal shock whose intensity
may depend on political literacy or pre-existing perception about government performance.
It may happen that the information provided (intention-to-treat) is not new to participants
and therefore treatment has a diluted effect for some of them.
2.2.3 The News Treatment
We employ a between-subject design, in which each survey participant was exposed to either
positive, negative or neutral information about the central government performance. We
denote these groups as positive or negative treatment, and control group, respectively. Each
be found at https://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/2539.
9The specific implementation calendar is detailed in Figure B.1, Appendix B.1.
10The official campaign period starts two weeks before the election date and ends in the day prior to the
election (reflection day), as defined by the Law 1/2001, that regulates the electoral procedures for the local
government bodies.
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respondent was presented with a pair of news articles about two different central government
policy areas, adapted from mainstream national media outlets.11
The news articles were selected following four pre-defined guidelines. Firstly, they should be
as recent as possible. Secondly, central government policy areas with varying degrees of media
coverage should be selected. We use the following policy areas: public finance (debt and
investment), national health system, old-age pensions, education, youth employment, and
road safety. Thirdly, for the same area, positive- and negative-tone news should be available
from the same source and within a negligible time gap. That is, if a positive treatment
consists of two positive pieces of information about, say, public finances and pensions, then
there is a corresponding negative treatment with two negative pieces of information about
the same two policy areas, from the same media outlets. Finally, to the extent possible, we
should aim at diversifying media outlets to avoid asymmetric perception of different outlets
amongst voters to influence our results – we ended up with two newspapers and one radio
station.
We created six positive, six negative, and one neutral information bundle, i.e., a total of 13
different bundles of two news articles each, according to the following structure. The first
three information bundles use public finance, mixed with youth employment, road safety,
and pensions. The remaining three bundles mix the National Health System with youth
employment, road safety, and education. The control group was administered two news
articles about a non-endagered Portuguese dog breed, the Serra da Estrela, designed to have
a similar extension and format as the treatment ones. One should highlight that public
finance was attracting a very high level of media attention by the time of the experiment,
with the government claiming a substantial improvement in the country’s financial health.
11Surveys and information bundles are in Portuguese. News were slightly edited by eliminating less
important sentences for the sake of shortness, as a way to gather readers’ attention to the most important
messages.
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By contrast, health policy received considerably lower media attention in the months before
the election. The remaining policy areas were chosen to cover both macroeconomic outcomes
(youth employment and pensions) and microeconomic policies (road safety and education),
to ensure that our results are not driven by the specific nature of the policies covered in the
news articles. A detailed description of all information bundles is provided in Appendix B.1,
Table B.2.
For each policy area, we were able to find a positive and negative-tone news article on the
same policy area, with minimal time gap and from the same source. As an example, on
the 6th of September 2017, a national radio station (TSF) announced that the Ministry of
Education planned to hire new 1.500 auxiliary teaching staff during the next school year.
Two days later, the same source reported that there were schools delaying the beginning of
the school year due to staff shortage. In other policy areas the match between the positive
and negative-tone news article was less perfect. One example is the National Health System
(NHS), where the positive news is about a higher budget allocation to the Health Ministry,
while the negative is about an increase in the outstanding debt to NHS suppliers.
Each information bundle appeared in the middle of the treatment survey, and included an
headline (in bold bigger font) and an edited version of the main text. The first article
included a graph created from actual data by the researchers to support the information
conveyed in the text. The graphs were built to be visually similar across the positive and
negative-tone news, despite the different information in the two. The second news article was
accompanied by an illustrative picture common to the positive and the negative-tone article.
An example of a positive and the corresponding negative information bundle is provided in
Appendix B.2. Given the high education level of our subjects, we are fairly confident that
they were able to apprehend the written information content of the treatment.12
12We do not intend to test the effectiveness of different delivering formats, but rather to test positive and
negative-tone information conveyed in a similar format.
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The design of the information bundles follows from a number of objectives. Firstly, com-
bining two news articles in each treatment bundle curbs the potential for a weak treatment.
Even if the respondent is aware about one of the articles, it is less likely that she has had
previous access to the two, particularly when combined with the visual information.13 Sec-
ondly, relying on truthful and credible information allows us to avoid the caveat in James
(2011), who does not find evidence of negative information which is not “real” and so can
contradict the prior perception of the citizens. Thirdly, the design allows us to disentangle
the impact of giving information about a given policy area from that of the actual tone
of the message. Lastly, the thirteen different information bundles reduce the likelihood of
contagion across different treatment groups. This is an important concern, given that the
surveys were administered in-class, implying that control and treated subjects responded the
surveys side-by-side in the same physical space.
2.2.4 Sampling and Randomisation
We implemented the experiment in two Lisbon business schools (NOVA and ISCAL). At
NOVA, each survey was implemented in a different round (one round a week, for a period
of 3 weeks), while at ISCAL logistic reasons related to the academic calendar forced us
to collapse the implementation into two rounds, with both baseline and treatment surveys
merged, and implemented on the week preceding the election.
The surveys were filled in on paper, either at the beginning or end of classes, under the
supervision of a member of the implementation team.14 Participation was voluntary and
13Our baseline survey included questions to ascertain respondents’ perception about central government
performance, which allows us to measure the immediate impact of the information.
14The implementation team was composed by the researchers and some Ph.D. students who received
specific training in order to adopt a standardised procedure in all classrooms. Additional details about
the implementation process can be found in Appendix B.1, where Figure B.1 shows the timeline of the
implementation and Table B.1 summarises the type of information collected in each survey.
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anonymous, and there were no monetary incentives for participants. Respondents were
asked to create a unique identifier at the beginning of the baseline survey, combining specific
digits of their birthdates and phone numbers, that they could easily replicate in the following
rounds.15 This ensures anonymity, while allowing the research team to link the three survey
rounds of each respondent. This information was clearly stated in the survey cover page and
was read by a member of the implementation team in the beginning of each implementation
round.
The main caveat of our approach is that it does not rely on a representative sample of
the population. This does not, however, threaten internal validity, as the treatments were
randomised. The advantage of relying on university students and implementing the surveys
in-class, however, is that the opportunity cost of response time is fairly low, which allowed us
to collect a fairly high amount of information; the total time to answer the three surveys is
around 30 minutes (Nova sample) and 20 minutes (Iscal sample). Our sample is fairly diverse
geographically and age-wise. It covers 170 out of the 308 municipalities, which guarantees
that our results are not driven by the political situation of the most represented municipality,
Lisbon. The minimum legal voting age in Portugal is eighteen. Given that the bulk of our
sample is constituted by undergraduate students, around 40% of our subjects are first-time
voters. Our data allows us to test whether these voters with little or no voting experience
are more susceptible to the information that they are given in the experience.
The randomisation procedure was made at the individual level, and implemented as fol-
lows.16 We organised the surveys prior to implementation by creating blocks of six surveys
according to the following sequence: 1 control, 2 positive, 1 control and 2 negative treatments
(CPPCNN), where surveys with positive and negative treatments were randomly drawn from
15In total, the code allows for 365 000 possibilities.
16The alternative to randomise at the class level was discarded due to lack of variability and uneven class
sizes which would make it difficult to have balanced treatment and control group sizes.
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the six positive and six negative available versions. These blocks were then distributed in
class on a row by row basis. Such a procedure aimed at ensuring adequate randomisation
(balancing) and at minimising contagion between treatment groups as a result of positive
and negative surveys being answered side-by-side. This option comes at expense of eventual
contagion from treatment to the control group, that we minimised by requesting the class
to keep silence during the surveys.
2.2.5 Identification and Outcome Variables
We divide our analysis into two separate parts, corresponding to the two research questions
identified in Subection 2.2.2, i.e., we test (i) whether the treatments changes the subject’s
perception about central government performance, and (ii) the extent to which the informa-
tion treatment changes the actual voting behaviour of the subjects – namely, turnout and
chosen party.
To evaluate the relevance of the information provided in the performance perception updat-
ing, we ask the subjects a set of questions about their subjective assessment of government
performance, both in general terms and in specific policy areas. Respondents are asked
about their opinion towards the general performance of the incumbent central government
both in the baseline and the treatment surveys; hence, we can compute the actual change in
perceived government performance induced by the treatment.17 This question, as shown in
Figure B.6 and Figure B.8 (Appendix B.3), required subjects to classify government perfor-
mance on a Likert-type scale ranging from “Very Unsatisfactory” to “Very Satisfactory”, not
allowing for neutral views.18
The subjective assessment about performance in specific policy areas is also surveyed twice,
17Table B.4 shows the average ex-ante perception of performance of the central government is very similar
across the two treatment and the control groups.
18This scale was later converted to range from -1 (negative) to 1 (positive).
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once before and once after treatment. In the first round, all subjects are asked about a
common set of policy areas, under the jurisdiction of the central government in Portugal,
which include, but are not limited to, all those covered in the news articles of the information
treatment. The second round arises immediately after the news treatment and prompts
subjects to respond whether, and how much, the news articles changed their perception
about the central government action in the specific policy area it covers. More specifically,
the NOVA classes were asked in the baseline survey and the treatment one, after the news
articles, whereas the ISCAL classes were asked in the same first survey, before and after the
news article. The possible responses in the second round were ’Yes, improved a lot’, ’Yes,
improved’, ’Did not change’, ’Yes, worsened’ and ’Yes, worsened a lot’. Figure B.7 shows
how the question was presented to the respondents who read the article about road safety.
Moreover, we ask about the impact of the information on the perception of the performance
of the Socialist Party.
The main outcome variables in this first step are the general and the policy-specific govern-
ment perception, in the areas covered in the news articles. Therefore, the baseline equation
that we estimate is as follows:
perf_measurei = α + β1POSi + β2NEGi + γXi + εi (2.1)
where perf_measurei is the measure of performance reported by subject i, POSi (resp.,
NEGi) is an indicator of the treatment received by subject i, and Xi is a vector of control
variables, including socio-demographic and political-related variables as well as class fixed
effects (to reduce the variance of the estimation). Standard errors are clustered at the class
level.
In the second part our aim is to test the extent to which the information treatment changes
the actual voting behaviour of the subjects – namely, turnout and chosen party, or more
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generally the interest for the election. For that, we rely on the self-reported retrospective
voting behaviour reported by the subjects in the follow-up survey (which took place from
the 2nd to the 10th day after the election, depending on the classes).
Because of unobserved characteristics, e.g., prior exposure to external information, or the
time devoted to actually reading the bundle of news articles, there may be problems of non-
compliance or protocol deviations. For this reason, the news treatment administered in the
paper survey is best seen as an intent-to-treat. As explained in Angrist (2006), regressing
the outcome variable (as casting a vote for the socialist party, or the decision to turnout)
directly on treatment assignment will provide conservative estimates because of the so-called
treatment dilution problem.
The solution is to use the treatment assignment as an instrument in the actual treatment –
in our case, the modified perception of the government performance –, and then estimating
the impact of the instrumented perception on the outcome variables. Therefore, the first
part of the analysis is the first stage regression in the instrumental variables approach used
to identify the causal impact of the treatment on voting behaviour. Therefore, our first stage
estimation is given by (2.1), and in the second stage we implement the following specification:
yi = α + βperf_measurei
∧
+ γXi + ηi (2.2)
where yi is the outcome variable of interest, i.e., whether or not one voted, or for whom.
2.3 Data
Our data consists of around 2 500 responses from two business schools in Lisbon – NOVA
and ISCAL. Since the link between the three survey rounds relies on an anonymised identifier
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built by each respondent, it is prone to error. Discarding the individuals for whom we do
not have answers for the three rounds, we end up with a total sample of 1 800 students –
478 from NOVA, and the remaining from ISCAL. In each round, we implemented surveys in
71 classrooms, with a number of attendees ranging from 15 to 150. In table B.5, we present
the main descriptive statistics.19
Most of the sample is composed of bachelor students, with an average age of 21,3 years.
Although age ranges from 16 to 54 years, the distribution is skewed to the right, with a
non-negligible percentage of non-eligible voters (5%), and even more first-time voters, as
around 47% were not in legal age to vote in the previous election of 2016.20 This feature
enables us to test the impact of information provision in inexperienced voters.
Around 60% of the sample is female and 29% of the students are displaced (i.e., they do
not live in their original family residence). On average, household size is 3,6 elements, the
equivalent household income per capita is around 1350 euros, and 70% of the students to not
contribute financially to the household income. In terms of religion, the majority is catholic
(55%), while 37% have no religion. Respondents were also enquired about parents’ job and
schooling status, with 16% mentioning that at least one of the parents is currently unem-
ployed. Roughly half of the sample has at least one parent who attained higher education,
and 27% have at least one parent who is a civil servant. Naturally, most of the subjects
are from the Lisbon agglomeration, although 170 (out of 308) Portuguese municipalities are
represented. A spatial representation of municipalities of origin is mapped in Figure B.9.
The geographic heterogeneity ensures that our results are not driven by the specificities of
the political market in the main metropolitan area of the country.
We collected information about respondents’ political knowledge, interest, experience, and
19A more complete set of descriptive statistics can be found in the online appendix: table C.1
20In the beginning of 2016 there was a presidential election. The President of the Republic is elected
directly in a runoff election.
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preferences, shown in panels B, C and D of Table B.5. Party affiliation is reported by 6% of
the respondents, while 26% have low understanding of politics. We depict the distribution
of respondents along the political spectrum for each of the schools in Figure B.10.21 Overall,
30,7% of the respondents identify as left or centre-left, 19% chose centre and 48,3% identify
as right or centre-right. Less than 2% report far-right or far-left ideologies. Most respondents
are aware that the local election is approaching, and 77% state in the baseline survey that
they are willing to vote. We collected voting intentions for the ones who plan to vote (’Which
candidate do you plan to vote for?’), but also for the remaining ones (’In case you would
vote, which candidate would you vote for with the highest probability?’).22 Pooling the
answers from these two groups, 23% do not know for whom they plan to (or would) vote
and another 23% plan to (or would) vote PS (the central government incumbent). The
most common reason for not voting was being distance from the voting poll (36%). Panel
F presents descriptive statistics of the main reasons driving the choice for both voters and
non-voters.
Panel E shows the performance perceptions. We start by presenting the descriptive statistics
of baseline perception on general government performance. In a scale from -1 (negative) to 1
(positive), the average is 0.15 (statistically different from zero at 1% confidence level), reflect-
ing the high government popularity at the time. As regards perception about specific areas,
economy and public finance perform quite well, and so does culture. Agriculture, forests and
sea, together with health are rated negatively.23 In order to grasp which government areas
drive the general perception, we regress the latter on the area-specific ones. The results
presented in table B.6 show that the economy and public finance are the most relevant ones.
21We asked respondents to self-locate in a left-right scale. We opted to focus on this more standard classifi-
cation and not ask about the socially conservative/liberal axis, given the over-representation of unexperienced
voters.
22In both cases, respondents were allowed to choose the “Prefer not to answer” option.
23The negative result on agriculture, forests and sea is not surprising given the forest fires in 2017, that
spread due to a severe drought but also ineffective fire-fighting systems, which lead to 109 deaths and a
four-fold increase in the burnt surface, relative to the previous 10-year average.
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This is true also when we consider the subsample of ISCAL respondents (column 2), with a
higher percentage of left wing subjects. In columns 3 and 4, we split the estimation by voters
that in 2015 (last parliamentary elections) voted for the socialists or the opposition parties
(PSD and CDS), and again economy and public finance are the most important policy areas.
The opinion about government intervention in labor and social security also seems to drive
the general performance perception.
When asked whether they would use the vote in local elections to send a message to the
government, one-third of the sample say they would, and amongst those, 42% would send a
positive message. We repeat this set of questions in the treatment survey, after the informa-
tion bundle, and observe no significant changes. The average general government perception
remains unaltered, and 5% are considering changing their decision, in face of the provided
information.
In the follow-up survey, 64% of the respondents state that they voted, and 33% voted or
would have voted for PS.24
Naturally, our sample is not representative of the national electorate. This does not hamper
the internal validity of the experiment, which is guaranteed by the randomisation protocol; we
next present a set of balance tests, to as an ex-post test to the validity of the randomisation.
In table B.3, Appendix B.1, we show the distribution of responses by survey type. As
expected given our CPPCNN randomisation procedure, each of the three groups corresponds
to around one third of the sample. The distribution by survey type is also close to uniform.
In table B.4, we present averages for a set of baseline variables by treatment group, which
are not statistically different across the three groups (positive and negative treatments, and
control group).
24The descriptive statistics of the outcome variables used in this paper have been highlighted in grey in
Table B.5.
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2.4 Change in Perceived Government Performance
This section presents the results on the immediate effect of the information treatment on
government performance perception, both in general and in specific areas, relative to the
baseline perception.
Table 2.1 presents preliminary information about the impact of the treatment. It shows
the perception update in the policy area covered by each news article, both regarding the
government – columns 1 and 3 – and the party in charge (PS) – columns 2 and 4, when
compared to the baseline performance perception. That is, the average difference in the
answers from the question show in Figure B.6 to the question shown in Figure B.7, immedi-
atly after each news article was shown. On average, the news were perceived as expected as
the positive (negative) treatment affects positively (negatively) the performance perception.
Interestingly, correlations between the government and perception about the Socialist party
are strong (0.65 for article 1, and 0.78 for article 2).
Table 2.1: Averages of government and PS performance perception by treatment group
Article 1 Article 2 Both articles
∆ perf. Gov. ∆ perf. PS ∆ perf. Gov. ∆ perf. PS Baseline perf. Gov. ∆ perf. Gov.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Positive treatment 0.169 0.114 0.221 0.180 0.210 0.059***
Negative treatment -.009 -.0384 -0.084 -0.084 0.076 -0.081***
Control group - - - - 0.182 0.026*
Significance level:* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Column 5 displays the average general government perception after the treatment, i.e. the
answer to the question shown in Figure B.8, in Appendix B.3. This highlights that post-
treatment, all groups have, on average, a positive perception about the general performance
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of the central government. Even so, the perception is clearly better for the respondents that
received the positive information (0.2, versus 0.08 for the the ones that received negative
information).
However, what we want to evaluate is whether the perception changed. Column 6, shows the
average change in the general perception about the central government performance from
the baseline (question shown in Figure B.6) to the performance perception after-treatment
(question shown in Figure B.8). The figures show that, on average, respondents that re-
ceived the positive (negative) treatment improved (worsened) their perception about the
central government performance, with the negative impact being slightly higher in terms of
magnitude.
Table 2.2 presents the main estimates of equation (2.1), for the case where the outcome
variable is the perception of government performance in the specific policy areas that were
included in the treatment. That is, the answer to the question shown in B.7, in Apprendix
B.3.
As it is clear, irrespective of the controls included, positive and negative treatment had the
expected effects. In all cases, the positive (negative) treatment improved (worsened) the per-
ception about government performance in the specific policy areas about which information
was shown. These results are in line with the ones discussed in Table 2.1.
In Apprendix B.5, in Table B.7, we provide the complete version of Table 2.2, where the
coefficients of our controls are shown.
Table 2.2 presents the main estimates of equation (2.1), for our main performance measure of
interest. That is, the post-treatment general perception of central government performance,
which is the answer to the question shown in Figure B.8 (Appendix B.3).
Column 1 reports results for perceived (general) government perception, without any con-
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Table 2.2: Impact of treatment on Specific Government Performance
Post-Treatment Specific Government Performance
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
T. POS. 0.129*** 0.130*** 0.115*** 0.117*** 0.117*** 0.129*** 0.129***
(11.16) (10.92) (8.96) (8.30) (8.27) (9.01) (9.07)
T. NEG -0.112*** -0.110*** -0.112*** -0.119*** -0.120*** -0.123*** -0.123***
(-9.29) (-8.76) (-7.95) (-8.31) (-8.45) (-7.67) (-7.64)
Baseline gov. perf. 0.068*** 0.066*** 0.072*** 0.065*** 0.068*** 0.067***
(4.75) (4.68) (4.56) (3.77) (3.73) (3.80)
PS spectum -0.010
(-0.64)
Support spectrum 0.019
(1.55)
Intent vote PS 0.026*
(1.68)
Intent Vote support 0.026*
(1.98)
Controls No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 1737 1711 1508 1132 1132 1145 1145
Adj. R Sq. 0.152 0.164 0.160 0.178 0.179 0.190 0.190
F-stat. 182.104 138.063 42.500 29.053 29.795 36.705 35.079
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Standard errors are clustered at class level, t-tests reported in parenthesis. Controls include socio-demographic and
measures of engagement/interest in politics. Significance level: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Table 2.3: Impact of treatment on general government performance
Post-Treatment General Government Performance
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
T. POS. 0.028 0.033** 0.031** 0.017 0.018 0.035* 0.036*
(1.53) (2.17) (2.00) (0.90) (1.01) (1.88) (1.92)
T. NEG. -0.106*** -0.106*** -0.108*** -0.122*** -0.124*** -0.108*** -0.108***
(-4.30) (-5.59) (-5.45) (-5.45) (-5.61) (-4.84) (-4.78)
Baseline gov. perf. 0.668*** 0.662*** 0.676*** 0.649*** 0.658*** 0.658***
(28.87) (26.75) (22.50) (20.82) (25.20) (25.16)
Centre 0.026
(1.19)
Left + Centre 0.079***
(4.42)
Intent Vote PS 0.061***
(3.54)
Intent Vote support 0.058***
(3.66)
Controls No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 1731 1708 1513 1145 1145 1153 1153
Adj. R Sq. 0.020 0.485 0.488 0.524 0.532 0.525 0.525
F-stat. 16.786 367.202 126.584 144.385 153.743 104.678 103.975
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Standard errors are clustered at class level, t-tests reported in parenthesis. Controls include socio-demographic variables
and measures of engagement/interest in politics. Significance levels: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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trols. Column 2 adds the baseline government performance, while column 3 adds further
controls for socio-demographic and political characteristics. The coefficient of the positive
treatment is positive and small and only significant in some specifications, this contrasts
with the negative treatment. In the latter, the negative effect is significant throughout the
specifications. The impact of the negative treatment is sizeable: it is equal to one-fourth
of the standard deviation of the general government perception. These results suggest that
there is evidence of negativity bias in our sample (James and John, 2007), as negative news
have a more pronounced effect than positive ones.
Columns 4–7 add alternative controls for the respondent’s political preferences. “Centre”
is an indicator of whether respondent’s ideology is situated at the centre of the political
spectrum. “Left + Centre” is an indicator of whether the respondent identifies with centre or
left-of-centre ideologies (the ones of the parliament coalition that sustains the government).
We also include indicators for whether respondents declared in the baseline that they plan to
vote in PS or the left-wing parties in the parliamentary coalition. Not surprisingly, three out
of these four variables are positive and significant at 1% confidence level, showing that not
only PS voters but also respondents aligned with supporting parties present higher propensity
to rate the government more positively. Interestingly, the magnitude of the coefficient on
baseline perception is robust to the inclusion of political preferences, suggesting that it may
be driven by a wider set of dimensions than ideology per se. Even so, the size of the coefficient
for the negative treatment is relatively stable, as well as its statistical significance.
The negativity bias could potentially be driven by a previous negative opinion about the
government in the specific policy area. We show in Table 2.4, that this is not the case by
interacting an indicator variable of a previous negative opinion on the negative treatment,
which turns out to be non significant. Moreover, we also assess the role of previous interest
in the policy area covered by each news article. These specifications ignore the control group,
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Table 2.4: Impact of each article on specific government performance
Specific Gov. Perf.
Article 1 Article 2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
T. NEG. -0.162*** -0.169*** -0.212*** -0.295*** -0.294*** -0.394***
(-7.98) (-7.77) (-3.92) (-15.42) (-12.89) (-9.17)
Negative opinion -0.088*** -0.051
(-2.84) (-1.16)
T. NEG. x Negative opinion 0.023 -0.009
(0.55) (-0.15)
High interest 0.012 -0.041
(0.33) (-0.84)
T. NEG x High interest -0.001 0.225***
(-0.03) (4.74)
Baseline gov. perf. 0.115*** 0.091*** 0.110** 0.045** 0.036 0.070*
(5.01) (3.95) (3.07) (2.17) (1.44) (2.30)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 1004 972 275 995 969 274
Adj. R Sq. 0.095 0.104 0.120 0.185 0.190 0.202
F-stat. 12.759 11.669 . 24.491 23.825 -
p-value 0.000 0.000 . 0.000 0.000 -
Standard errors are clustered at class level, t-statistics reported in parenthesis. Controls include socio-demographic
and measures of engagement in politics. Significance levels: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
since it does not deal with any specific policy area; therefore, we are directly comparing the
positive (omitted) and negative treatment. Columns 1 and 4 confirm the negativity bias
obtained in Table 2.3. In Columns 2 and 5, the treatment is interacted with an variable for
whether subjects reported a baseline negative opinion about government performance in the
specific policy area, while in columns 3 and 6 the treatment is interacted with an indicator
of high self-reported interest in that policy area.25 We do not find any support for the
hypothesis that a negative baseline opinion makes participants update perception differently
when exposed to negative information. However, there is evidence that participants with
a greater interest in a specific policy area react less negatively to the negative treatment.
This may due to these individuals’ stock of information on the topic, given their interest,
decreasing the impact of the provided information.
Another possible source of interest for, or private information about, a given policy area is
25The question about interest in each area was just collected at NOVA.
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Table 2.5: Impact of each article on specific government performance, by parents’ job and
job status
Specific Gov. Perf.
Professor Doctor Retired
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
T. NEG -0.353*** -0.315*** -0.375*** -0.344*** -0.068 -0.056
(-6.73) (-6.02) (-12.04) (-10.50) (-1.34) (-0.97)
T. NEG x JOB 0.299*** 0.284** 0.020 -0.063 -0.065 -0.023
(2.69) (2.33) (0.20) (-0.50) (-0.64) (-0.19)
JOB -0.116 -0.121 0.129 0.149 0.090 0.047
(-1.48) (-1.45) (1.35) (1.36) (0.84) (0.53)
Baseline gov. perf. 0.175*** 0.121** 0.079** 0.048 0.085 0.061
(3.10) (2.04) (2.47) (1.47) (1.39) (0.88)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 127 114 394 360 191 169
Adj. R Sq. 0.263 0.175 0.249 0.227 0.009 0.012
F-stat. 15.822 6.069 51.789 12.181 1.365 1.635
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.256 0.082
Standard errors are clustered at class level, t-statistics reported in parenthesis. Controls include socio-
demographic and measures of engagement in politics. Significance level: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, ***
p < 0.01
the profession of the parents. For example, respondents whose parents are teachers are likely
more informed about the educational landscape in Portugal than others, and therefore may
react differently to information about government performance in educational matters.In
unreported descriptive statistics, around 45% of the respondents report political discussions
within family and with close friends as one of the most important sources of political in-
formation, only surpassed by outdoors and media (TV, radio, newspapers). In fact, only
12% of respondents state they never participate in conversations about politics with their
relatives. Also, 40% of the sample state that their position in the political spectrum results
from family and friends’ environment.
We test this hypothesis in Table 2.5, using whether at least one of the parents has one of these
occupations – teachers, physicians, retired –, combined with the news articles on education,
health, and pensions, respectively.26 We find that having at least one teacher (resp., one
doctor) as parent leads subjects to react less negatively to the negative treatment involving
26The remaining policy areas covered in the treatments – public finance, youth employment or road safety
– do not have professions directly linked to them.
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education (resp., health).27 By contrast, we do not find a statistically significant effect of
having at least one retired parent.
2.5 Impact of Updated Government Perception on Vot-
ing Behaviour
We now tackle the second research question, i.e., the extent to which the information treat-
ment changes the subjects’ voting behaviour.
The previous section provides convincing evidence that the information treatment has an
effect both on the perception about the incumbent central government and the incumbent
(socialist) party in charge. Our goal is to assess whether the exogenously-induced updated
perception translates into different voting outcomes at local level.
Our main variable of interest is the likelihood to vote for the Socialist party in the local
election. We start by presenting in the reduced form OLS regression of the following speci-
fication:
V ote_for_PSi = β1POSi + β2NEGi + γXi + ηi
Regressions presented in Table 2.6 control for baseline government performance and initial
intention to vote for PS.
The voting outcome – whether or not the subject voted for the socialist party – is regressed
directly on the treatment variables and there is no evidence of a significant average treatment
effect, which confirms the treatment dilution problem discussed in Subsection 2.2.5.
27Including more education- and health-related jobs, such as school staff or nurses does not alter the
results.
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Table 2.6: OLS regression of voting for PS on treatment groups
Vote for PS (OLS)
(1) (2)
T. NEG 0.003 0.012
(0.12) (0.41)
T. POS. 0.020 0.029
(0.77) (1.03)
Plans to vote for PS (gov. party) 0.644*** 0.642***
(19.81) (18.85)
Baseline gov. perf. 0.153*** 0.148***
(6.26) (5.92)
Controls No Yes
Obs. 1192 1076
Adj. R Sq. 0.417 0.414
F-stat. 268.981 88.780
p-value 0.000 0.000
Therefore, we proceed to the instrumental variables approach, where the updated perception
on central government performance is instrumented with the treatment. In this way, we
isolate the impact of an exogenously treatment-induced change in the individual’s perception
about central government performance on the probability of voting for the Socialist Party
(PS), the central government incumbent. Results are presented in table 2.7, where after-
treatment general government performance is instrumented with two sets of instruments,
following the specification shown in equation (2.2).
In the first specification, we instrument with the two treatment-group dummy variables.
Then, we instrument with each of the 12 questionnaire indicator variables. All specifications
control for baseline perception, implying that we focus on a change in perception due to
treatment. Throughout the columns, we observe that an increase in treatment-induced
general government performance leads to a higher probability of voting for PS. The point
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Table 2.7: Second stage regression (2SLS) of voting for PS on treatment-induced exogenous
general government performance
Vote for PS (2SLS)
IV: T. Pos. & T. Neg. IV: Survey Dummies
(1) (2) (3) (4)
General gov. performance 0.270 0.243 0.322** 0.312*
(1.51) (1.26) (2.13) (1.92)
Plans to vote for PS 0.568*** 0.568*** 0.565*** 0.564***
(15.67) (15.15) (15.52) (14.93)
Baseline gov. perf. -0.009 0.017 -0.045 -0.030
(-0.07) (0.13) (-0.44) (-0.28)
Participant Controls No Yes No Yes
Council Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 1077 969 1077 969
estimates range from 0.243 to 0.322, implying that a one-standard deviation increase in
government performance perception increases the likelihood of voting PS by about 9.7 to
12.9 percentage points.
The effect is statistically significant only when we use all the survey dummies as excluded
instruments; bundling the negative and positive treatments does not provide significant
estimates even if the coefficients have the expected sign.
These results provide some support to the idea that the perception about the central gov-
ernment can affect voting behaviour in local elections.
2.6 Conclusion
In this work we performed a randomised experiment on students of two business schools with
a twofold goal. On the one hand, measuring the impact of positive and negative information
in shaping performance perceptions and, on the other, assessing whether the perception of
performance about the central government action can affect local voting behaviour.
Our experiment took place around the 2017 local election and our treatment consisted on a
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bundle of positive or negative information. Each bundle included two news articles and two
visual aids (a graph and a picture) on a specific policy area. In total we created 12 different
questionnaires that cover diverse policy areas such as public finance and road safety. With
this design we aim at contributing to the literature on the effects of positive and negative
information, specifically in two ways. First, we convey factual information, from respected
media outlets in Portugal, in two different tones. This means that, contrary to other studies
where the message in at least one of the tones is fictional, we provide a factual information
treatment to all subjects. When this is not the case, subjects reactions may be influenced
by prior knowledge that the information provided is not factual. Additionally, the diversity
in terms of policy areas included, unprecedented in previous studies, allows us to assess
specifically the tone of the message, instead of specific effects associated with particular
topics.
In terms of performance perception updating, our results provide clear and robust evidence
of negativity bias. Although both positive and negative information affects the students’
perception in specific policy areas, only the negative information sticks and leads to a decline
in the general perception about the central government performance. This finding is in line
with the literature on the effects of positive versus negative information.
The second question we want to explore is related with the interplay of different government
layers in electoral outcomes. The literature about second order elections, mainly focused on
European elections, shows that voting behaviour is sometimes driven by factors that are not
related to the respective government layer. Moreover, voters may see the party system as a
selection mechanism for local candidates and thus information about the performance of the
central government can benefit candidates from the same party at the local level.
In principle, this link would mean that a better performance perception about the central
government could have positive effects on the local voting behaviour for the parties head-
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ing or supporting the central government. Although we do not find an average treatment
effect, most likely due to treatment dilution, we find some evidence of spillovers using an
instrumental variable approach. Specifically, we instrument the ex-post general government
performance measure with our treatment dummies. The fitted values of this regression are
then used to assess the impact of the treatment on voting intentions. In this context, we
find that an increase in the performance perception leads to an increase in the likelihood to
vote for the Socialist Party, i.e., the central government incumbent. These results however
are not robust to different specifications.
Overall, our results indicate that information provision affects the perception about politi-
cians, particularly for negative information. These findings can be particularly relevant in
the context of fake news.
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Chapter 3
Finding Local Fiscal Multipliers: Do Lo-
cal Elections matter?1
3.1 Introduction
In 2009, Barack Obama launched a $787 billion stimulus package to boost recovery after the
2008 crisis. The stimulus amounted to 4% of the US GDP and was one of the most sizeable
packages ever implemented in the US (the New Deal stimulus, for instance, amounted to
1.5% of GDP).2 In a speech, in 2008, he stated “We’ve got shovel-ready projects all across
the country. And governors and mayors are pleading to fund it. The minute we can get
those investments to the state level, jobs are going to be created”. In Europe, on the other
hand, the 2010 sovereign debt crisis launched a broad wave of pro-cyclical policies. Facing
slower economic growth (or even recession), several countries in Europe implemented sizeable
austerity packages, arguing that spending stimulus could not overlook financial stability.
Germany, the biggest economy of the Eurozone, announced in 2010 an austerity package,
including spending cuts, tax increases and a reduction of public employment, expected to
grant cumulated savings of around $95 billion by 2014. These two strategies rely on two
1This chapter was written in co-authorship with Francesco Franco and Susana Peralta.
2The big promise, The Economist, August 2012.
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underlying views of the impact of public spending on the economy, and have triggered a
renewed interest in the accurate estimation of the impact of public spending on the economy.
Fiscal multipliers measure the effect of a given fiscal variable (e.g., expenditure) on an out-
come of interest (e.g., output). Traditionally, the literature has focused on fiscal multipliers
at an aggregate level (for individual countries or a panel of countries), with varying results
depending on the countries, the time span, the policy and outcome variables and, particu-
larly, the methodology used. The recent literature has showed that multipliers depend on
the economic context, i.e., they are state dependent. Revenue and expenditure multipliers
are not the same when the economy is in expansion or recession, or when monetary policy
is near the zero lower bound or even when government spending is increasing or decreasing
in the previous periods.3
The challenge in the estimation of fiscal multipliers is reverse causality, since expenditure can
cause changes in output, which itself has an impact in spending. Credible estimation relies
on finding discretionary policy decisions that are unrelated to output. Since this proves a
difficult task when dealing with a panel of countries, a recent branch of the literature takes
advantage of the quality and availability of local level data to estimate fiscal multipliers. 4
Acconcia, Corsetti, and Simonelli (2014), for instance, capture spending cuts arising from
dismissal of public authorities due to suspicions of Mafia infiltration in city councils to
compute fiscal multipliers for 95 Italian provinces. Serrato and Wingender (2016), on the
other hand, use shocks in population estimates to compute fiscal multipliers to 3000 US
3The study of state-dependent multipliers was pioneered by Barro and Redlick (2011) and Auerbach
and Gorodnichenko (2012) that studied the sensitivity of multipliers to periods of economic expansion and
recessions and by Cogan, Cwik, Taylor, and Wieland (2010) that first evaluated the interplay between the
monetary policy stance and the fiscal multipliers.
4Although national and subnational multipliers are not directly comparable, as it has been discussed in
the literature.
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counties.5 These papers use an instrumental variable approach to identify spending shocks.6
Brückner and Tuladhar (2014), on the other hand, use a system GMM to estimate the
state-dependent impact of local spending of Japanese prefectures.
Other relevant empirical studies in local fiscal multipliers using U.S. data (for county, region
or state levels), include Chodorow-Reich, Feiveson, Liscow, and Wooston (2012), Clemens
and Miran (2012), Wilson (2012), Shoag (2013), Nakamura and Steinsson (2014), Dube,
Kaplan, and Zipperer (2014), Dupor (2015), Fishback and Kachanovskaya (2015) Adelino,
Cunha, and Ferreira (2017), Dupor and Guerrero (2017) and Dupor and McCrory (2018).
Outside the U.S., Buchheim and Watzinger (2017) performed a county-level study for Ger-
many, while Corbi, Papaioannou, and Surico (2017) evaluated effects economic effects of
federal transfers to Brazilian municipalities. A comprehensive overview of the literature and
a discussion about the relationship between local and national fiscal multipliers is provided
by Chodorow-Reich (2018).
In this paper, we use local elections to capture discretionary spending increases and compute
their effect on local output in Portuguese municipalities.7 We also contribute to the literature
on state-dependent local fiscal multipliers, by analysing the influence of the government
spending cycle, the size of the municipality and political cycle on the fiscal transmission
mechanism. The validity of our instrument relies on an extensive literature on political
business cycles. Coelho et al. (2006) and Veiga and Veiga (2007) show that there is evidence
of local political business cycles in Portugal. Fiva and Natvik (2013) provides an empirical
application for Norwegian municipalities, and Drazen and Eslava (2010), for Colombian ones.
5Guo, Liu, and Ma (2016) use earmarked transfers to National Poor Counties in China to compute local
spending multipliers for 1800 Chinese counties.
6Consistent with the narrative identification strategy, typically used in the estimation of macroeconomic
multipliers.
7Levitt (1997) uses a similar instrument to identify the impact of police on crime, taking advantage of
the fact that the size of the police force increases disproportionally in mayoral and gubernatorial election
years.
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To compute the multipliers of local spending in Portuguese municipalities we gather a com-
prehensive database of local spending and local output measures. Information about ex-
penditure and revenues of 278 Portuguese mainland municipalities, is continuously available
between 1986 and 2014. We focus on the effects of fiscal expenditure manipulation, partic-
ularly in infrastructure investment and current expenditure.8 Our main outcome variable
is the total private wage bill of full-time employees in the municipality. We further decom-
pose the wage bill into a price component (the mean wage) and a quantity component (the
number of workers in the municipality).
The main results are as follows. We show that these spending spikes lead to a positive change
in the local wage bill. This effect, albeit statistically robust, is small in magnitude. Increasing
spending per capita by 1% leads to a boost between 0.09 and 0.14% of the contemporaneous
wage bill. The effect is driven by local employment, which increases between 1.5 and 1.7%,
on average, in response to investment and current expenditure, respectively. We also show
that this effect is influenced by contextual factors. Multipliers are substantially higher in
bigger municipalities and lower in municipalities where the mayor has been in power for more
than 3 terms. We also find some evidence multiplier asymmetry, as the effects of spending
increases and decreases seem to differ.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. In the next section we present a brief
discussion about the institutional framework in Portugal. Section 3.3 shows the main features
of our data and Section 3.4 describes our empirical model and the identification strategy. We
then present our main results. Section 3.6 discusses state-dependent local fiscal multipliers.
The last section concludes.
8Investment expenditure the most significant component of capital expenditure, that includes expenses
with land acquisition, housing, other buildings and constructions - road works, public space maintenance,
waste treatment, etc. Current expenditure, on the other hand is mainly comprised of local public sector
payroll and purchases of current goods and services.
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3.2 Institutional Background and Local Fiscal Policy
Fiscal policy in Portugal is defined both at the central and local levels.9 The local admin-
istration is split between the municipality and the parish levels. The mainland territory is
divided in 278 municipalities, which are subsequently divided in a total of 2882 parishes.10
Each municipality has a Town Council (executive body), headed by the mayor, and a Mu-
nicipal Assembly, the legislative body.
The local government have the aims of improving the well-being of inhabitants, promoting
social and economic development, managing territorial planning and providing local public
goods.11 As described in Direção Geral das Autarquias Locais (2004), municipalities manage,
and in some cases provide, rural and urban equipments, energy, transportation, education,
health care and sports, civil protection, municipal police, sewage and waste collection and
social welfare local policies. The highest proportion of revenues stems from transfers from
the central government, exogenous to municipalities. They are free to set and collect fees
within some legal limits; as regards local taxes, the municipalities rely on a property tax,
surtaxes on the personal and corporate income taxes, that they can set within given tax
ranges, and an indirect tax on the sale of real estate, which is set by the central government.
Importantly, municipalities cannot change the tax base. It is therefore fair to assume that
municipalities have more autonomy in choosing spending allocation than the total revenue
they collect.
9The Portuguese territory includes a mainland territory and two autonomous regions, the islands of
Azores and Madeira. Given that the two archipelagos have autonomous regional governments, with some
freedom to define fiscal policy locally, we concentrate on the mainland territory.
10Out of the current 278 municipalities, 3 were created in 1998 (Odivelas, Trofa and Vizela), therefore
our empirical analysis will make use of 275 municipalities, in practice. Including the islands, there are 308
municipalities, divided in 3091 parishes.
11Law 159/99, Law 169/99 and Law 5-A/2002 jointly define the competences and attributions of all local
level administrative bodies.
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Figure 3.1: Per capita revenue and expenditure
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Local Government Revenue and Expenditure
The accounts of local government bodies are public and made available on an yearly basis.12
They provide information at the municipal level and specify both revenue and expenditure
totals and breakdowns in a set of baseline categories.
The following graph plots the evolution of total spending and total revenue of mainland
municipalities in Portugal from 1986 to 2014.13
Local spending increased sharply until 2001 (from around 2bne to almost 8bne), stabilises
between 2001 and 2008, and contracts sharply after 2009 (to less than 7bne in 2014), as
a response to the European Sovereign Debt Crisis and the fiscal adjustment programme
implemented in Portugal between 2011 and 2014. Total revenue follows closely the evolution
12These accounts have been published by the Local Administration Authority, DGAL, an entity within
the Ministry of Internal Affairs, since 1978. The figures are available for all years except 1984 and 1985.
13As we discuss later, the time frame of the analysis is decided based on data availability regarding the
outcome variables of interest.
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of spending, hence there is no concern of deficit accumulation in the period under analysis.
This path is roughly consistent with the business cycles for the Portuguese Economy.14
Between 1986 and 1999 the macroeconomic fundamentals evolved positively: the average
real GDP growth was around 4%, while inflation stabilised at 2.3% in 1999 (dropping from
12.6% in 1986); additionally, the unemployment rate decreased from 8.3% (in 1985) to 4.4%
in 1999. Since 2000, economic conditions deteriorated with an average real GDP growth of
1.38% until 2008, and -0.81% between 2009 and 2013.15
Figure 3.2: Per capita revenue disaggregation
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14After a long period of right-wing dictatorship (between 1933 to 1974), the period between 1974 and 1980s
was characterised by high economic and political instability. In 1986 Portugal joined the European Union
and, in the following years, economic stability and economic growth increased, with European structural and
cohesion funds playing a key role in increasing the country’s development and the standards of living of the
population.
15Source: PorData and Bank of Portugal.
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Figure 3.2 shows the disaggregated per capita revenue into its current and capital compo-
nents.
The disaggregation of local per capita expenditure is shown below. The main items of
current expenditure are payroll and the purchases of goods and services, while the most
important component of capital expenditure is investment. Investment expenditures include
all increases in fixed capital. Such an increase may be due to a purchase or production of
durable goods, or improvements in the existing goods to boost their productivity or life span.
Other capital expenditures include financial expenditures and capital transfers to parishes.
Figure 3.3: Per capita expenditure disaggregation
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The breakdown of total investment expenditure is as shown in Appendix C.1, in Figure
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C.1. Panel A shows that the average investment expenditure per capita peaked at more
than 400e in 2001 and 2002, and has been declining since then. The relative weight of
all seven components is relatively stable, as shown in Panel B. Overall, miscellaneous con-
structions and expenditures associated with other (non housing) buildings are the most
relevant components. Miscellaneous constructions include street and complementary con-
struction/maintenance, sewage, water distribution and treatment, waste treatment and a
residual expenditure category, while other buildings reflect expenditure in sports facilities,
social infrastructure and a residual category.
Since we are interested in the policy choices that contribute more directly to the local econ-
omy, we focus on the expenditure side policy, particularly in the total current expenditure
and in a subset of capital expenditure, investment spending.
3.3 Data
We use data on local public finance accounts, municipal economical, social and demographic
indicators, macroeconomic fundamentals and municipal political data. The time span of our
analysis is constrained by the simultaneous availability of these types of data. As a result,
we focus on the period between 1986 and 2014.
Local public finance data, including the expenditure variables that are our key explanatory
variables, is obtained from the Local Administration Authority, an entity under the supervi-
sion of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, as explained in section 3.2. As regards the outcome
variable, we proxy local output using the total wage expenditure of full time private sector
workers in each municipality. Although the national wage expenditure does not reflect all
output variations, this is the best proxy available since we have no measure of GDP disag-
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gregated to the municipal level in Portugal.16 As we show in Figure C.2, in Appendix 3.3,
the changes in the national wage bill of private sector workers, measured in real terms, are
very close to the growth rate of real GDP across time (Panel A). Panel B shows the strong
correlation between the two variables.
We further disaggregate changes the wage bill into changes in the average wage paid to
employees (price effect) and the number of employees (quantity effect). All the employment
and wage data is obtained from the Portuguese linked employee-employer administrative
dataset (Quadros de Pessoal - QdP), that includes information about all the companies
operating in Portugal, collected by the Ministry of Employment.
The mean wage is obtained by calculating a simple average of wages of full time workers by
municipality.17 Our measure includes both the fixed and the variable components of wages,
to capture any fluctuations in wages. In Portugal, reducing the base wage (the main fixed
component) is generally not legally possible, so we expect that changes in wages resulting
from local government stimulus occur mainly in the variable components of wages.18 The
total number of workers in the municipality is is the sum of the full-time workers in all the
companies (or their subsidiaries) located in a given municipality.19
Other socio-demographic variables, like population density, lagged local budget deficit, lagged
change in number of firms in the municipality, were also collected. Such variables are used
mainly as controls, as the effectiveness of government spending is likely to be conditioned by
16Another measure of local GDP is the local value added, however it is only available from 2001 onwards
and at the NUTS III level. NUTS are official statistical units defined by the Eurostat. Currently, the
mainland territory of Portugal is divided into 25 NUTS III.
17The maximum amount of regular work time is defined by law and set to 40 hours/week. However,
collective bargaining agreements stipulate different limits for different sectors, like banking (35 hours/week).
To avoid excluding particular sectors, we code all workers with at least 35 hours/week (140 hours/month)
of paid work as full-time. This excludes roughly the bottom 1% of the sample in every year.
18According to the article 129 of the Labour Law (Law 7/2009) employers are not allowed to demote or
reduce wages of workers, unless in very strict conditions (as when the company is facing severe financial
difficulties).
19Therefore, outcome variables are source-based rather than residence-based. If someone lives in a munic-
ipality but works in another, his wage and employment will be considered in the latter.
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several municipal-specific factors.
We capture the national business cycle with a set of macroeconomic controls, obtained from
the Bank of Portugal Statistics and the International Financial Statistics (IMF). These
macro-controls include real GDP growth, fixed capital accumulation as share of GDP, na-
tional unemployment rate, private consumption as share of GDP and the reference interest
rate of 10 year treasury bonds. The option to include time dummies is not available as these
would be collinear with our instrument, which is an election year indicator.
Finally, due to the nature our identification strategy, we also collect a set of political variables.
The political wing of local governments, the number of terms the the mayor has been in power
and a set of dummies to signal whether the party in power has majority in the Town Council
and the Municipal Assembly, and political alignment with the central government.
All the data used is annual, with all monetary variables at constant prices of 2010, converted
using the GDP deflator. Descriptive statistics are provided in Appendix C.1, Table C.1.
3.4 Methodology
Our empirical model draws on the literature about fiscal transmission mechanisms at local
level, particularly Acconcia et al. (2014). The baseline specification that we estimate is:
yt,i = αi + ηtrendt,i + βgt,i + γXt,i + εt,i, (3.1)
where αi are municipal fixed effects, trendt,i is a linear municipal specific time trend, Xt,i
is a set of controls and εi,t is the error term. The outcome variable, yt,i, is the percentage
change of the per capita wage bill (or the mean wage/the number of workers) in municipality
i. Finally, gt,i, represents the difference in the per capita spending variable (current or
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investment expenditure) from period t−1 to period t, scaled by the lagged outcome variable
of interest.20
We follow Barro and Redlick (2011) and scale our main explanatory variable to ensure that
both spending and output variables enter the equation in the same relative units, so that
the estimate of β is directly the impact multiplier. Two recent studies about local fiscal
multipliers, Acconcia et al. (2014) and Ramey and Zubairy (2018), also use the same scaled
change in spending instead of a regular percentage change.21
The vector of controls, Xt,i, includes up to two lags of the outcome and government spending
variables (to account for potential autocorrelation) and a set of socio-demographic and polit-
ical controls (microeconomic controls) and of macroeconomic fundamentals (macroeconomic
controls). To control for time variant effects we include a linear municipality-specific time
trend, as in De Witte, Geys, and Schönhage (2018) or Besley and Burgess (2004), as well as
a set of macro economic controls.22
Estimating equation (3.1) carries a number of challenges. First, if government spending can
lead to changes in output, it can also be the case that spending is driven by it. Although local
spending is arguably less responsive to output than aggregate, country-level spending, there
are a number of channels through which it may be influenced by the municipal economic
activity. Municipalities have a number of responsibilities in the social area, such as childhood
and elderly care, or public housing, in which family contributions are usually indexed to
private income, and the remainder has to be covered by the municipal budget; mayors
may respond to the economic cycle by spending more (or less) as a means to overcome the
20Specifically, the spending and outcome variables are given by: gt,i =
Gt,i−Gt−1,i
Yt−1,i
and yt,i =
Yt,i−Yt−1;i
Yt−1;i
.
21Including actual changes of both variables would lead to an elasticity that could be converted ex-post
to a multiplier, typically by multiplying the elasticity by the sample average ratio of the output variable by
the spending variable. As discussed in Ramey and Zubairy (2018) post-estimation of fiscal multipliers from
elasticities can lead to over estimation of multipliers, particularly for wide time spans.
22The inclusion of municipality-specific time trends allows for each municipality’s time variant character-
istics to evolve according to an idiosyncratic trend.
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cycle; finally, public employment may be used to counteract periods of high unemployment.
Consequently, credible identification must rely on an exogenous source of variation.23
In this paper, we use an election year indicator to instrument local spending, following on
an important avenue of recent research, including Serrato and Wingender (2016), Acconcia
et al. (2014) and Guo et al. (2016), that resorts to instrumental variables to estimate local
multipliers.24 .
Our IV specification is implemented using 2SLS, with the spending variable of interest being
instrumented with a dummy variable that is equal to one whenever a local electoral episode
occurs, D.local_electiont. Thus, the first stage regression of our baseline specification is:
gt,i = αi + ηtrendt,i + δD.local_electiont + γXt,i + vt,i, (3.2)
where δ measures the effect of the occurrence of a local election in the local spending variables
and vt,i is the error term. The second stage equation is then given by:
yt,i = αi + ηtrendt,i + βgt
∧
+ γXt,i + εt,i, (3.3)
where β is the impact local fiscal multiplier. All equations, otherwise explicitly stated,
are weighted by the municipal population level to reflect municipal size heterogeneity, as in
Shoag (2013) and Acconcia et al. (2014). Standard errors are robust and clustered to account
for heteroskedastictiy and possible spacial correlation (due to common municipal/regional
23The macro literature addresses endogeneity with a variety of techniques(Whalen and Reichling (2015),
?). The two most common approaches are i) based on econometric/empirical assumptions, as in the Choleski
Decomposition or the Blanchard and Perotti (2002) identification scheme, and ii) the narrative approach,
where researchers identify particular exogenous movements in fiscal policy using different sources of in-
formation (like news reports or major historical events) Econometric-based methods like VARs and, more
recently, the Local Projection Method of Jordà (Jordà, 2005), require different identification assumptions
when compared with estimates in the context of DSGE models, for instance.
24Instrumental variables can be seen as the microeconomics counterpart of the narrative approach.
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characteristics).25
3.4.1 Identification strategy: Local Elections and Government Spend-
ing
Several studies have documented that politicians manipulate spending for electoral purposes,
a result which has been confirmed for Portugal by Veiga and Veiga (2007).
We depart from this result and use the political business cycle to compute local fiscal multi-
pliers for Portuguese municipalities, between 1986 and 2014. Our data spans seven electoral
episodes, corresponding to 4 year terms, in 1989, 1993, 1997, 2001, 2005, 2009 and 2013.26
All the elections in our sample occurred in the last quarter of the respective year; therefore,
we assume that elected local governments only take office effectively in the following year, as
the budget in place up to the end of the election year was prepared by the former incumbent
Town Council.27 The election of 2005, for instance was held in October 9th. The mayor
takes office up to 20 days after the final results of the election are determined and has to
prepare the budget for 2006 in the three months that follow. The budget in place until
December 31st of 2005 was approved in the last quarter of 2004. In this context it is realistic
to assume that the incumbent local government decides in the last quarter of 2004 whether
he is going to hump up expenditure in order to increase the odds of being re-elected in the
25As in Acconcia et al. (2014), we cluster at the NUTSIII×year level, to incorporate the business cycle
common particularities of neighbouring municipalities. Our results are robust to clustering at the NUTSIII
or at the municipality level.
26The first local election in Portugal was in 1976. Between 1976 and 1985 four elections took place, as
initially local mandates were set to 3 years. From 1985 onwards elections occurred every 4 years.
27According to the Law 73/2013, that establishes the financial rules and procedures for local governments,
the budget of year t is prepared by the Town Council and submitted for approval to the local deliberative
branch, the Municipal Assembly, up to the end of October of t − 1. If local elections took place between
July 30th and December 15th (as occurs in every election year in our sample) the budget proposal should
be submitted up to three months after the elected government formally takes office.
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2005 election.28
Figure 3.4 plots the national average of per capita spending variables of interest. Vertical
lines highlight years in which local elections took place.
Figure 3.4: Local Government Spending and Municipal Elections
0
20
0
40
0
60
0
80
0
in 
Eu
r
1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014
(national average per capita)
-2
0
-1
0
0
10
20
30
40
%
 ch
an
ge
1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014
Current Expenditures Capital Expenditures Investment Expenditures
(percentage changes)
Vertical lines represent (local) election years.
Local Expenditure and Local Elections
The upper panel provides the national average, in levels, of the spending variables. Current
expenditures increase throughout the sample period (blue line); however, larger increases
seem to occur in electoral years. Capital expenditures, and particularly Investment expen-
ditures (red and green lines), are more volatile and increase more sharply in electoral years.
28Even if the mayor does not run for the election, he may still wish to increase spending to increase the
chances of the candidate he endorses (most likely, belonging to the same party) being elected.
Bruno Carvalho 105
This pattern is even clearer in the bottom figure, that plots the year-on-year change in the
same variables, where all variables exhibit positive growth rates in election years.
Table C.2, in Appendix C.2, shows the sample average of the spending variables in election
and no-election years. Investment expenditure per capita is 38e higher in election years
(corresponding to a 12.8% difference) and the differences are significant up to the 1% level.
Differences in current expenditures are, as expected, less sizeable (+42e and +3.4%) and
the statistical significance of the test of difference in means is smaller.
The fact that spending spikes in all the election years in our period of analysis suggests that
the instrumental variable correlates with the explanatory variable in our main specification.
Next, we tackle the exclusion restrction.
3.4.2 Validity of the Instrument
To argue for the exogeneity of our instrument, we need to establish that i) changes in
outcome variables do not lead to election episodes and ii) that election episodes only affect
the outcome variables through the government spending channel.
Local electoral episodes are scheduled by the central government at least 80 days in advance.29
The length of each term is defined ex-ante and set to four years. If the local government
is for some reason dismissed, the mayor can either be replaced or an interim election may
occur. The mayor who is elected in the interim election serves a short term only until the
following pre-determined nationwide local election. In the period covered by our analysis,
only three interim elections occurred.30 Therefore, local elections are exogenous to local
decision makers and the evolution of local outcome variables, whether positive or negative,
29Law 1/2001, August 14th.
30 The most important was in Lisbon, in 2007, because the incumbent mayor lost the support of his
political party.
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does not affect the pre-determined electoral calendar.
As regards the exclusion restriction, note that most of the expenditure directly associated
with elections is campaign spending, mostly financed through public funds. The legislation
in Portugal restricts campaign funding sources to party/candidate contributions, private
donations (heavily restricted) and a statutory public allowance attributed to candidates
by the national government.31 As a consequence, most of the spending is financed by the
statutory allowance.
In the next figure we plot the costs and funding sources of three local election episodes, based
on the reports that candidates submit to the Portuguese Constitutional Court for audit.32
Figure 3.5: Campaign Spending in Local Elections (2005/09/13)
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31Parties and campaigning funding and expenditures are regulated by the Law 19/2003, subsequently
altered by Law 64-A/2008, Law 55/2010, Law 1/2013 and Organic Law 5/2015.
32Detailed expenditure and revenue reports are required under the Law 19/2003 and are available from
2005 onwards.
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Panel (A) shows total (national) expenditure and funding associated with campaigning for
the five biggest Portuguese parties, whether they are running by themselves or in a coalition.
These parties are, from the left to the right of the political spectrum, the Left Bloc (BE),
the Portuguese Communist Party (PCP), the Socialist Party (PS), the Social Democrat
Party (PSD) and the People’s Party (CDS). In 2005 these parties spent a total of 64 million
euros, since then total spending has been declining, due to changes in the campaigning laws
that reduced spending limits per municipality and also the maximum statutory allowance
available per municipality. As it is clear from panel (B), the most important source of funding
is the statutory allowance, with donations playing a residual role. Table C.3, in Appendix
C.2, provides more detailed information on campaign spending figures, showing that in 2005,
for instance, 63% of the spending was financed by the statutory allowance. There are some
coalitions in the data, which are decided case-by-case, depending on the political situation
in each municipality.33 Although other parties and independent candidates run for local
elections, they gather a very small amount of votes when compared to the big five. In 2005,
for instance, out of the 308 municipalities, 301 mayors were elected in one of the five big-party
lists, and only 7 were independent.
The reduced importance of donations and the fact that even party contributions are in some
sense publicly funded alleviate potential concerns about campaign spending being a shock to
the local economy per se.34 Additionally, it is important to stress that most of the spending
is associated with campaigning materials, that include outdoors, flyers and political events.
Figure C.5, in Appendix, shows the campaign spending of the top 5 contenders in Portuguese
local, presidential, European and general elections, as a percentage of the GDP of the respec-
tive year. Local elections, due to its nature, are the ones carrying the highest campaigning
33Most coalitions in our period of analysis are between the centre-right PSD and the right-wing CDS.
34Party contributions are financed by the parties’ budget, which is also heavily regulated. Parties survive
mostly based on public grants they are entitled to.
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costs despite the fact that they represent, at their peak, less than 0.04% of the GDP. It is,
therefore, unlikely that this spending has more than residual direct effects on the economy.
The only other cost that can be attributed directly to election episodes is the administrative
costs of organising the election. In 2005, that figure amounts to 7,3em and includes all the
expenditure that the Direction of Internal Affairs bears in election logistics. 35 Its most
significant component (63% of the 7,3em) is the compensation offered to the members of
voting assemblies, for the administrative tasks performed in the election day. The resources
to support this spending come from the budget of the Ministry of Internal Affairs that
transfers most of the funds to the local administration, that in turn pays suppliers and
administrative staff.
We also investigate whether elections are, in itself, a shock to our local spending variables.
This is relevant to establish the channel through which election episodes can affect local
economic developments. In the absence of a proper counterfactual we regress our local
spending variables on dummies that are equal to one whenever there is an election (local or
not) in our sample.
Results are shown in Table 3.1. In practice, we are running a simplified version of our first
stage equation, equation (3.2), to check whether the strong positive correlation observed for
both outcome variables and local election episodes (in the first line of the table) also occurs
for non-local elections.
These regressions include municipal fixed effects and the standard errors are robust and
clustered at the municipal level. Recall that spending variables in our empirical model are
differences in spending scaled by the lagged outcome variable. As a result, in Table 3.1, the
outcome variables in columns (1) and (3) are spending changes scaled by the per capita wage
35This cost is smaller than the administrative cost of the National Referendum about the decriminalisation
of abortion held in 2007 that, according to the same source, had a 9,1em cost.
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bill, in columns (2) and (4) by the mean wage and in columns (3) and (5) by the number of
workers
Table 3.1: Effects of election episodes on local government spending.
Investment Expenditure (per-capita) Current Expenditure (per-capita)
Wage bill Mean Wage Workers Wage bill Mean Wage Workers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
D.local_election 44.686∗∗∗ 4.299∗∗∗ 4.760∗∗∗ 32.837∗∗∗ 2.830∗∗∗ 3.364∗∗∗
[11.254] [0.705] [1.397] [10.727] [0.691] [1.062]
D.general_election 15.645 1.627∗∗ 1.127 -5.757 -1.152 -0.535
[12.553] [0.627] [1.414] [9.829] [0.628] [0.986]
D.european_election -27.455∗∗ -1.385∗∗ -3.329∗∗ 9.755 0.279 0.948
[13.082] [0.687] [1.510] [6.619] [0.431] [0.712]
D.presidential_election 75.473∗∗∗ 4.056∗∗∗ 7.990∗∗∗ 15.863 0.785 1.251
[16.834] [0.904] [1.888] [14.722] [0.941] [1.468]
D.any_non_local_election -6.998 -1.029 -1.032 -19.282∗∗ -1.759∗∗∗ -1.833∗∗
[12.287] [0.644] [1.406] [8.008] [0.506] [0.801]
N 7733 7733 7733 7733 7733 7733
Investment Expenditure is defined as the year-on-year change in local Investment Spending per capita, divided by the lagged
outcome variable of interest (Current Expenditure is defined analogously). The explanatory variables D.local_election,
D.general_election, D.european_election and D.presidential_election are dummies that are equal to one in every year a local,
general, European or presidential election occurs, respectively. D.any_non_local_election is a dummy variable, equal to one
when a non-local election episode occurs. All regressions are estimated separately and in all cases they include municipal
fixed effects. Standard errors, reported in brackets, are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered at the NUTSIII×year
level. Significance levels: ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Overall, there is no consistent pattern (of positive correlation) in any type of election aside
from the local elections, which shows that these politically motivated spending spikes are
specifically associated with municipal elections. The only exception are the presidential
elections, for investment expenditures. These results are driven by the fact that presidential
and local elections sometimes occur in the same year. Moreover, the Portuguese President
has no executive powers in general and cannot influence the budget of local municipalities
directly. So it is not plausible that spending in local elections is being driven by presidential
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elections. To circumvent possible confounding effects due to the timing of non-local and
local elections, in the last line of the table we report the estimates for a dummy that is equal
to one whenever non-local election occurs. The coefficients are negative in all cases and are
significant only for current expenditures, establishing that, on average, a non-local election
has, at best, a negative impact on local spending.
Our instrument therefore satisfies the conditions for unbiased estimates of local fiscal mul-
tipliers. Moreover, it has the potential of being replicable for future research; in fact, it
was already used by Levitt (1997). Most studies about local fiscal multipliers are based on
the particularities of the ARRA (Chodorow-Reich et al. 2012, Wilson 2012 or Dupor and
McCrory 2018) or using a set-up with strong links to country particularities. Acconcia et al.
(2014), for instance, uses council dismissals in Italian municipalities as an instrument for
the decline in local spending, an identification strategy that is unlikely to be usable in other
settings.
3.5 Baselines Multipliers
In this section we present the baseline estimates of the main model, described by equation
3.1. In each of the following tables we present the estimates of local investment and current
expenditure on the three outcome variables of interest: the wage bill, the mean wage and
the number of full-time workers in the municipality. Overall, OLS estimation of equation
3.1, reported in the first two columns of each table, yields multipliers of the expected sign,
but very small and generally not statistically significant. Our IV estimates, obtained from
estimating equations 3.2 and 3.3 in a 2SLS framework, provide more sizeable multipliers,
both for investment and current expenditure.
The impact multipliers of local spending on the wage bill are presented in Table 3.2. The first
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stage estimates show a clear positive impact of local elections on local government spending,
particularly for investment expenditure. The F-test of excluded instruments is well above
10 (42 for investment expenditure and 19 for current expenditure), which provides further
support for our identification strategy.
Table 3.2: Wage Bill Multipliers
OLS IV
1st St. 2nd St. 1st St. 2nd St.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Investment_Exp.t 0.00** 0.09***
[0.00] [0.02]
Current_Exp.t 0.00 0.12***
[0.00] [0.04]
D.local_electiont 30.94*** 22.89***
[4.66] [5.18]
Observations 7172 7172 7172 7172 7172 7172
R2 0.02 0.02 0.05 - 0.29 -
F-stat 4.12 3.73 11.89 6.18 5.49 6.34
p-value 0.0011 0.0024 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000
Ftest (Inst.) - - 42.14 - 18.72 -
p-value - - 0.0000 - 0.0000 -
Notes: Annual data at municipal level, between 1986 and 2014. Investment Expenditure is defined
as the year-on-year change in local Investment Spending per capita, divided by the previous’
year private-sector wage bill (Current Expenditure is defined analogously). The Wage bill is the
percentage change on the per-capita municipal expenditure in private-sector wages of full-time
employees (at least 140 paid hours/month). All estimated equations are population weighted
and include municipality fixed effects, municipal-specific time trends and a set of microeconomic,
macroeconomic and political controls. Two lags of the spending and the outcome variable are also
included. Standard errors, reported in brackets, are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered at
the NUTSIII×year level. Estimation is done by two-stage least-squares, using D.local_election
as an instrumental variable, which is equal to one in all local election years. Significance levels: *
p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
The impact of these politically motivated spending spikes on the wage bill is 0.09, for in-
vestment expenditure, and 0.12 for current expenditure, both significant up to the 1% level.
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These figures imply that a spending increase of 1% causes a contemporaneous increase of
0.1% in the wage bill.
Table C.4, in Appendix C.3, shows the effects of the lags of the outcome and explanatory
variables. Interestingly, both the first and the second lags of investment expenditures are
significant and positive (column 4), implying that investment expenditure affect the wage
bill beyond the immediate contemporaneous effect. For current expenditures, the results are
analogous, although only the first lag is significant.
Following Acconcia et al. (2014), we calculate the dynamic multipliers of investment and
current expenditure, by adding up the coefficients of contemporaneous and one-year lag of
spending (while correcting for lagged effects of the outcome variable), to capture the (two
years) cumulative effects of local spending.36 For investment expenditures this dynamic
multiplier amounts to 0.09, while for current expenditures it is approximately 0.17.37 Notice
also that investment and current spending decisions do not seem to be a result of local
economic activity. The coefficients of the two lags of the wage bill are not significant in the
first stage equations, as it is shown in columns (3) and (5).
Albeit statistically strong, the actual point estimates in Table 3.2 seem relatively small. As
discussed before, the total wage expenditure in a municipality is driven by two different
components, the actual wages paid (price effect) and the number of people employed in the
municipality (quantity effect). Wages and the number of workers may react differently to
contemporaneous spending spikes leading to confounding effects on the wage bill.
The results in Table 3.3 show that the wage-bill impact is mostly driven by municipal private-
sector employment.
36As usual in fiscal multiplier literature, we assume that lagged spending is exogenous to the current state
of the economy.
37Using the information on Table C.4, Appendix C.3, the calculations are straightforward: βinv ≈ 0.085 ≈
0.09+0.01
1−(−0.17) and βcurr ≈ 0.17 ≈ 0.12+0.081−(−0.19) .
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Table 3.3: Workers’ Multipliers
OLS IV
1st St. 2nd St. 1st St. 2nd St.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Investment_Exp.t 0.01 1.50**
[0.01] [0.64]
Current_Exp.t 0.01 1.71**
[0.01] [0.83]
D.local_electiont 1.30*** 1.14***
[0.35] [0.42]
Observations 7172 7172 7172 7172 7172 7172
R2 0.03 0.03 0.07 - 0.27 -
F-stat 2.68 2.48 7.09 2.44 3.64 3.01
p-value 0.0205 0.0305 0.0000 0.0330 0.0029 0.0107
F-test (Inst.) - - 13.41 - 6.99 -
p-value - - 0.0003 - 0.0084 -
Notes: Annual data at municipal level, between 1986 and 2014. Investment Expenditure is defined
as the year-on-year change in local Investment Spending per capita, divided by the previous’
year total number of full-time private-sector workers in the municipality (Current expenditure
is defined analogously). Workers is the percentage change on the total number of full-time (at
least 140 paid hours/month) private-sector workers in the municipality. All estimated equations
are population weighted and include municipality fixed effects, municipal-specific time trends
and a set of microeconomic, macroeconomic and political controls. Two lags of the spending
and the outcome variable are also included. Standard errors, reported in brackets, are robust
to heteroskedasticity and clustered at the NUTSIII×year level. Estimation is done by two-stage
least-squares, using D.local_election as an instrumental variable, which is equal to one in all
local election years. Significance levels: ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
An election leads to an average increase of 1.30% of per capita investment expenditure scaled
by the lagged employment level (column 3). This positive impact is highly statistically
significant and leads to a positive change in the number of workers in the municipality. An
exogenous spike in local investment expenditure by 1% of the number of workers in the
municipality leads to an increase in the number of full-time workers of 1.5%.
For current expenditure the effects are similar, albeit not as strong statistically. The positive
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relation between election episodes and spikes in current expenditure changes is present,
however the F-test for the first stage is below the usual threshold of 10. Even so, we reject
the null that the instruments are weak up the 1% significance level, which provides some
support to our identification strategy.
These results can be interpreted in light of the particularities of each spending variable.
Investment expenditures include items such as the construction or improvement in roads
or municipal buildings, such as schools or health care facilities and therefore require the
municipality to hire firms from the construction sector, which may respond to the temporary
demand shock by hiring more workers. The lion’s share of current expenditures are the
payroll costs of local public servants and purchases of current goods, whose connection with
contemporaneous private sector employment level is less direct.
To better illustrate the impact of spending on local job creation, we can calculate the cost-
per-job implied by the workers’ multipliers.38 The per capita cost-per-job is calculated as the
inverse of the workers’ multiplier, which for investment expenditures is 1/β = 1/1.50 ≈ 0.67
while for current expenditure it amounts to 1/β = 1/1.71 ≈ 0.58. The total monetary cost
can be obtained by using the population level of the mean municipality in our sample (35
154 inhabitants), this implies that the average municipality can produce a private-sector job
with 23 436e investment expenditure and 20 558e of current expenditure.39
As in other comparable studies, we find that the OLS estimates have a significant downward
bias, particularly when we assess spending effects on the number of workers. This bias
indicates that local policy spending choices are not systematically driven by the state of
38Serrato and Wingender (2016), Chodorow-Reich et al. (2012) and Buchheim and Watzinger (2017) while
using different methodologies to compute their employment multipliers, report the cost-per-job to make
comparisons with other studies easier.
39Using the average municipality population across time does not condition our estimate of the cost-per-
job significantly, as population has been relatively constant overtime during the time span of the analysis.
The municipal population yearly average varies across time between 34 041 and a peak of 36 187, which
would imply a cost-per-job between 22 694e and 24 125e.
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the local economy.40 At the same time, the existence of anticipation effects seems to be less
relevant in our case. First, the presence of anticipation effects would mean that our multiplier
estimates would be a lower bound estimate, which would indicate that the employment
multiplier could be even higher. Second, although economic agents may expect municipal
spending to increase in electoral years, they can neither anticipate it with certainty, nor
anticipate the exact dimension of the increase.
It is also important to stress that our cost-per-job, ranging from $24 875 to $28 358, lies
comfortably within analogous estimates from previous works.41 Corbi et al. (2017), for
instance, by exploring the discontinuties in terms of population thresholds that govern the
allocation of federal transfers to municipalities in Brazil, estimate a cost-per-job of $8 000.
Adelino et al. (2017), on the other hand, estimate that on averege the cost of creating a job
in US muncipalities is approximately $20 000. Similarly, Buchheim and Watzinger (2017)
evaluating the effects of a sizeable German infrastructure stimulus package at the county
level, estimates a cost-per-job of 25 000e. Chodorow-Reich et al. (2012) finds a similar cost-
per-job of $26 000 as a result of the countercyclical impulse provided by the transfers to state
government under the ARRA, in 2008. Finally, Serrato and Wingender (2016) estimates that
the cost-per-job generated by a rise in federal transfers to US counties amounts to $ 30 000.42
The results for the the mean wage are presented in Table 3.4, where the first stage estimates,
on columns (3) and (5) of Table 3.4, and the respective F-tests of excluded instruments, show
40Acconcia et al. (2014) point out that the size of the downward bias of a positive OLS multiplier could be
a result of a high degree of countercyclical fiscal policy. Given the particularities of our municipal spending
variables, we believe that it is not the case here. As discussed, municipal expenditure at t is defined in the
municipal budget at the end of t−1, meaning that it is not likely that expenditure reacts contemporaneously
to the state of the local economy. Additionally, the first and second lags of our outcome variables in the first
stage equations of Tables C.4 to C.6 are generally not significant in explaining the evolution of the spending
variables of reference.
41The conversion to USD was done using the average exchange rate of USD-EUR between 1999 and 2016,
based on the annual period-average exchange rate from the IFS database of IMF.
42Others studies identify higher figures for the cost of creating one job position, namely Wilson (2012)
$125k/job or Dube et al. (2014), $120k/job, both in the US.
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again that spending increases significantly in election years.
Table 3.4: Wage Multipliers
OLS IV
1st St. 2nd St. 1st St. 2nd St.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Investment_Exp.t 0.02*** 0.10
[0.01] [0.07]
Current_Exp.t 0.02 0.15
[0.01] [0.11]
D.local_electiont 3.89*** 2.53***
[0.51] [0.44]
Observations 7172 7172 7172 7172 7172 7172
R2 0.08 0.08 0.13 - 0.28 -
F-stat 18.74 13.28 47.45 15.30 7.32 13.02
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Ftest (Inst.) - - 56.35 - 32.03 -
p-value - - 0.0000 - 0.0000 -
Notes: Annual data at municipal level, between 1986 and 2014. Investment Expenditure is defined
as the year-on-year change in local Investment Spending per capita, divided by the previous’ year
mean private-sector wage of full-time employees (Current Expenditure is defined analogously).
Wage is the percentage change on the mean municipal private-sector wage of full-time employees
(at least 140 paid hours/month). All estimated equations are population weighted and include
municipality fixed effects, municipal-specific time trends and a set of microeconomic, macroeco-
nomic and political controls. Two lags of the spending and the outcome variable are also in-
cluded. Standard errors, reported in brackets, are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered at
the NUTSIII×year level. Estimation is done by two-stage least-squares, using D.local_election
as an instrumental variable, which is equal to one in all local election years. Significance levels: *
p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
The fiscal multipliers, although positive and more sizeable than the OLS estimates, are not
statistically significant. In practice, this means that local spending spikes do not lead to con-
temporaneous changes in the mean wage. It is reasonable that, anticipating downward wage
rigidity, employers are reluctant to increase wages following a temporary shock, anticipating
that they will not be able to decrease them subsequently, if needed.43 In fact, according to
43Several studies document the high wage rigidities in the Portuguese labour market, namely as a result of
Bruno Carvalho 117
Table C.5 in Appendix C.3, if wages respond to spending changes, that effect is mostly for
investment expenditure and with a one period lag, as the impact of Investment_Exp.t−1 in
the mean wage is positive and statistically significant.
3.5.1 Including spending from years prior to local elections
Our identification strategy is based on the hypothesis that mayors increase local spending
to increase electoral success. So far, we considered only the expenditure spikes that occur
in the year of the election. However, Figure 3.4 suggests that at least some of the electoral
motivated spending may occur in the year prior to the election.44
We include the effects of the year prior to the election by expanding our set of instrumental
variables. Consequently our first stage equation becomes:
gt,i = αi + ηtrendt,i + δ1D.local_electiont + δ2D.local_electiont−1 + γXt,i + vt,i, (3.4)
where D.local_electiont is a dummy variable equal to one in all local election years (and
zero otherwise) and D.local_electiont−1 is a similar variable, equal to one in all years prior
to an election episode. Consequently, δ1 measures contemporaneous effect and δ2 measures
the lagged effect of local elections on our local spending variables. The remaining variables,
as well as the second stage equation, defined by equation 3.3, remain the same.
Table 3.5 shows the first and second stage estimates for investment and current expenditure
on the mean wages and on the number of full time workers. It is interesting to note that the
the prohibition, by law, to reduce wages (downward wage rigidity). As Martins (2015) points out, based on
survey data on Portuguese firms, downward wage rigidity constraints are less biding only for firms with a low
fraction of permanent and high-skilled workers, particularly when the share of the flexible wage components
is high.
44The implementation of ambitious investment projects (building council housing, for instance) takes
longer and so they may need to start in the year prior to the election.
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F-test of excluded instruments is higher for investment expenditures, which is the spending
item that is more likely to be enacted in the year before the election, as discussed above.
This is confirmed by the coefficients of D.local_electiont−1, which is higher for investment
expenditures’ changes (columns (1) and (5)). The F-tests of excluded instruments are above
10 for both the investment and current expenditure.
Table 3.5: Wage and Workers’ Multipliers (including year prior to local election)
Panel A: Mean Wage Panel B: Workers
1st St. 2nd St. 1st St. 2nd St. 1st St. 2nd St. 1st St. 2nd St.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Investment_Exp.t 0.18** 0.91*
[0.07] [0.48]
Current_Exp.t 0.28** 1.31*
[0.13] [0.69]
D.local_electiont 4.30*** 2.53*** 1.52*** 1.28***
[0.52] [0.46] [0.37] [0.46]
D.local_electiont−1 1.00** 0.44* 0.65* 0.36***
[0.44] [0.26] [0.34] [0.12]
Observations 7172 7172 7172 7172 7172 7172 7172 7172
R2 0.033 - 0.006 - 0.051 - 0.001 -
F-stat 27.41 17.23 6.02 16.78 8.50 3.08 2.71 3.65
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0158 0.0196 0.0000
F-test (Inst.) 32.44 - 14.23 - 8.12 - 5.28 -
p-value 0.0000 - 0.0000 - 0.0003 - 0.0053 -
Notes: Annual data at municipal level, between 1986 and 2014. Investment Expenditure is defined as the year-on-year change
in local Investment Spending per capita, divided by the previous’ year relevant outcome variable (mean private-sector wage
or the number of full-time employees in the private sector). The outcome variables, Wage or Workers, are defined as the
percentage change, in the municipality, of the outcome variables of interest. All estimated equations are population weighted
and include municipality fixed effects, municipal-specific time trends and a set of microeconomic, macroeconomic and political
controls. One lag (2nd order) of the outcome and explanatory variables are also included (not shown). Standard errors,
reported in brackets, are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered at the NUTSIII×year level. Estimation is done by two-
stage least-squares, using D.local_electiont and D.local_electiont−1 as instrumental variables, which are equal to one,
respectively, in years of local elections and in years prior to local elections. Significance levels: ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗
p < 0.01
The inclusion of the year prior to the election reduces the power of our instruments for
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the employment specifications, as both for investment and current expenditures the F-test
of excluded instruments is below 10. Even so, the implied multipliers are positive and
statistically significant at the 10% level. Employment multipliers are slightly lower (between
0.9 and 1.3) than in the baseline specification.
Including the effect of previous year expenditure generates a positive and statistically sig-
nificant effect on the mean wage. This suggests that wages may take longer to adjust than
employment, although we interpret this result with caution, given the rigidity of the wages
documented in previous literature. It may be that these results are driven by the creation
of better paid jobs or by the variable components of the wage. The small magnitude of the
impact – an increase of 1% of local spending, scaled by the lagged mean wage, leads to a
boost of the mean wage between 0.2% and 0.3% – confirms our cautious interpretation of
the result.
3.6 State-Dependent Multipliers
The literature about state-dependent fiscal multipliers takes advantage of diverse economic
conditions to estimate heterogeneous fiscal multipliers, e.g., depending on the business cycle
(Caggiano, Castelnuovo, Colombo, and Nodari, 2015), for countercyclical spending in reces-
sions (Riera-Crichton, Vegh, and Vuletin, 2015), in recession periods associated with banking
stress or weak public finances (Hernández de Cos and Moral-Benito, 2016), or near the zero
lower bound (Ramey and Zubairy, 2018). (Ilzetzki, Mendoza, and Végh, 2013) expanded
the heterogeneity dimensions to include the level of debt, the exchange rate regime or the
level of development of the country.45 Evidence of state-dependence at subnational level is
more scarce. Nakamura and Steinsson (2014), for instance, shows that subnational spending
45Parker (2011) provides a discussion about the need and relevance of reflecting the economic cycle in the
estimation of fiscal multipliers.
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multipliers are higher in periods of national and state-level economic slack (measured by
unemployment).
In the next sections we i) discuss the effects of municipality size on the fiscal multipliers
and ii) assess whether the local political cycle affects both the spending spikes and the local
output effects. Having established that our results are driven by local employment, we focus
on the number of workers as the outcome variable of interest.
3.6.1 Are multipliers affected by the size of the municipality?
The size of the municipality is likely to affect the value of the local fiscal multipliers. Bigger
municipalities have more dynamic labour markets and financial resources of such municipal-
ities are also potentially higher. Moreover, the potential scope for large spikes in investment
expenditure is also higher, as repairing a central avenue in a big city is most likely more
expensive than doing a similar repair in a small village.
An obvious way of assessing heterogenous effects of local spending in municipalities of differ-
ent sizes is to focus on their population level. We do so by running the baseline regressions
discussed in the last section, but for samples restricted on population quartiles. As the
overall population level does not change very expressively during the period of our analysis,
we compute population quartiles using the whole sample. Therefore, for each outcome vari-
able, we run four separate regressions, using the same baseline specification, except for the
inclusion of population weighting in the estimation procedure. We estimate the multipliers
for municipalities that lie between the 3 quartiles: Q1=8119, Q2=16 097 and Q3=37 438.
Table 3.6 shows the effects of local spending on the number of full time workers in the
municipality. The effects are more sizeable as the population level increases. Increasing
investment expenditure by 1% leads to an increase of 7.64% of municipal employment, which
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corresponds to a cost-per-job of 13 025e, while for current expenditure this figure amounts
to 8 469e, for the average municipality.46
Table 3.6: Workers’ Multipliers, by population level.
pop ≤ Q1 Q1 < pop ≤ Q2 Q2 < pop ≤ Q3 pop > Q3
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Investment_Exp.t 0.21* 0.04 1.76** 7.64*
[0.12] [0.17] [0.86] [4.04]
Current_Exp.t 0.54** 0.03 1.84** 11.75*
[0.26] [0.11] [0.77] [6.33]
Observations 1845 1845 1768 1768 1756 1756 1803 1803
F-stat 5.45 4.74 2.30 2.15 3.42 5.89 1.81 1.76
p-value 0.0001 0.0003 0.0438 0.0582 0.0047 0.0000 0.1091 0.1183
F-test (Inst.) 6.86 9.91 12.25 2.35 9.70 32.98 19.82 30.73
p-value 0.0091 0.0018 0.0005 0.1255 0.0019 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Notes: Annual data at municipal level, between 1986 and 2014. The estimation procedure and the definition of
all variables used are analogous to the one implemented in Table 3.3, except for the fact that regressions are not
population weighted. Population quartiles were determined for the whole sample and are such that Q1=8119,
Q2=16097 and Q3=37438. Significance levels: ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
The multiplier is significantly higher than the one obtained in our baseline estimates. This
shows that in bigger municipalities local spending is able to affect the local economy more
sizeably.
These findings could be a consequence of two issues. On one hand, smaller municipalities
are likely to have scarcer resources and so they cannot increase local spending enough so
that there is a significant impact on the private sector labour market.47 On the other hand,
smaller municipalities typically have less resident companies and so the Town Council may
46The cost-per-job is obtained by dividing the average population level, for the municipalities above the
third quartile (99512 inhabitants), by the value of the multiplier obtained in Table 3.6.
47To illustrate, the average investment per capita in municipalities in the first quartile of the population
is 148e while for the municipalities above the third quartile the figure amounts to 425e.
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need to hire companies in neighbouring municipalities to undertake the projects.48
For reference, we also report in Appendix C.4.1 the estimates, by population level, for the
wage bill and the mean wage. Table C.8 shows that both the wage bill multipliers and
the relevance of our instrument (evaluated by the F-test of excluded instruments) increase
as population increases. The effects over the wage bill are more visible above the median
municipality, population wise. For municipalities above the third quartile an increase of
spending, scaled by the per capita wage bill, of 1% increases the municipal wage expenditure
by 0.14% for investment expenditures and 0.25% for current expenditure. These results are
higher than the ones implied by our baseline estimates. The findings for the mean wage, in
Table C.9, are similar, although the effects over the mean wage are still not significant across
all the population quartiles.
Tables C.10 to C.12, in Appendix C.4.1, provide further support to these results. In each
table we calculate the multipliers for each of our outcome variables, by restricting the sam-
ple to the municipalities that have cities and coastal municipalities.49 These work as two
alternative measures of the size of the municipality. Overall, the results are similar.
3.6.2 Political Stance
We now analyse the extent to which mayors with higher political capital, as proxied by the
number of terms in office, give rise to differences in spending, and whether this translates into
heterogenous effects on the local economic activity. In this section, we do so by re-estimating
our baseline models using interactions.
48The average number of firms in municipalities in the first quartile is 131, municipalities above the third
quartile have, on average 2466 firms.
49According to Law 11/82, a village can be classified as a city if it has at least 8000 inhabitants and if it
possesses certain collective structures like hospitals, cultural centres, schools (at least up to the secondary
level) and public transportation, among others.
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Table 3.7: Workers’ Multipliers, for municipalities with the same mayor for more than 3
terms.
Panel A: Workers and Investment Exp. Panel B: Workers and Current Exp.
1st St. 1st St. 2nd St. 1st St. 1st St. 2nd St.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Investment_Exp.t 1.63**
[0.72]
D.high_termst × Investment_Exp.t -0.28
[0.82]
Current_Exp.t 3.02**
[1.24]
D.high_termst × Investment_Exp.t -2.21*
[1.24]
D.high_termst 0.36 0.10 -0.89 0.51 1.06*** 0.47
[0.36] [0.29] [0.65] [0.37] [0.36] [0.99]
D.local_electionst 1.25*** 0.17 0.85*** 0.27
[0.32] [0.11] [0.24] [0.18]
D.high_termst ×D.local_electionst 0.16 1.14** 1.15 1.59*
[0.50] [0.47] [0.88] [0.88]
Observations 7172 7172 7172 7172 7172 7172
R2 0.09 0.02 - 0.29 0.00 -
F-stat 5.90 3.28 2.29 4.19 2.87 2.86
p-value 0.0000 0.0019 0.0257 0.0002 0.0059 0.0061
F-test (Inst.) 7.53 3.40 - 6.41 1.54 -
p-value 0.0006 0.0339 - 0.0017 0.2151 -
Notes: Annual data at municipal level, between 1986 and 2014. Investment Expenditure is defined as the year-on-year change in local
Investment Spending per capita, divided by the previous’ year number of workers. The outcome variable is the percentage change of the
number of Workers, in the municipality. All estimated equations are population weighted and include municipality fixed effects, municipal-
specific time trends and a set of microeconomic, macroeconomic and political controls. Standard errors, reported in brackets, are robust
to heteroskedasticity and clustered at the NUTSIII×year level. Estimation is done by two-stage least-squares, using D.local_electiont
and D.high_termst ×D.local_electionst as instrumental variables. The former is equal to one in all election years and the latter is an
interaction term, equal to one for all municipalities whose mayor, in election years, is in power for more than 3 terms. Significance levels:
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Term limits for mayors – a maximum of three consecutive terms – were introduced in Portugal
in 2005, but only became binding in the 2013 election. Lopes da Fonseca (2016) shows that
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term limited mayors in Portugal are more fiscally conservative, in that they set lower tax
rate and spend less than their counterparts who can be up for reelection.50
In Table 3.7 we investigate the heterogenous effects of local spending multipliers for mayors
that have been in power for at least 3 terms.51 We define the threshold at 3 terms because
the average number of terms in our sample is 2.5 (ranging from 1 to 10) and because, in that
way, we can provide some rationale to the limit imposed by the Law 46/2005.
Both the coefficients of D.high_termst and of the interaction variable suggest that mayors
that have been in power for long spend more than mayors in earlier terms, although the
effects are not statistically significant (shown in columns 1 and 4).
Moreover, the economic effect of spending is smaller, particularly for current expenditures.
The fiscal multiplier is 3.02% for municipalities with mayors between the first and the third
terms. From the fourth term onwards, the employment multipliers reduces to 0.81% (3.02-
2.21), which is smaller than the 1.71% linear multiplier shown in Table 3.3. This figure
implies a cost-of-job created of 43 400e.
3.7 Conclusions
This paper uses a novel instrument to identify exogenous local spending shocks and estimate
local fiscal multipliers. We take advantage of the opportunistic behaviour of politicians in
electoral periods and instrument exogenous changes in local spending using a dummy variable
for the election year to capture electorally motivated expenditure.
50 Veiga and Veiga (2018) show that term-limits increase voter turnout in local Portuguese municipalities.
Dalle Nogare and Ricciuti (2011) surveys the literature about term limits, and shows that there is evidence
of different behaviour of term-limited central governments, for a panel of 52 countries. Klein and Sakurai
(2015), on the other hand, shows that first-terms mayors in Brazil (not term-limited) reduce local taxes and
shift spending from current to capital items in election years, to boost the probability of being reelected.
51D.high_terms is equal to one whenever num_terms > 3.
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Local elections in Portugal are scheduled by the central government and take place in fixed
four-year intervals and are, as such, exogenous to local policy makers. To establish that
elections are not per se a shock to local output, we investigate the logistics and financials
of local elections. We show that election episodes entail administrative and campaign costs
which represent a negligible share of 0.04% of GDP. Administrative costs are supported
mostly by the municipalities and campaign costs by political parties. Mandatory reports
are submitted to the Portuguese Constitutional Court in every election to detail campaign
budgets. Most of the revenues come from either central or local government allowances and
almost all the costs are associated with spending on promotional and campaigning materials.
Typically costs materialise in the campaign period, two weeks prior to the election day.
Therefore, it is unlikely that the direct cost of electoral episodes represents a shock to local
output which makes us confident about the validity of the instrument.
Using a rich panel dataset with detailed information on municipal level expenditure and
revenue, we analyse two expenditure items, local investment in fixed assets, and current
expenditure, and conclude that the former is more prone to political business cycles. We
then compute local fiscal multipliers of municipal spending on three local outcome variables
of interest: the total wage expenditure of full time workers in the private sector (wage bill),
the mean wage of private sector workers and the total number of full-time workers in the
municipality.
Overall, we find that local expenditure shocks in electoral years lead to contemporaneous
increase on both the wage bill (around 0.1%) and on the number of workers (between 1.5 and
1.7%). The municipal mean wage is more rigid and, if anything, responds with a one period
lag, with a small effect that ranges from 0.4 to 0.6%. These results are robust to different
specifications and to the inclusion of the year prior to election as an additional instrument.
We also evaluate the sensitivity of multipliers to different demographic, and political contexts.
Bruno Carvalho 126
On the behaviour of voters and politicians: Municipal elections and the economy.
We show that multipliers are higher for bigger municipalities and find evidence that mayors
in power for longer periods tend to produce spending (particularly current) that has smaller
effects on the local economic activity.
The main contributions of this paper are to provide a novel identification strategy and to
add to the literature on state-dependent multipliers by investigating previously unexplored
dimensions of heterogeneity.
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Appendix A
Title of Appendix
A.1 Campaigning in Portugal
A.1.1 The rules of campaigning in local elections
Law 19/2003 establishes the baseline set-up that regulates campaign spending and funding
in Portuguese elections, depending on the election type. In what follows we summarise the
rules for local elections.
Campaign spending for local elections is limited, by a spending ceiling per municipality. This
ceiling is defined according to the number of eligible voters in the municipality and is binding
for every candidate/party running for office. The expenditure ceiling for each municipality
is defined using the reference value for social subsidies (IAS), then multiplied by a positive
constant, depending on the threshold for the specific municipality.1
As shown in Table A.1, municipalities are divided in four thresholds that depend directly
on the amount of eligible voters and a fifth that includes the two most important cities in
1IAS, Indexante dos Apoios Sociais, is defined every year by the central government and is used as a
reference (minimum) value for social transfers and other public spending. For reference, the value for 2017
was 421.32e.
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Table A.1: Spending Limits and number of municipalities per threshold.
Thresholds Num. Municipalities
Level Criteria Limit 2005 2009 2013
1 ≤ 10 000 eligible voters 150×IAS 118 114 113
2 > 10 000 and ≤ 50 000 eligible voters 300×IAS 150 146 145
3 > 50 000 and < 100 000 eligible voters 450×IAS 21 25 26
4 ≥ 100 000 eligible voters 900×IAS 17 21 22
5 Lisbon and Oporto 1350×IAS 2 2 2
Portugal.2
Table A.1 also includes the number of municipalities in our sample that are associated to
each threshold. Albeit the distribution is fairly stable, the number of municipalities in levels
three and four has been increasing, at the expense of the two bottom levels.
Spending limits within each threshold should evolve primarily due to the yearly updates of
IAS, however subsequent legislation imposed additional restrictions during the period of our
analysis. For the 2005 election the reference value was, in practice, the minimum wage of
374.70e, while for the 2009 and 2013 elections the minimum wage level for 2008, 426e, was
used. The total spending limit for each threshold level was reduced even further by the Law
1/2013, that imposed an additional cut of 20% for each level, with immediate effects on the
2013 election.
The spending limits in place in each election, for each threshold, are shown in Table A.2.
Overall, limits increased slightly from 2005 to 2009 and declined sharply in the 2013 election.
Notice also that, by construction, the 20% cut penalized municipalities in the top levels to a
larger extent, in absolute terms. In Lisbon and Oporto, for instance, the reduction amounted
to 126ek.
Funding for elections is also heavily regulated. Allowed revenue streams are divided in four
2Lisbon and Oporto are the two biggest and most important cities in Portugal. The corresponding
municipalities, albeit not necessarily the ones with the highest number of eligible voters, have a higher
spending limit.
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Table A.2: Spending Limits per threshold level and year.
Spending Limits
Level 2005 2009 2013
1 61 822.32 64 311.18 50 321.94
2 123 644.65 128 622.36 100 643.88
3 185 466.97 192 933.56 150 965.81
4 370 933.95 385 867.13 301 931.63
5 556 400.92 578 800.69 452 897.44
Values reported at constant prices (2010).
items: the public funding for the election, parties’ contributions, donations and fundraisers.
Donations and fundraising in cash are limited to 25e per donor, higher donations are allowed
whenever the identity of the donor can be tracked (up to a limit of 22 482e, per donor).3
Parties’ can use their own funds in campaign spending, provided that the funds are allocated
to spending in a particular municipality.
A.1.2 Candidates’ reports on campaign spending and revenue
Figure A.1: Revenue Report of Socialist party in municipality of Amadora (2013 election).
3Figures report to the 2005 local election.
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Figure A.2: Expenditure report of Socialist party in municipality of Amadora (2013 election).
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A.2 OLS estimation: Additional Tables
Table A.3: OLS estimates, using spending by 4 biggest parties. (with controls)
vsharePS vsharePSD vshareCDS vsharePCP
(1) (2) (3) (4)
cspendingPS 0.083∗∗∗
[0.015]
cspendingPSD 0.090∗∗∗
[0.022]
cspendingCDS 0.135∗∗
[0.061]
cspendingPCP 0.057∗∗∗
[0.020]
cspendingmun -0.046∗∗∗ -0.059∗∗∗ -0.007 -0.016∗∗∗
[0.007] [0.019] [0.006] [0.004]
population -0.000∗∗ -0.000 0.000 0.000
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
D.inc_run 0.300 1.108 -0.217 -1.255∗∗∗
[0.935] [1.133] [1.389] [0.448]
num_terms -0.424 0.575∗ -0.199 0.432∗∗∗
[0.265] [0.323] [0.379] [0.145]
num_candidates -1.096∗∗ -2.525∗∗∗ -0.905 -0.256
[0.423] [0.591] [0.752] [0.198]
L.D.alignedTC -1.111∗∗ 0.933 -0.376 -0.075
[0.504] [0.609] [0.431] [0.231]
N 914 675 464 892
R2 0.141 0.353 0.120 0.107
F 10.837 20.579 3.376 7.010
p 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000
Campaign spending variables in thousands. All regressions include fixed effects, time
dummies and controls. Robust and clustered standard errors at municipal level. ∗
p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A.4: Individual campaign spending effects, by party.
vsharePS vsharePSD vshareCDS vsharePCP
(1) (2) (3) (4)
cspendingPS 0.088∗∗∗ -0.059∗∗∗ -0.017 0.002
[0.029] [0.022] [0.011] [0.007]
cspendingPSD -0.043∗ 0.066∗∗∗ -0.010 -0.033∗∗
[0.023] [0.023] [0.010] [0.013]
cspendingCDS -0.116 -0.058 0.180∗∗∗ -0.004
[0.072] [0.087] [0.062] [0.015]
cspendingPCP 0.043 -0.089∗∗ -0.024 0.089∗∗
[0.047] [0.043] [0.019] [0.044]
population -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000∗
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
D.inc_run -2.719∗ 3.537∗∗ 0.248 -0.646
[1.446] [1.479] [1.368] [0.728]
num_terms 0.221 -0.211 -0.253 0.175
[0.459] [0.431] [0.391] [0.186]
num_candidates -1.829∗ -1.923∗∗ -0.618 -0.614
[0.957] [0.876] [0.510] [0.434]
L.D.alignedTC -0.411 1.778∗∗ -0.601∗ 0.271
[0.877] [0.877] [0.355] [0.375]
N 463 462 438 458
R2 0.109 0.333 0.114 0.142
F 2.198 10.329 3.384 3.519
p 0.015 0.000 0.000 0.000
Campaign spending variables in thousands. All regressions include fixed effects, time
dummies and controls. Robust and clustered standard errors at municipal level. ∗
p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A.5: OLS estimates, using spending of winner and runner up.
vsharewinner vsharerunner−up win_margin
(1) (2) (3)
cspendingwinner 0.015 -0.005 0.020
[0.011] [0.009] [0.016]
cspendingrunner−up -0.035∗∗∗ 0.055∗∗∗ -0.090∗∗∗
[0.009] [0.011] [0.018]
cspendingmun -0.021∗∗ -0.017∗∗∗ -0.004
[0.008] [0.005] [0.010]
population 0.000 -0.000 0.000
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
D.inc_run 3.870∗∗∗ -2.143∗∗∗ 6.012∗∗∗
[0.746] [0.703] [1.319]
num_terms 0.247 -0.430∗ 0.677
[0.223] [0.222] [0.415]
num_candidates -2.201∗∗∗ -1.220∗∗∗ -0.981∗
[0.359] [0.316] [0.592]
L.D.alignedTC 0.370 -0.704∗ 1.074
[0.423] [0.401] [0.748]
N 903 903 903
R2 0.288 0.174 0.179
F 19.723 11.211 11.897
p 0.000 0.000 0.000
Campaign spending variables in thousands. All regressions include fixed effects, time
dummies and controls. Robust and clustered standard errors at municipal level. ∗
p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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A.3 Expected Statutory Allowance
Table A.6: Difference between vote shares for Town Council (TC) and Municipal Assembly
(MA).
Obs. Mean S.D. Min. Max.
vshare_TCPS − vshare_MAPS 1 209 0.7 2.97 -7.8 21.6
vshare_TCPSD − vshare_MAPSD 939 0.96 2.93 -9.9 15
vshare_TCCDS − vshare_MACDS 591 -0.58 1.74 -24.9 18.6
vshare_TCPCP − vshare_MAPCP 1 196 -0.64 1.72 -10.3 9.1
Table A.7: Instrumental Variables: Expected Statutory Allowances.
Obs. Mean S.D. Min. Max.
ESA_winner 924 77 742.85 47 108.66 13 944.7 349 607.7
ESA_runnerup 924 60 278.93 40 187.8 0 346 340.6
ESA_PS 899 65 019.36 40 700.3 11 834.5 300 708.7
ESA_PSD 614 63 835.16 36 305.95 7 240.1 259 519.6
ESA_CDS 239 25 575.93 17 115.66 5 684.2 97 857.9
ESA_PCP 638 34 513.38 31 798.07 6 018.1 237 355.4
A.3.1 ESA for winner and runner-up: Assumptions
To compute the ESA in the winner and runner-up perspective we need assumptions that
cover the following cases: i) if the winner/runner-up is part of a coalition today, but in the
previous election he run by himself; ii) if the winner/runner-up runs alone, but was part of
a coalition in the former election; iii) if the winner/runner-up is an independent candidate
running for the first time.
If in election t two parties run in a coalition, while they run separately in t−1, we argue that
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the coalition expects to gather in t the sum of the individual vote shares in t−1. In the second
case, that is if in election t two parties run separately, but in t − 1 they run in a coalition,
we infer the relative importance of the coalition members in t− 1 based on the last election
where they run separately. Finally, for independent candidates we assume, preferably, the
average vote share of independent candidates in the same district.4 Whenever this vote
share is not available (or it is made only of one observation), we take the national average
instead. In both cases, this averages provide a reasonable expectation of electoral success
for independent candidates, in a set-up dominated by party-candidates. If the independent
candidate was associated to party in the previous election, the lagged Municipal Assembly
share assumed is the simple average between the measure of the expectation of independent
candidates and the vote share of that party in the same period/municipality.5
4Portugal is divided in 18 mainland districts. Although districts are not administrative regions, they
form the electoral constituencies based on which the seats in the national parliament are allocated in general
elections. Hence, they are the most relevant subnational division (above municipalities) for electoral purposes.
5This assumption reflects both the particularities of independent candidacies and the potential leverage
that these candidates may have as a result of being part of party in the previous election. If, for instance,
the independent candidate was elected in t− 1 through the Socialist Party, then part of the political capital
of the Socialist Party will in principle stick to the candidate when he runs independently. In fact, there are
cases where the independent candidate in t is the incumbent mayor elected by a given party in the prior
election. In such situations, it is clear that albeit losing the support of the party, this candidate will gather
votes from some former partisan voters.
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A.4 IV Estimation: Additional Tables
Table A.8: Effect of campaign spending of the winner.
vshare_TCwinner vshare_TCwinner vshare_TCwinner vshare_TCwinner
1st Stage 2nd Stage 1st Stage 2nd Stage 1st Stage 2nd Stage 1st Stage 2nd Stage
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
cspendingwinner 0.144∗∗∗ 0.144∗∗∗ 0.092∗∗ 0.029
[0.037] [0.039] [0.041] [0.026]
TSwinner 0.678∗∗∗ 0.678∗∗∗ 0.570∗∗∗ 0.582∗∗∗
[0.120] [0.120] [0.140] [0.142]
cspsendingmun 0.020 -0.032∗∗∗ 0.020 -0.032∗∗∗ 0.002 -0.035∗∗∗ 0.008 -0.026∗∗∗
[0.043] [0.011] [0.043] [0.011] [0.042] [0.008] [0.045] [0.007]
population -0.000 0.000
[0.001] [0.000]
D.inc_run 5.593∗∗ 3.864∗∗∗
[2.572] [0.754]
num_terms -3.082∗∗∗ 0.261
[0.889] [0.222]
num_candidates -3.946 -2.064∗∗∗
[2.456] [0.364]
L.D.aligned_TC -0.370 0.234
[1.725] [0.414]
N 914 914 914 914 914 914 914 914
R2 0.224 - 0.224 - 0.249 0.076 0.274 0.284
F 28.746 7.631 28.746 6.855 24.526 13.561 11.735 21.464
p 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
F-test excluded 30.83 - 32.00 - 16.55 - 16.91 -
p 0.000 - 0.000 - 0.000 - 0.000 -
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clust. Std. Errors No Yes Yes Yes
Time dummies No No Yes Yes
Campaign spending variables in thousands. Vote shares in a scale of 0-100. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A.9: Effect of campaign spending of the runner-up.
vshare_TCrunner−up vshare_TCrunner−up vshare_TCrunner−up vshare_TCrunner−up
1st Stage 2nd Stage 1st Stage 2nd Stage 1st Stage 2nd Stage 1st Stage 2nd Stage
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
cspendingrunner−up 0.127∗∗∗ 0.127∗∗∗ 0.144∗∗∗ 0.141∗∗∗
[0.030] [0.030] [0.040] [0.044]
TSrunner−up 0.583∗∗∗ 0.583∗∗∗ 0.507∗∗∗ 0.463∗∗∗
[0.097] [0.097] [0.105] [0.097]
cspsendingmun
population 0.001∗∗ -0.000
[0.001] [0.000]
D.inc_run -3.708∗ -1.867∗∗∗
[2.162] [0.718]
num_terms -0.753 -0.323
[0.730] [0.236]
num_candidates -3.772∗∗∗ -0.899∗∗
[1.418] [0.370]
L.D.aligned_TC 3.300∗ -0.973∗∗
[1.678] [0.417]
N 912 912 912 912 912 912 912 912
R2 0.160 0.024 0.160 0.024 0.183 - 0.218 0.062
F 22.271 9.216 22.271 9.122 19.950 6.682 13.765 10.651
p 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
F-test excluded 32.33 - 36.15 - 23.15 - 22.64 -
p 0.000 - 0.000 - 0.000 - 0.000 -
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clust. Std. Errors No Yes Yes Yes
Time dummies No No Yes Yes
Campaign spending variables in thousands. Vote shares in a scale of 0-100. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A.10: Effect of campaign spending of Socialist Party (PS)
vshare_TCPS vshare_TCPS vshare_TCPS vshare_TCPS
1st Stage 2nd Stage 1st Stage 2nd Stage 1st Stage 2nd Stage 1st Stage 2nd Stage
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
cspendingPS 0.094
∗∗∗ 0.094∗∗∗ 0.089∗∗∗ 0.082∗∗∗
[0.026] [0.026] [0.031] [0.031]
TSPS 0.737
∗∗∗ 0.737∗∗∗ 0.648∗∗∗ 0.600∗∗∗
[0.105] [0.105] [0.117] [0.110]
cspsendingmun 0.088∗∗ -0.049∗∗∗ 0.088∗∗ -0.049∗∗∗ 0.073∗∗ -0.048∗∗∗ 0.086∗∗ -0.047∗∗∗
[0.036] [0.010] [0.036] [0.010] [0.036] [0.010] [0.036] [0.009]
population 0.001 -0.000∗∗
[0.001] [0.000]
D.inc_run 0.284 0.613
[2.163] [0.921]
num_terms -0.325 -0.474∗
[0.865] [0.262]
num_candidates -4.458∗∗∗ -0.963∗∗
[1.524] [0.454]
L.D.aligned_TC -0.397 -1.024∗∗
[1.425] [0.507]
N 890 890 890 890 890 890 890 890
R2 0.240 0.101 0.240 0.101 0.250 0.110 0.268 0.130
F 27.039 14.099 27.039 13.111 24.385 10.175 12.696 7.822
p 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
F-test excluded 52.31 - 49.29 - 30.55 - 29.64 -
p 0.000 - 0.000 - 0.000 - 0.000 -
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clust. Std. Errors No Yes Yes Yes
Time dummies No No Yes Yes
Campaign spending variables in thousands. Vote shares in a scale of 0-100. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Bruno Carvalho 154
On the behaviour of voters and politicians: Municipal elections and the economy.
Table A.11: Effect of campaign spending of Social Democrat Party (PSD)
vshare_TCPSD vshare_TCPSD vshare_TCPSD vshare_TCPSD
1st Stage 2nd Stage 1st Stage 2nd Stage 1st Stage 2nd Stage 1st Stage 2nd Stage
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
cspendingPSD 0.375
∗∗∗ 0.375∗∗∗ 0.225∗ 0.188∗
[0.095] [0.104] [0.134] [0.110]
TSPSD 0.643
∗∗∗ 0.643∗∗∗ 0.462∗∗ 0.483∗∗
[0.120] [0.120] [0.198] [0.191]
cspsendingmun 0.110∗∗ -0.134∗∗∗ 0.110∗∗ -0.134∗∗∗ 0.092∗∗ -0.129∗∗∗ 0.069 -0.112∗∗∗
[0.052] [0.030] [0.052] [0.032] [0.046] [0.029] [0.045] [0.024]
population -0.000 -0.000
[0.001] [0.000]
D.inc_run 2.718 0.964
[2.735] [1.233]
num_terms -2.055∗∗ 0.671∗
[0.934] [0.375]
num_candidates 1.528 -2.541∗∗∗
[1.703] [0.648]
L.D.aligned_TC 2.412 0.681
[1.786] [0.714]
N 568 568 568 568 568 568 568 568
R2 0.228 - 0.228 - 0.312 0.257 0.330 0.353
F 21.454 11.261 21.454 9.393 31.802 28.068 14.895 17.806
p 0.000 . 0.000 . 0.000 . 0.000 .
F-test excluded 32.57 - 28.85 - 5.43 - 6.42 -
p 0.000 - 0.000 - 0.021 - 0.012 -
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clust. Std. Errors No Yes Yes Yes
Time dummies No No Yes Yes
Campaign spending variables in thousands. Vote shares in a scale of 0-100. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A.12: Effect of campaign spending of People’s Party (CDS)
vshare_TCCDS vshare_TCCDS vshare_TCCDS vshare_TCCDS
1st Stage 2nd Stage 1st Stage 2nd Stage 1st Stage 2nd Stage 1st Stage 2nd Stage
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
cspendingCDS -0.050 -0.050 0.012 -0.055
[0.198] [0.166] [0.165] [0.211]
TSCDS 0.436
∗∗ 0.436∗∗ 0.470∗∗ 0.404∗∗
[0.171] [0.171] [0.181] [0.157]
cspsendingmun -0.043 -0.015 -0.043 -0.015 -0.035 -0.005 -0.034 -0.008
[0.047] [0.010] [0.047] [0.009] [0.048] [0.010] [0.042] [0.011]
population -0.001 0.000
[0.001] [0.000]
D.inc_run -4.391∗ -0.848
[2.236] [2.885]
num_terms -0.578 -0.380
[0.824] [0.606]
num_candidates -4.288 -3.031∗
[3.385] [1.735]
L.D.aligned_TC 0.339 -0.675
[1.372] [0.860]
N 188 188 188 188 188 188 188 188
R2 0.107 - 0.107 - 0.113 0.030 0.243 0.069
F 3.656 1.276 3.656 1.309 1.959 0.968 4.220 1.762
p 0.029 0.283 0.029 0.276 0.105 . 0.000 .
F-test excluded 6.02 - 6.47 - 6.75 - 6.57 -
p 0.016 - 0.013 - 0.011 - 0.012 -
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clust. Std. Errors No Yes Yes Yes
Time dummies No No Yes Yes
Campaign spending variables in thousands. Vote shares in a scale of 0-100. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A.13: Effect of campaign spending of Communist Party (PCP)
vshare_TCPCP vshare_TCPCP vshare_TCPCP vshare_TCPCP
1st Stage 2nd Stage 1st Stage 2nd Stage 1st Stage 2nd Stage 1st Stage 2nd Stage
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
cspendingPCP 0.142 0.142 0.181
∗ 0.157
[0.122] [0.111] [0.101] [0.106]
TSPCP 0.301
∗∗∗ 0.301∗∗∗ 0.362∗∗∗ 0.356∗∗
[0.106] [0.106] [0.133] [0.137]
cspsendingmun 0.028 -0.023∗∗∗ 0.028 -0.023∗∗∗ 0.033 -0.025∗∗∗ 0.032 -0.022∗∗∗
[0.020] [0.008] [0.020] [0.008] [0.020] [0.009] [0.019] [0.008]
population 0.000 0.000
[0.000] [0.000]
D.inc_run 1.094 -2.028∗∗∗
[1.658] [0.675]
num_terms -0.886∗∗ 0.700∗∗∗
[0.438] [0.212]
num_candidates -0.930 -0.073
[0.890] [0.355]
L.D.aligned_TC 1.225 -0.387
[0.918] [0.392]
N 604 604 604 604 604 604 604 604
R2 0.097 0.003 0.097 0.003 0.105 -0.031 0.119 0.056
F 7.981 6.554 7.981 6.611 4.936 6.347 4.030 4.331
p 0.000 . 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000
F-test excluded 7.04 - 8.09 - 7.39 - 6.74 -
p 0.008 - 0.005 - 0.007 - 0.010 -
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clust. Std. Errors No Yes Yes Yes
Time dummies No No Yes Yes
Campaign spending variables in thousands. Vote shares in a scale of 0-100. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Appendix B
Title of Appendix
B.1 Experimental Design and Implementation
Figure B.1: Timeline of Experiment Implementation
Table B.1: Survey Contents
Baseline Treatment Follow-up
• Sociodemographics, political
orientation and interest in pol-
itics, past voting experience;
• Expected voting behaviour*;
• Feelings towards current gov-
ernment performance.
• Expected voting behaviour*;
• Treatment/Control informa-
tion;
• Updated voting behaviour and
updated feelings towards curr.
gov. performance.
• Realised voting behaviour*.
*Voting Behaviour includes: turnout, voting direction (candidate) and reasons,
for both voters and non-voters.
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Table B.2: Subjects of news, by type of survey.
Survey No. 1st Article 2nd Article
N
eg
at
iv
e/
P
os
it
iv
e 1/7 Public Finance Pensions
2/8 Public Finance Youth Employment
3/9 Public Finance Road Safety
4/10 Health Youth Employment
5/11 Health Education
6/12 Health Road Safety
C 13 Portuguese Dog Breed
Table B.3: Percentage of respondents by survey type and treatment/control groups.
Group Survey No. % % %
T. Neg
1 5.83
16.3
32.94
2 5.50
3 5.00
4 5.67
16.65 5.11
6 5.83
T. Pos
7 5.67
17.3
33.28
8 5.83
9 5.89
10 4.83
15.811 5.22
12 5.38
Control 13 33.78
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Table B.4: Balance tests.
Group Female ISCAL Age Displaced HH income Gov. perf. perc.
T. Pos 0.59 0.73 21.0 0.29 2530.4 0.16
T. Neg 0.60 0.74 21.7 0.29 2546.9 0.15
Control 0.57 0.74 21.2 0.29 2479.6 0.15
Pos./Neg. (p-value) 0.871 0.927 0.057 0.829 0.926 0.887
Treat./Contr. (p-value) 0.344 0.959 0.646 0.979 0.704 0.772
The last two rows present the t-test p-value for mean equality. The upper one test equality of means
between positive and negative treatment, while the bottom one between treatment and control groups.
B.2 Treatment: Survey Samples
Survey 6: Negative Information
Figure B.2: First Article, Health Care
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Figure B.3: Second Article, Road Safety
Survey 12: Positive Information
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Figure B.4: First Article, Health Care
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Figure B.5: Second Article, Road Safety
B.3 Government Performance measures
Figure B.6: General Government performance baseline (perfgov_b)
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Figure B.7: Policy area-specific performance
Figure B.8: General Government performance after treatment (perfgov_t)
B.4 Descriptive Statistics
Table B.5: Descriptive Statistics
Obs. Mean S.D. Min. Max.
Panel A: Socio-Demographic Characteristics
ISCAL 1 800 0,73 0,44 0 1
Undergraduate 1 797 0,97 0,16 0 1
Female 1 797 0,59 0,49 0 1
Age 1 784 21,32 5,97 16 54
Under legal age to vote until last elections (2016) 1 785 0,47 0,5 0 1
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Household size 1 728 3,59 1,15 1 11
HH income per capita (equiv.) 1 710 1352,72 1631,49 111,8 17677,7
Respondent contributes to HH: wages 1 794 0,21 0,41 0 1
Respondent contributes to HH: pensions 1 794 0,02 0,14 0 1
Respondent contributes to HH: subsidies/scholarship 1 794 0,1 0,29 0 1
Respondent does not contibute to HH 1 794 0,68 0,47 0 1
No religion 1 778 0,37 0,48 0 1
Catholic 1 778 0,55 0,5 0 1
At least one parent is unemployed 1 800 0,16 0,37 0 1
At least one parent attained high education 1 748 0,46 0,5 0 1
At least one parent is civil servant 1 761 0,27 0,44 0 1
Panel B: Turnout determinants and knowledge
Displaced student 1 793 0,29 0,45 0 1
Person in power makes difference 1 786 0,54 0,5 0 1
One vote makes difference 1 789 0,6 0,49 0 1
Understanding politics is complicated 1 780 0,17 0,38 0 1
Knows about term limits 477 0,7 0,46 0 1
Knows about D’Hondt method 477 0,16 0,37 0 1
Panel C: Interest and experience in politics
Self-reported interest in politics (1: No interest, 4: very interested) 1 789 2,6 0,78 1 4
Belongs to a political party as militant 1 775 0,06 0,24 0 1
Actively supported a candidate in this local election 1 794 0,06 0,23 0 1
Does not belong to any civil organization 1 775 0,73 0,45 0 1
Run for role appointed by suffrage in the past 1 777 0,4 0,49 0 1
Last local elections (2013): voted 1 791 0,16 0,37 0 1
Last local elections (2013): no age 1 791 0,77 0,42 0 1
Last parliamentary elections (2015): voted 1 786 0,36 0,48 0 1
Last parliamentary elections (2015): no age 1 786 0,52 0,5 0 1
Last presidential elections (2016): voted 1 785 0,39 0,49 0 1
Last presidential elections (2016): no age 1 785 0,47 0,5 0 1
General interest in this election (1: No interest, 4: very interested) 1 794 2,51 0,88 1 4
Participation in the project increased interest (self-reported) 1 783 0,21 0,4 0 1
Participation in the project boosted search for information (self-reported) 1 786 0,19 0,4 0 1
Panel D: Political preferences and opinion (general)
Knows which part of the political spectrum identifies with 1 772 0,72 0,45 0 1
Position in the spectrum results from own ideas 1 717 0,61 0,49 0 1
Position in the spectrum results from family and friend contexts 1 717 0,4 0,49 0 1
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Position in the spectrum results from opinion about politicians 1 717 0,22 0,41 0 1
Within the same party politicians share ideology no matter central or local
roles
1 758 0,49 0,5 0 1
Panel E: Political preferences and opinion (towards current government)
General gov. performance (-1: negative, 1: positive) 1 769 0,15 0,4 -1 1
Gov. performance (-1: negative, 1: positive): agriculture, forest and sea 1 731 -0,28 0,61 -1 1
Gov. performance (-1: negative, 1: positive): home affairs 1 714 -0,04 0,58 -1 1
Gov. performance (-1: negative, 1: positive): culture 1 726 0,26 0,59 -1 1
Gov. performance (-1: negative, 1: positive): defense 1 711 -0,09 0,58 -1 1
Gov. performance (-1: negative, 1: positive): education 1 722 0,09 0,69 -1 1
Gov. performance (-1: negative, 1: positive): economy 1 727 0,32 0,68 -1 1
Gov. performance (-1: negative, 1: positive): public finance 1 719 0,23 0,67 -1 1
Gov. performance (-1: negative, 1: positive): health 1 721 -0,17 0,62 -1 1
Gov. performance (-1: negative, 1: positive): labor and social security 1 722 0,09 0,63 -1 1
Considers using the vote to send a message to gov. 1 761 0,33 0,47 0 1
Considers sending a positive message to gov. 549 0,42 0,49 0 1
General gov. performance (-1: negative, 1: positive), after treatment 1 731 0,16 0,4 -1 1
Considers using the vote to send a message to gov., after treatment 1 755 0,34 0,47 0 1
Considers sending a positive message to gov., after treatment 589 0,45 0,5 0 1
Considers changing vote, after treatment 1 745 0,05 0,21 0 1
Used the vote to send a message to gov., follow-up 1 724 0,33 0,47 0 1
Sent a positive message to gov., follow-up 557 0,41 0,49 0 1
Panel F: Voting behaviour in Local Elections 2017
Knows about election 1 788 0,95 0,21 0 1
Intends to vote 1 793 0,77 0,42 0 1
Does not intend to vote 1 793 0,18 0,38 0 1
No age to vote 1 793 0,05 0,22 0 1
Does not know on whom to vote for 1 332 0,23 0,42 0 1
Plans to vote for PS (gov. party) 1 332 0,23 0,42 0 1
Choice reason: candidate’s ideas match mine 876 0,43 0,49 0 1
Choice reason: only candidate I know well 876 0,14 0,34 0 1
Choice reason: Do not want to vote in other candidates 876 0,09 0,29 0 1
Choice reason: my family would vote for that candidate 876 0,13 0,34 0 1
Choice reason: candidate from the party I usually vote for 653 0,51 0,5 0 1
Why plan not to vote (2017): I do not identify with electoral programs 312 0,21 0,41 0 1
Why plan not to vote (2017): I do not care 312 0,25 0,43 0 1
Why plan not to vote (2017): I was far from my polling station 312 0,36 0,48 0 1
Why plan not to vote (2017): I do not understand electoral system 312 0,08 0,27 0 1
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Voted (follow-up) 1 798 0,64 0,48 0 1
Did not vote (follow-up) 1 798 0,3 0,46 0 1
No age to vote (follow-up) 1 798 0,05 0,22 0 1
Voted/would vote in PS (gov. party) 1 453 0,33 0,47 0 1
When decided that would vote?: always knew would vote 1 151 0,85 0,36 0 1
When decided that would vote?: a week before the election 1 151 0,08 0,27 0 1
When decided that would vote?: on the election day 1 151 0,07 0,25 0 1
Did you consider voting in a different candidate? 1 143 0,27 0,44 0 1
In your decision, which was the most important: candidate 1 097 0,51 0,5 0 1
In your decision, which was the most important: party 1 097 0,4 0,49 0 1
Figure B.9: Geographical Dispersion
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Figure B.10: Political Spectrum (self-reported)
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Table B.6: Relation between general gov. performance and in specific intervention areas
(baseline)
General government performance (baseline)
All ISCAL PS (2015) Opposition (2015)
Agriculture, forest and sea 0.039*** 0.039** 0.047 0.045
(2.90) (2.57) (1.16) (1.15)
Home affairs 0.069*** 0.066*** -0.021 0.054
(4.69) (3.99) (-0.44) (1.33)
Culture 0.021 0.024 0.061 0.044
(1.46) (1.51) (1.23) (1.14)
Defense 0.044*** 0.047*** 0.043 0.028
(3.02) (2.85) (0.82) (0.64)
Education 0.046*** 0.036** -0.072 0.051
(3.60) (2.52) (-1.63) (1.41)
Economy 0.157*** 0.144*** 0.175*** 0.256***
(9.08) (7.38) (3.01) (5.23)
Public finance 0.115*** 0.108*** 0.071 0.127***
(6.68) (5.47) (1.26) (2.63)
Health 0.028** 0.013 -0.014 0.060
(1.97) (0.83) (-0.32) (1.52)
Labor and social security 0.074*** 0.076*** 0.096** 0.050
(5.12) (4.83) (2.01) (1.24)
Obs. 1621 1213 128 203
Adj. R Sq. 0.360 0.342 0.192 0.500
F-stat. 102.328 70.986 4.361 23.480
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
t-statistic in parenthesis. Significance levels: ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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B.5 Regressions with controls
Table B.7: Impact of treatment on Specific Government Performance
Post-Treatment Specific Government Performance
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
T. POS. 0.129*** 0.130*** 0.115*** 0.117*** 0.117*** 0.129*** 0.129***
(11.16) (10.92) (8.96) (8.30) (8.27) (9.01) (9.07)
T. NEG -0.112*** -0.110*** -0.112*** -0.119*** -0.120*** -0.123*** -0.123***
(-9.29) (-8.76) (-7.95) (-8.31) (-8.45) (-7.67) (-7.64)
Baseline gov. perf. 0.068*** 0.066*** 0.072*** 0.065*** 0.068*** 0.067***
(4.75) (4.68) (4.56) (3.77) (3.73) (3.80)
ISCAL 0.021 0.026* 0.026* 0.016 0.014
(1.60) (1.96) (1.85) (1.09) (0.93)
Female 0.033** 0.040** 0.039** 0.036** 0.035**
(2.30) (2.21) (2.13) (2.20) (2.14)
Age 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.34) (0.37) (0.33) (0.40) (0.34)
First election 0.039*** 0.041*** 0.042*** 0.043*** 0.042***
(3.22) (3.40) (3.45) (3.24) (3.12)
HH size 0.001 0.003 0.004 0.004 0.004
(0.22) (0.67) (0.78) (0.70) (0.71)
HH income p.c. -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(-0.82) (-0.31) (-0.24) (-0.37) (-0.37)
Catholic -0.005 -0.005 -0.002 -0.013 -0.012
(-0.38) (-0.33) (-0.13) (-0.90) (-0.81)
Parents unemployed -0.013 -0.020 -0.019 -0.028 -0.028
(-0.78) (-1.23) (-1.19) (-1.58) (-1.61)
Displaced 0.011 0.012 0.012 0.009 0.010
(0.69) (0.65) (0.64) (0.49) (0.52)
Low underst. of elec. process 0.032** 0.036* 0.036* 0.031* 0.030*
(2.50) (1.87) (1.88) (1.98) (1.90)
Politics complicated: yes -0.013 -0.012 -0.014 -0.022 -0.021
(-0.82) (-0.56) (-0.67) (-1.20) (-1.19)
Interest in politics -0.005 -0.008 -0.007 -0.011 -0.012
(-0.65) (-0.90) (-0.81) (-1.14) (-1.25)
Position from family and friend 0.000 -0.004 -0.002 -0.019 -0.019
(0.00) (-0.27) (-0.14) (-1.28) (-1.28)
PS spectum -0.010
(-0.64)
Support spectrum 0.019
(1.55)
Vote PS 0.026*
(1.68)
Vote support 0.026*
(1.98)
Obs. 1737 1711 1508 1132 1132 1145 1145
Standard errors are clustered at class level, t-tests reported in parenthesis. Controls include socio-demographic and measures of engage-
ment/interest in politics. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table B.8: Impact of treatment on general government performance
Post-Treatment General Government Performance
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
T. POS. 0.028 0.033** 0.031** 0.017 0.018 0.035* 0.036*
(1.53) (2.17) (2.00) (0.90) (1.01) (1.88) (1.92)
T. NEG. -0.106*** -0.106*** -0.108*** -0.122*** -0.124*** -0.108*** -0.108***
(-4.30) (-5.59) (-5.45) (-5.45) (-5.61) (-4.84) (-4.78)
Baseline gov. perf. 0.668*** 0.662*** 0.676*** 0.649*** 0.658*** 0.658***
(28.87) (26.75) (22.50) (20.82) (25.20) (25.16)
ISCAL 0.018 0.012 0.008 0.001 -0.003
(1.25) (0.68) (0.45) (0.06) (-0.15)
Female 0.006 -0.001 -0.008 0.006 0.004
(0.45) (-0.05) (-0.48) (0.37) (0.25)
Age 0.003** 0.003** 0.003** 0.003 0.003
(2.32) (2.36) (2.31) (1.64) (1.54)
First election 0.016 0.009 0.011 0.014 0.012
(0.85) (0.45) (0.54) (0.71) (0.58)
HH size 0.002 0.002 0.004 0.000 0.001
(0.27) (0.26) (0.51) (0.04) (0.07)
HH income p.c. -0.000** -0.000 -0.000 -0.000** -0.000**
(-2.17) (-1.63) (-1.58) (-2.43) (-2.34)
Catholic -0.021 -0.031* -0.020 -0.019 -0.016
(-1.30) (-1.73) (-1.19) (-1.00) (-0.83)
Parents unemployed -0.034* -0.036* -0.036 -0.068*** -0.070***
(-1.68) (-1.69) (-1.66) (-3.19) (-3.22)
Displaced 0.033* 0.036* 0.034* 0.021 0.023
(1.87) (1.98) (1.96) (1.08) (1.16)
Low underst. of elec. process 0.039* 0.037 0.036 0.019 0.017
(1.87) (1.38) (1.36) (0.77) (0.67)
Politics complicated: yes -0.044** -0.045* -0.049* -0.030 -0.030
(-2.22) (-1.76) (-1.89) (-1.37) (-1.35)
Interest in politics -0.023* -0.018 -0.018 -0.025* -0.027*
(-1.81) (-1.13) (-1.14) (-1.83) (-1.97)
Position from family and friend -0.017 -0.018 -0.016 -0.030 -0.030
(-1.04) (-0.92) (-0.84) (-1.52) (-1.50)
Centre 0.026
(1.19)
Left + Centre 0.079***
(4.42)
Intent Vote PS 0.061***
(3.54)
Intent Vote support 0.058***
(3.66)
Obs. 1731 1708 1513 1145 1145 1153 1153
Standard errors are clustered at class level, t-tests reported in parenthesis. Controls include socio-demographic and measures of engage-
ment/interest in politics. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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B.6 Descriptive statistics - long table (online appendix)
Table B.9: Descriptive Statistics
Obs. Mean S.D. Min. Max.
Panel A: Socio-Demographic Characteristics
ISCAL 1 800 0,73 0,44 0 1
Undergraduate 1 797 0,97 0,16 0 1
Female 1 797 0,59 0,49 0 1
Age 1 784 21,32 5,97 16 54
Under legal age to vote in last elections (2016) 1 786 0,41 0,49 0 1
Household size 1 728 3,59 1,15 1 11
HH income per capita (equiv.) 1 710 1352,72 1631,49 111,8 17677,7
HH income 1 779 2518,69 3095,15 250 25000
Lives with father (NOVA only.) 476 0,88 0,33 0 1
Lives with mother (NOVA only.) 476 0,97 0,16 0 1
Lives with siblings (NOVA only.) 476 0,79 0,41 0 1
Lives with children (NOVA only.) 476 0 0,05 0 1
Lives with grandparents (NOVA only.) 476 0,05 0,23 0 1
Main income HH sources: wages 475 0,9 0,3 0 1
Main income HH sources: self-employment 475 0,21 0,41 0 1
Main income HH sources: agriculture 475 0,01 0,12 0 1
Main income HH sources: pensions 475 0,04 0,2 0 1
Main income HH sources: unemployment and other subsidies 475 0,03 0,18 0 1
Main income HH sources: investment returns 475 0,17 0,37 0 1
Respondent contributes to HH: wages 1 794 0,21 0,41 0 1
Respondent contributes to HH: pensions 1 794 0,02 0,14 0 1
Respondent contributes to HH: subsidies/scholarship 1 794 0,1 0,29 0 1
Respondent contributes to HH: other 1 794 0 0,04 0 1
Respondent does not contibute to HH 1 794 0,68 0,47 0 1
No religion 1 778 0,37 0,48 0 1
Catholic 1 778 0,55 0,5 0 1
At least one parent is unemployed 1 800 0,16 0,37 0 1
Father attained high education 1 749 0,34 0,47 0 1
Mother attained high education 1 765 0,39 0,49 0 1
At least one parent attained high education 1 748 0,46 0,5 0 1
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Father is civil servant 1 766 0,12 0,33 0 1
Mother is civil servant 1 784 0,21 0,41 0 1
At least one parent is civil servant 1 761 0,27 0,44 0 1
Panel B: Turnout determinants and knowledge
Displaced student 1 793 0,29 0,45 0 1
Low understanding of electoral process (self-reported) 1 792 0,26 0,44 0 1
Medium understanding of electoral process (self-reported) 1 792 0,64 0,48 0 1
High understanding of electoral process (self-reported) 1 792 0,1 0,3 0 1
Person in power makes difference: no 1 786 0,02 0,15 0 1
Person in power makes difference: maybe 1 786 0,43 0,5 0 1
Person in power makes difference: yes 1 786 0,54 0,5 0 1
Person in power makes difference: no opinion 1 786 0,01 0,11 0 1
One vote makes difference: no 1 789 0,02 0,15 0 1
One vote makes difference: maybe 1 789 0,37 0,48 0 1
One vote makes difference: yes 1 789 0,6 0,49 0 1
One vote makes difference: no opinion 1 789 0,01 0,1 0 1
Understanding politics is complicated: no 1 780 0,16 0,37 0 1
Understanding politics is complicated: maybe 1 780 0,66 0,47 0 1
Understanding politics is complicated: yes 1 780 0,17 0,38 0 1
Knows about term limits (NOVA only.) 477 0,7 0,46 0 1
Knows about D’Hondt method (NOVA only.) 477 0,16 0,37 0 1
Panel C: Interest and experience in politics
Self-reported interest in politics (1: No interest, 4: very interested) 1 789 2,6 0,78 1 4
Frequency newspapers reading (1: never, 3: many times) 475 1,87 0,67 1 3
Frequency political discussion (1: never, 3: many times) 475 2,11 0,59 1 3
Frequency political websites/blogs (1: never, 3: many times) 477 1,34 0,59 1 3
Frequency TV political programs (1: never, 3: many times) 474 2,15 0,65 1 3
Belongs to a political party as militant 1 775 0,06 0,24 0 1
Actively supported a candidate in this local election 1 794 0,06 0,23 0 1
Belongs to NGO/volunteering organizations 1 775 0,12 0,33 0 1
Belongs to youth, cultural, religious or sport organization 1 775 0,16 0,37 0 1
Belongs to other kind of organization 1 775 0 0,02 0 1
Does not belong to any civil organization 1 775 0,73 0,45 0 1
Run for role appointed by suffrage in the past 1 777 0,4 0,49 0 1
Last local elections (2013): voted 1 791 0,16 0,37 0 1
Last local elections (2013): no age 1 791 0,77 0,42 0 1
Last parliamentary elections (2015): voted 1 786 0,36 0,48 0 1
Last parliamentary elections (2015): no age 1 786 0,52 0,5 0 1
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Last presidential elections (2016): voted 1 785 0,39 0,49 0 1
Last presidential elections (2016): no age 1 785 0,47 0,5 0 1
Why didn’t vote (2005): I do not identify with politicians/electoral program 5 0 0 0 0
Why didn’t vote (2005): I do not care 5 0 0 0 0
Why didn’t vote (2005): my vote would not matter 5 0 0 0 0
Why didn’t vote (2005): I was far from my polling station 5 0,8 0,45 0 1
Why didn’t vote (2005): I do not understand electoral system 5 0,4 0,55 0 1
Why didn’t vote (2005): other reason 5 0 0 0 0
Why didn’t vote (2005): I do not remember the reason 5 0 0 0 0
Why didn’t vote (2006): I do not identify with politicians/electoral program 17 0,06 0,24 0 1
Why didn’t vote (2006): I do not care 17 0,06 0,24 0 1
Why didn’t vote (2006): my vote would not matter 17 0,12 0,33 0 1
Why didn’t vote (2006): I was far from my polling station 17 0,41 0,51 0 1
Why didn’t vote (2006): I do not understand electoral system 17 0,18 0,39 0 1
Why didn’t vote (2006): other reason 17 0,12 0,33 0 1
Why didn’t vote (2006): I do not remember the reason 17 0,12 0,33 0 1
General interest in this election (1: No interest, 4: very interested) 1 794 2,51 0,88 1 4
Participation in the project increased interest (self-reported) 1 783 0,21 0,4 0 1
Participation in the project boosted search for information (self-reported) 1 786 0,19 0,4 0 1
Panel D: Political preferences and opinion (general)
Knows which part of the political spectrum identifies with 1 772 0,72 0,45 0 1
Position in the spectrum results from own ideas 1 717 0,61 0,49 0 1
Position in the spectrum results from family and friend contexts 1 717 0,4 0,49 0 1
Position in the spectrum results from opinion about politicians 1 717 0,22 0,41 0 1
Within the same party politicians share ideology no matter central or local
roles
1 758 0,49 0,5 0 1
Interest in gov. areas (1: low interest, 3: high interest): agriculture, forest
and sea
466 1,69 0,69 1 3
Interest in gov. areas (1: low interest, 3: high interest): home affairs 466 1,91 0,72 1 3
Interest in gov. areas (1: low interest, 3: high interest): culture 466 2,16 0,71 1 3
Interest in gov. areas (1: low interest, 3: high interest): defense 465 1,89 0,72 1 3
Interest in gov. areas (1: low interest, 3: high interest): education 469 2,65 0,54 1 3
Interest in gov. areas (1: low interest, 3: high interest): economy 470 2,7 0,52 1 3
Interest in gov. areas (1: low interest, 3: high interest): public finance 470 2,47 0,63 1 3
Interest in gov. areas (1: low interest, 3: high interest): health 470 2,48 0,61 1 3
Interest in gov. areas (1: low interest, 3: high interest): labor and social
security
467 2,31 0,63 1 3
Panel E: Political preferences and opinion (towards current government)
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General gov. performance (-1: negative, 1: positive) 1 769 0,15 0,4 -1 1
Gov. performance (-1: negative, 1: positive): agriculture, forest and sea 1 731 -0,28 0,61 -1 1
Gov. performance (-1: negative, 1: positive): home affairs 1 714 -0,04 0,58 -1 1
Gov. performance (-1: negative, 1: positive): culture 1 726 0,26 0,59 -1 1
Gov. performance (-1: negative, 1: positive): defense 1 711 -0,09 0,58 -1 1
Gov. performance (-1: negative, 1: positive): education 1 722 0,09 0,69 -1 1
Gov. performance (-1: negative, 1: positive): economy 1 727 0,32 0,68 -1 1
Gov. performance (-1: negative, 1: positive): public finance 1 719 0,23 0,67 -1 1
Gov. performance (-1: negative, 1: positive): health 1 721 -0,17 0,62 -1 1
Gov. performance (-1: negative, 1: positive): labor and social security 1 722 0,09 0,63 -1 1
Considers using the vote to send a message to gov. 1 761 0,33 0,47 0 1
Considers sending a positive message to gov. 549 0,42 0,49 0 1
Change in perception in gov. performance (-1: negative, 1: positive) after
article 1
1 163 0,08 0,32 -1 1
Change in perception in PS performance (-1: negative, 1: positive) after
article 1
1 151 0,04 0,32 -1 1
Change in perception in gov. performance (-1: negative, 1: positive) after
article 2
1 156 0,07 0,36 -1 1
Change in perception in PS performance (-1: negative, 1: positive) after
article 2
1 137 0,05 0,33 -1 1
First article is the most relevant 1 171 0,37 0,48 0 1
Second article is the most relevant 1 171 0,63 0,48 0 1
General gov. performance (-1: negative, 1: positive), after treatment 1 731 0,16 0,4 -1 1
Considers using the vote to send a message to gov., after treatment 1 755 0,34 0,47 0 1
Considers sending a positive message to gov., after treatment 589 0,45 0,5 0 1
Considers changing vote, after treatment 1 745 0,05 0,21 0 1
Used the vote to send a message to gov., follow-up 1 724 0,33 0,47 0 1
Sent a positive message to gov., follow-up 557 0,41 0,49 0 1
Sent a negative message to gov., follow-up 557 0,48 0,5 0 1
Sent other type of message to gov. follow-up 557 0,11 0,31 0 1
Panel F: Voting behaviour in Local Elections 2017
Knows about election 1 788 0,95 0,21 0 1
Intends to vote 1 793 0,77 0,42 0 1
Does not intend to vote 1 793 0,18 0,38 0 1
No age to vote 1 793 0,05 0,22 0 1
Does not know on whom to vote for 1 332 0,23 0,42 0 1
Choice reason: candidate’s ideas match mine 876 0,43 0,49 0 1
Choice reason: only candidate I know well 876 0,14 0,34 0 1
Choice reason: Do not want to vote in other candidates 876 0,09 0,29 0 1
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Choice reason: it is not my first option, but that one did not have a chance
to win
876 0,06 0,23 0 1
Choice reason: I do not identify with the candidate proposed by the party I
usually vote for
876 0,02 0,13 0 1
Choice reason: I know personally elements from candidates’ list 876 0,04 0,19 0 1
Choice reason: my family would vote for that candidate 876 0,13 0,34 0 1
Choice reason: my friends would vote for that candidate 876 0,08 0,27 0 1
Choice reason: it is not my first option, but that one did not have a chance
to win
876 0,08 0,27 0 1
Choice reason: candidate from the party I usually vote for 653 0,51 0,5 0 1
Why plan not to vote (2017): I do not identify with electoral programs 312 0,21 0,41 0 1
Why plan not to vote (2017): I do not care 312 0,25 0,43 0 1
Why plan not to vote (2017): my vote would not matter 312 0,04 0,2 0 1
Why plan not to vote (2017): I was far from my polling station 312 0,36 0,48 0 1
Why plan not to vote (2017): I do not understand electoral system 312 0,08 0,27 0 1
Why plan not to vote (2017): other reason 312 0,11 0,32 0 1
Information sources: outdoors 1 773 0,6 0,49 0 1
Information sources: TV/radio/newspapers 1 773 0,57 0,5 0 1
Information sources: social media / blogs 1 773 0,31 0,46 0 1
Information sources: internet (other than candidates websites) 1 773 0,23 0,42 0 1
Information sources: discussions with family and friends 1 773 0,44 0,5 0 1
Information sources: candidates websites 1 773 0,08 0,28 0 1
Intends to vote, intermediate survey (NOVA only) 477 0,7 0,46 0 1
Does not intend to vote, intermediate survey (NOVA only) 477 0,18 0,38 0 1
No age to vote, intermediate survey (NOVA only) 477 0,12 0,33 0 1
Why plan not to vote (2017): I do not identify with politicians/electoral
program, after intermediate (NOVA only)
84 0,13 0,34 0 1
Why plan not to vote (2017): I do not care (NOVA only) 84 0,17 0,37 0 1
Why plan not to vote (2017): my vote would not matter (NOVA only) 84 0,04 0,19 0 1
Why plan not to vote (2017): I was far from my polling station (NOVA only) 84 0,6 0,49 0 1
Why plan not to vote (2017): I do not understand electoral system (NOVA
only)
84 0,07 0,26 0 1
Why plan not to vote (2017): other reason (NOVA only) 84 0,04 0,19 0 1
Voted (follow-up) 1 798 0,64 0,48 0 1
Did not vote (follow-up) 1 798 0,3 0,46 0 1
No age to vote (follow-up) 1 798 0,05 0,22 0 1
Voted/would vote in BE 1 453 0,05 0,22 0 1
Voted/would vote in CDU 1 453 0,07 0,26 0 1
Voted/would vote in PS 1 453 0,33 0,47 0 1
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Voted/would vote in PSD 1 453 0,28 0,45 0 1
Voted/would vote in CDS 1 453 0,23 0,42 0 1
Reason to choose that candidate: candidate represents my interests/ideas 1 118 0,36 0,48 0 1
Reason to choose that candidate: among all, it is the one that seems to
represent me better
1 118 0,33 0,47 0 1
Reason to choose that candidate: it is not my first option, but that one did
not have a chance to win
1 118 0,02 0,12 0 1
Reason to choose that candidate: candidate from the party I usually vote for 1 118 0,1 0,29 0 1
Reason to choose that candidate: candidate fits in the political spectrum
section I mostly identify with
1 118 0,12 0,32 0 1
Reason to choose that candidate: other 1 118 0,13 0,33 0 1
When decided that would vote?: always knew would vote 1 151 0,85 0,36 0 1
When decided that would vote?: a week before the election 1 151 0,08 0,27 0 1
When decided that would vote?: on the election day 1 151 0,07 0,25 0 1
When decided that would vote?: other 1 151 0 0,06 0 1
Did you consider voting in a different candidate? 1 143 0,27 0,44 0 1
In your decision, which was the most important: candidate 1 097 0,51 0,5 0 1
In your decision, which was the most important: party 1 097 0,4 0,49 0 1
In your decision, which was the most important: other 1 097 0,03 0,18 0 1
Why did not vote (2017): I do not identify with politicians/electoral program,
after intermediate
528 0,18 0,39 0 1
Why did not vote (2017): I do not care 528 0,19 0,4 0 1
Why did not vote (2017): my vote would not matter 528 0,04 0,2 0 1
Why did not vote (2017): I was far from my polling station 528 0,5 0,5 0 1
Why did not vote (2017): I do not understand electoral system 528 0,05 0,21 0 1
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Appendix C
Title of Appendix
C.1 Data
Figure C.1: Decomposition of Investment expenditure per capita (national average)
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Figure C.2: Local Output Measures vs. GDP - changes
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Figure C.3: Correlation between changes in the mean wage and spending variables
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Figure C.4: Correlation between changes in the number of workers and spending variables
1
2
3
4
5
W
or
ke
rs
 (%
 ch
an
ge
)
-10 0 10 20
Current expenditures per capita (% change)
2
3
4
5
6
W
or
ke
rs
 (%
 ch
an
ge
)
-40 -20 0 20 40
Investment expenditures per capita (% change)
Changes in the number of workers and changes in spending variables
Table C.1: Descriptive Statistics
Obs. Mean S.D. Min. Max.
Panel A: Local Finance - Revenue (in millions)
total_revenue 6 649 23.51 45.94 0.5 854.7
current_revenue 6 649 16.04 35.1 0.5 572
current_transfers 6 649 5.57 5.3 0.5 82.4
direct_taxes 6 649 6.52 21.13 0 361.1
indirect_taxes 6 651 0.66 2.63 -0.1 60
sales_goods/services 6 649 1.79 4.32 0 82.5
property_income 6 649 0.55 1.37 0 31.9
fees/fines 6 649 0.69 2.91 0 83.5
capital_revenue 6 651 7.46 12.85 0 352.4
capital_transfers 6 651 4.98 4.98 0 125.3
sales_durable_goods 6 376 0.57 3.89 0 164.6
other_capital_revenue 6 651 1.91 7 0 282.6
Continued on next page
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Table C.1: Descriptive Statistics
Obs. Mean S.D. Min. Max.
Panel B: Local Finance - Expenditures (in millions)
total_expenditure 6 649 23.42 45.94 0.4 843.8
current_expenditure 6 651 13.57 28.65 0 494.7
payroll 6 651 6.5 15.95 0 310.4
purchases_goods/services 6 651 4.66 8.19 0 129.9
current_transfers 6 651 1.48 3.27 0 68.3
financial_expenditure 6 651 0.44 1.04 0 30.3
other_current_expenditure 6 651 0.51 1.79 0 31.8
capital_expenditure 6 649 9.85 18.44 0.3 437.5
investment_expenditure 6 651 6.64 12.92 0 320.6
other_capital_expenditure 6 649 3.2 8.41 -80.4 373.7
Panel C: Local Finance - Investment Expenditure Breakdown (in millions)
land 6 600 0.32 1.39 0 71.1
habitation 6 600 0.65 4.6 0 160.1
other_buildings 6 600 1.59 2.99 0 61.4
miscellaneous_constructions 6 600 3.33 5.24 0 135.6
transportation_material 6 651 0.14 0.3 0 9.3
machinery/equipments 6 651 0.46 0.96 0 26.8
other_investment_expenditures 6 651 0.16 0.67 0 23.8
Panel D: Macroeconomic Fundamentals
unemployment_rate 6 673 7.75 3.53 3.9 16.2
national_budget_deficit 6 673 -6831.67 2980.37 -14239.8 -2686.9
gdp_growth_real 6 673 1.31 2.27 -4 4.8
inflation 6 673 3.42 2.73 -0.8 11.8
share_priv_cons 6 673 64.57 1.15 62.6 66.3
share_pub_cons 6 673 19.02 1.31 16.9 21.4
share_fbcf 6 673 23.1 3.84 14.8 28
Panel E: Demographics and Economic Municipal Variables
population_density 6 669 3.05 8.73 0 79.1
share_pop_65+ 6 669 21.38 6.68 6.7 45
firms 6 370 920.11 1933.41 10 29710
wages 6 370 829.35 168.57 477.3 2301.4
workers 6 370 9312.44 25844.16 79 419690
Continued on next page
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Table C.1: Descriptive Statistics
Obs. Mean S.D. Min. Max.
Panel F: Political Variables
D.local_election 6 673 0.25 0.43 0 1
D.gen_election 6 673 0.29 0.45 0 1
D.majority_TC 6 639 0.85 0.36 0 1
D.majority_MA 6 636 0.64 0.48 0 1
D.majority_TC_MA 6 639 0.63 0.48 0 1
D.winner_right 6 639 0.44 0.5 0 1
D.incumbent 6 651 0.69 0.46 0 1
num_terms 6 639 2.58 1.7 1 10
D.same_winner_party 6 626 0.73 0.44 0 1
Monetary values in constant prices (2010), shares in a scale of 0-100.
C.2 Identification
Table C.2: Differences in means of spending variables: election vs non-election years.
Levels Changes
Election No Election diff. Election No-election diff.
Investment Exp.1 297.35e 259.45e 37.9e∗∗∗ 18.64% 8.29% 12.8%∗∗∗
Current Exp.1 484.71e 442.40e 42.31e∗∗ 9.34% 5.97% 3.37%∗∗∗
N 1937 6082 - 1937 6082 -
Notes: Spending variables in per capita terms. Test of difference in means, comparing spending in election
and non election years, where the significance reported tests H0: diff<0. Significance levels: * p<0.05, **
p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Bruno Carvalho 185
Appendices
Figure C.5: Campaign Spending of main candidates in Portuguese Elections
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Table C.3: Campaigning costs and revenues in local elections.
Party
Costs Revenues
Total Cost Party Contribution Public Funding Private Donations Total Revenue
2005 Election
BE 1 672 981.84e 120 993.79e 1 525 677.74e 28 254.84e 1 674 926.37e
PS 24 026 933.57e 762 676.36e 17 824 684.08e 5 210 029.92e 23 797 390.36e
PCP 4 698 723.27e 293 015.94e 4 254 649.89e 104 428.64e 4 652 094.46e
CDS 3 041 430.92e 700 662.48e 2 356 188.59e 107 482.26e 3 164 333.33e
PSD 28 856 980.80e 7 886 843.62e 13 398 510.41e 4 699 869.10e 25 985 223.13e
Coalitions’ Total 1 342 915.80e 2 214 982.55e 0.00e 842 885.64e 3 057 868.19e
Total 63 639 966.21e 11 979 174.74e 39 359 710.70e 10 992 950.39e 62 331 835.83e
2009 Election
BE 1 329 778.77e 1 246 370.53e 1 137 090.01e 310 768.37e 2 694 228.91e
PS 24 230 903.15e 7 569 295.68e 18 809 219.14e 2 746 030.77e 29 124 545.58e
Continued on next page
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Table C.3: Campaigning costs and revenues in local elections.
Party
Costs Revenues
Total Cost Party Contribution Public Funding Private Donations Total Revenue
PCP 4 805 495.73e 4 705 290.97e 4 420 731.46e 92 125.87e 9 218 148.30e
CDS 1 789 444.85e 1 767 099.10e 1 539 279.84e 22 345.74e 3 328 724.69e
PSD 11 863 141.38e 1 698 618.34e 9 367 376.79e 797 146.26e 11 863 141.39e
Coalitions’ Total 5 737 071.70e 875 429.43e 4 537 367.54e 324 274.72e 5 737 071.69e
Total 49 755 835.57e 17 862 104.05e 39 811 064.78e 4 292 691.72e 61 965 860.55e
2013 Election
BE 1 161 830.92e 230 081.02e 883 650.18e 52 409.06e 1 166 140.27e
PS 19 199 997.20e 417 098.59e 16 808 357.21e 1 403 091.36e 18 628 547.16e
PCP 4 269 663.83e 2 236 064.66e 4 064 301.99e 60 321.36e 6 360 688.00e
CDS 1 495 742.75e 1 188 779.48e 1 193 235.89e 98 939.26e 2 480 954.63e
PSD 7 138 145.67e 1 385 979.62e 4 867 601.80e 863 751.59e 7 117 333.00e
Coalitions’ Total 6 458 889.77e 1 986 305.34e 4 018 579.32e 562 357.50e 6 567 242.15e
Total 39 724 270.14e 7 444 308.71e 31 835 726.39e 3 040 870.12e 42 320 905.22e
Notes: Values in constant prices (2010), the data was obtained from the parties’ reports on campaign spending and revenue, submitted
and audited by the Portuguese Constitutional Court.
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C.3 Baseline estimates of Fiscal Multiplier
Table C.4: Wage Bill Multipliers
OLS IV
1st St. 2nd St. 1st St. 2nd St.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Investment_Exp.t 0.00** 0.09***
[0.00] [0.02]
Current_Exp.t 0.00 0.12***
[0.00] [0.04]
Investment_Exp.t−1 0.00** -0.14** 0.01**
[0.00] [0.07] [0.01]
Investment_Exp.t−2 0.00 -0.17*** 0.02**
[0.00] [0.06] [0.01]
Current_Exp.t−1 0.00** -0.61** 0.08**
[0.00] [0.26] [0.03]
Current_Exp.t−2 0.00 -0.29 0.04
[0.00] [0.22] [0.03]
Wage_billt−1 -0.15*** -0.15*** 0.14 -0.17*** 0.22 -0.19***
[0.04] [0.04] [0.19] [0.04] [0.14] [0.04]
Wage_billt−2 -0.03 -0.03 -0.04 -0.02 0.15 -0.04
[0.05] [0.05] [0.21] [0.05] [0.12] [0.05]
D.local_electiont 30.94*** 22.89***
[4.66] [5.18]
Observations 7172 7172 7172 7172 7172 7172
R2 0.02 0.02 0.05 - 0.29 -
F-stat 4.12 3.73 11.89 6.18 5.49 6.34
p-value 0.0011 0.0024 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000
Ftest (Inst.) - - 42.14 - 18.72 -
p-value - - 0.0000 - 0.0000 -
Notes: Annual data at municipal level, between 1986 and 2014. Investment Expenditure is defined as
the year-on-year change in local Investment Spending per capita, divided by the previous’ year private-
sector wage bill (Current Expenditure is defined analogously). The Wage bill is the percentage change
on the per-capita municipal expenditure in private-sector wages of full-time employees (at least 140 paid
hours/month). All estimated equations are population weighted and include municipality fixed effects,
municipal-specific time trends and a set of microeconomic, macroeconomic and political controls. Two lags
of the spending and the outcome variable are also included. Standard errors, reported in brackets, are
robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered at the NUTSIII×year level. Estimation is done by two-stage
least-squares, using D.local_election as an instrumental variable, which is equal to one in all local election
years. Significance levels: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table C.5: Wage Multipliers
OLS IV
1st St. 2nd St. 1st St. 2nd St.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Investment_Exp.t 0.02*** 0.10
[0.01] [0.07]
Current_Exp.t 0.02 0.15
[0.01] [0.11]
Investment_Exp.t−1 0.03*** -0.32*** 0.05**
[0.01] [0.03] [0.02]
Investment_Exp.t−2 0.00 -0.21*** 0.02
[0.01] [0.02] [0.02]
Current_Exp.t−1 0.02** -0.61*** 0.10
[0.01] [0.23] [0.07]
Current_Exp.t−2 0.01 -0.29 0.05
[0.01] [0.19] [0.04]
Waget−1 -0.26*** -0.26*** 0.04 -0.27*** 0.02 -0.27***
[0.03] [0.03] [0.03] [0.04] [0.02] [0.04]
Waget−2 -0.18*** -0.18*** -0.03 -0.18*** 0.02 -0.18***
[0.03] [0.03] [0.03] [0.03] [0.02] [0.03]
D.local_electiont 3.89*** 2.53***
[0.51] [0.44]
Observations 7172 7172 7172 7172 7172 7172
R2 0.08 0.08 0.13 - 0.28 -
F-stat 18.74 13.28 47.45 15.30 7.32 13.02
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Ftest (Inst.) - - 56.35 - 32.03 -
p-value - - 0.0000 - 0.0000 -
Notes: Annual data at municipal level, between 1986 and 2014. Investment Expenditure is defined as
the year-on-year change in local Investment Spending per capita, divided by the previous’ year mean
private-sector wage of full-time employees (Current Expenditure is defined analogously). Wage is the
percentage change on the mean municipal private-sector wage of full-time employees (at least 140 paid
hours/month). All estimated equations are population weighted and include municipality fixed effects,
municipal-specific time trends and a set of microeconomic, macroeconomic and political controls. Two lags
of the spending and the outcome variable are also included. Standard errors, reported in brackets, are
robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered at the NUTSIII×year level. Estimation is done by two-stage
least-squares, using D.local_election as an instrumental variable, which is equal to one in all local election
years. Significance levels: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table C.6: Workers’ Multipliers
OLS IV
1st St. 2nd St. 1st St. 2nd St.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Investment_Exp.t 0.01 1.50**
[0.01] [0.64]
Current_Exp.t 0.01 1.71**
[0.01] [0.83]
Investment_Exp.t−1 0.01 -0.15* 0.23
[0.01] [0.08] [0.15]
Investment_Exp.t−2 0.01* -0.24*** 0.37*
[0.01] [0.07] [0.20]
Current_Exp.t−1 0.01* -0.59** 1.01
[0.01] [0.26] [0.63]
Current_Exp.t−2 0.01* -0.27 0.48
[0.01] [0.21] [0.42]
Workerst−1 -0.17*** -0.17*** 0.03 -0.21*** 0.02* -0.21***
[0.06] [0.06] [0.02] [0.07] [0.01] [0.06]
Workerst−2 0.03 0.03 0.00 0.03 0.01 0.01
[0.07] [0.07] [0.02] [0.08] [0.01] [0.07]
D.local_electiont 1.30*** 1.14***
[0.35] [0.42]
Observations 7172 7172 7172 7172 7172 7172
R2 0.03 0.03 0.07 - 0.27 -
F-stat 2.68 2.48 7.09 2.44 3.64 3.01
p-value 0.0205 0.0305 0.0000 0.0330 0.0029 0.0107
F-test (Inst.) - - 13.41 - 6.99 -
p-value - - 0.0003 - 0.0084 -
Notes: Annual data at municipal level, between 1986 and 2014. Investment Expenditure is defined as the
year-on-year change in local Investment Spending per capita, divided by the previous’ year total number of
full-time private-sector workers in the municipality (Current expenditure is defined analogously). Workers
is the percentage change on the total number of full-time (at least 140 paid hours/month) private-sector
workers in the municipality. All estimated equations are population weighted and include municipality fixed
effects, municipal-specific time trends and a set of microeconomic, macroeconomic and political controls.
Two lags of the spending and the outcome variable are also included. Standard errors, reported in brackets,
are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered at the NUTSIII×year level. Estimation is done by two-stage
least-squares, using D.local_election as an instrumental variable, which is equal to one in all local election
years. Significance levels: ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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C.3.1 Lagged effect of Spending of Mean wages
Table C.7: One-period ahead Wage Multipliers.
1st St. 2nd St. 1st St. 2nd St.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Investment_Exp.t 0.39***
[0.08]
Current_Exp.t 0.58***
[0.13]
Investment_Exp.t−1 -0.33*** 0.13***
[0.03] [0.03]
Investment_Exp.t−2 -0.21*** 0.10***
[0.02] [0.02]
Current_Exp.t−1 -0.62*** 0.37***
[0.22] [0.14]
Current_Exp.t−2 -0.30 0.19
[0.20] [0.11]
Waget 0.10*** -0.40*** 0.04** -0.38***
[0.03] [0.04] [0.02] [0.03]
Waget−1 0.08*** -0.27*** 0.02 -0.25***
[0.03] [0.03] [0.02] [0.03]
Waget−2 0.00 -0.13*** 0.02 -0.14***
[0.03] [0.03] [0.02] [0.02]
D.local_election 3.82*** 2.56***
[0.48] [0.44]
Observations 7172 7172 7172 7172
R2 0.13 -0.53 0.29 -1.04
F-stat 42.17 23.47 6.11 24.27
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
F-test (Inst.) 57.35 30.95
p-value 0.0000 0.0000
Notes: Annual data at municipal level, between 1986 and 2014. Investment Ex-
penditure is defined as the year-on-year change in local Investment Spending
per capita, divided by the previous’ year mean private-sector wage of full-time
employees (Current Expenditure is defined analogously). Wage is the percent-
age change on the mean municipal private-sector wage of full-time employees
(at least 140 paid hours/month). The outcome variable of all regressions is the
one-period ahead change in wages (Waget+1). All estimated equations are pop-
ulation weighted and include municipality fixed effects, municipal-specific time
trends and a set of microeconomic, macroeconomic and political controls. Con-
temporaneous change in wages and two lags of the spending and the outcome
variable are also included. Standard errors, reported in brackets, are robust to
heteroskedasticity and clustered at the NUTSIII×year level. Estimation is done
by two-stage least-squares, using D.local_election as an instrumental variable,
which is equal to one in all local election years. Significance levels: * p<0.1, **
p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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C.4 State dependent multipliers
C.4.1 Municipal size-related heterogeneity
Table C.8: Wage bill Multipliers, by population level.
pop ≤ Q1 Q1 < pop ≤ Q2 Q2 < pop ≤ Q3 pop > Q3
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Investment_Exp.t 0.03* 0.00 0.05* 0.14***
[0.02] [0.01] [0.03] [0.05]
Current_Exp.t 0.07** 0.00 0.06* 0.25***
[0.03] [0.01] [0.03] [0.08]
Observations 1845 1845 1768 1768 1756 1756 1803 1803
F-stat 5.59 6.13 4.80 4.84 3.49 4.64 2.80 2.67
p-value 0.0001 0.0000 0.0003 0.0002 0.0040 0.0004 0.0166 0.0211
F-test (Inst.) 5.57 15.86 12.35 3.03 11.54 43.63 32.25 39.41
p-value 0.0187 0.0001 0.0005 0.0825 0.0007 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Notes: Annual data at municipal level, between 1986 and 2014. The estimation procedure and the definition of
all variables used are analogous to the one implemented in Table 3.2, except for the fact that regressions are not
population weighted. Population quartiles were determined for the whole sample and are such that Q1=8119,
Q2=16097 and Q3=37438. Significance levels: ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table C.9: Wage Multipliers, by population level.
pop ≤ Q1 Q1 < pop ≤ Q2 Q2 < pop ≤ Q3 pop > Q3
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Investment_Exp.t -0.05 0.00 -0.08 0.08
[0.12] [0.07] [0.10] [0.08]
Current_Exp.t -0.09 0.00 -0.11 0.14
[0.21] [0.06] [0.13] [0.13]
Observations 1845 1845 1768 1768 1756 1756 1803 1803
F-stat 15.45 15.34 6.79 6.70 8.73 8.50 7.41 6.89
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
F-test (Inst.) 4.65 11.43 24.91 3.42 14.18 32.87 36.49 41.80
p-value 0.0315 0.0008 0.0000 0.0648 0.0002 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Notes: Annual data at municipal level, between 1986 and 2014. The estimation procedure and the definition of
all variables used are analogous to the one implemented in Table 3.4, except for the fact that regressions are not
population weighted. Population quartiles were determined for the whole sample and are such that Q1=8119,
Q2=16097 and Q3=37438. Significance levels: ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table C.10: Wage bill Multipliers, in cities and coastal municipalities.
Cities Coastal
1st St. 2nd St. 1st St. 2nd St. 1st St. 2nd St. 1st St. 2nd St.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Investment_Exp.t 0.14*** 0.09***
[0.04] [0.03]
Current_Exp.t 0.16*** 0.26***
[0.06] [0.10]
Investment_Exp.t−1 -0.30*** 0.04*** -0.31*** 0.03***
[0.06] [0.01] [0.06] [0.01]
Investment_Exp.t−2 -0.21*** 0.03*** -0.18*** 0.02***
[0.04] [0.01] [0.03] [0.01]
Current_Exp.t−1 -0.67** 0.11** -0.27*** 0.09**
[0.27] [0.05] [0.09] [0.04]
Current_Exp.t−2 -0.34 0.05 0.02 0.02
[0.27] [0.04] [0.05] [0.01]
Wage_bill.t−1 0.31** -0.24*** 0.34** -0.25*** -0.01 -0.08 0.02 -0.09**
[0.13] [0.07] [0.15] [0.06] [0.30] [0.05] [0.09] [0.05]
Wage_bill.t−2 0.27 -0.06 0.41** -0.09 0.25 -0.13** 0.10 -0.14***
[0.16] [0.07] [0.17] [0.09] [0.33] [0.05] [0.08] [0.04]
D.local_electiont 23.09*** 20.63*** 28.91*** 9.56***
[3.33] [6.52] [4.56] [3.41]
Observations 2736 2736 2736 2736 1531 1531 1531 1531
R2 0.123 - 0.329 - 0.142 - 0.065 -
F-stat 19.02 4.13 2.77 4.96 16.13 3.70 5.06 3.85
p-value 0.0000 0.0010 0.0175 0.0002 0.0000 0.0028 0.0002 0.0021
F-test (Inst.) - 45.93 - 9.54 - 38.00 - 7.44
p-value - 0.0000 - 0.0021 - 0.0000 - 0.0067
Notes: Annual data at municipal level, between 1986 and 2014. The sample is restricted, in left panel, to municipalities that have
cities (according to the 2001 definition, which establishes 144 cities in a total of 121 municipalities) and in the right panel, to
municipalities that have a border with the ocean (59 municipalities). Investment Expenditure is defined as the year-on-year change
in local Investment Spending per capita, divided by the previous’ year mean private-sector wage (Current Expenditure is defined
analogously). Wage is the percentage change on the mean municipal private-sector wage. All estimated equations are population
weighted and include municipality fixed effects, municipal-specific time trends and a set of microeconomic, macroeconomic and
political controls. Standard errors, reported in brackets, are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered at the NUTSIII×year
level. Estimation is done by two-stage least-squares, using D.local_election as an instrumental variable, which is equal to one
in all local election years. Significance levels: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table C.11: Workers’ Multipliers in Coastal Municipalities and Cities.
Cities Coastal
1st St. 2nd St. 1st St. 2nd St. 1st St. 2nd St. 1st St. 2nd St.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Investment_Exp.t 6.46** 2.25***
[2.77] [0.84]
Current_Exp.t 2.16 9.28***
[1.39] [3.54]
Investment_Exp.t−1 -0.27*** 1.73** -0.36*** 0.88**
[0.08] [0.86] [0.13] [0.37]
Investment_Exp.t−2 -0.22*** 1.32* -0.25*** 0.66***
[0.05] [0.69] [0.07] [0.25]
Current_Exp.t−1 -0.68** 1.46 -0.07 0.83
[0.27] [1.08] [0.10] [0.93]
Current_Exp.t -0.34 0.74 0.22*** -1.47
[0.28] [0.75] [0.08] [0.93]
Workerst−1 0.01 -0.28** 0.01 -0.27** -0.06 0.11 -0.01 0.04
[0.01] [0.12] [0.02] [0.11] [0.04] [0.09] [0.01] [0.07]
Workerst−2 0.00 0.03 0.03 -0.00 0.07 -0.19 0.01 -0.11*
[0.00] [0.11] [0.02] [0.13] [0.06] [0.12] [0.00] [0.06]
D.local_electiont 0.32*** 0.97* 0.91*** 0.21***
[0.08] [0.53] [0.24] [0.06]
Observations 2736 2736 2736 2736 1531 1531 1531 1531
R2 0.092 - 0.335 - 0.198 - 0.056 -
F-stat 7.10 2.01 2.33 1.84 5.81 1.85 3.75 1.60
p-value 0.0000 0.0748 0.0411 0.1030 0.0000 0.1032 0.0026 0.1593
F-test (Inst.) - 14.86 - 3.18 - 13.23 - 11.22
p-value - 0.0001 - 0.0752 - 0.0003 - 0.0009
Notes: Annual data at municipal level, between 1986 and 2014. The sample is restricted, in left panel, to municipalities that
have cities (according to the 2001 definition, which establishes 144 cities in a total of 121 municipalities) and in the right panel,
to municipalities that have a border with the ocean (59 municipalities). Investment Expenditure is defined as the year-on-year
change in local Investment Spending per capita, divided by the previous’ year total number of full-time private-sector workers
in the municipality (Current Expenditure is defined analogously). Workers is the percentage change on the total number of
full-time private-sector workers in the municipality. All estimated equations are population weighted and include municipality
fixed effects, municipal-specific time trends and a set of microeconomic, macroeconomic and political controls. Standard errors,
reported in brackets, are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered at the NUTSIII×year level. Estimation is done by two-stage
least-squares, using D.local_election as an instrumental variable, which is equal to one in all local election years. Significance
levels: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table C.12: Wage Multipliers in Coastal Municipalities and Cities.
Cities Coastal
1st St. 2nd St. 1st St. 2nd St. 1st St. 2nd St. 1st St. 2nd St.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Investment_Exp.t 0.14* 0.12
[0.08] [0.09]
Current_Exp.t 0.20 0.25
[0.12] [0.23]
Investment_Exp.t−1 -0.31*** 0.08*** -0.27*** 0.05**
[0.05] [0.03] [0.04] [0.03]
Investment_Exp.t−2 -0.17*** 0.03* -0.16*** 0.01
[0.03] [0.02] [0.03] [0.02]
Current_Exp.t−1 -0.63*** 0.14 -0.41*** 0.16
[0.24] [0.09] [0.09] [0.10]
Current_Exp.t.2 -0.31 0.07 -0.11** 0.09**
[0.22] [0.06] [0.05] [0.04]
Waget−1 0.06* -0.30*** 0.02 -0.29*** 0.02 -0.22*** 0.02 -0.23***
[0.04] [0.05] [0.03] [0.05] [0.04] [0.05] [0.02] [0.05]
Waget−2 -0.01 -0.22*** 0.03 -0.22*** -0.01 -0.20*** -0.02 -0.20***
[0.03] [0.05] [0.03] [0.04] [0.04] [0.06] [0.02] [0.06]
D.local_electiont 3.90*** 2.68*** 4.41*** 1.82***
[0.53] [0.56] [0.69] [0.55]
Observations 2736 2736 2736 2736 1531 1531 1531 1531
R2 0.199 - 0.307 - 0.209 - 0.203 -
F-stat 2.56 8.09 2.44 7.67 4.49 5.16 5.56 5.96
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000
F-test (Inst.) - 51.22 - 21.77 - 38.44 - 10.27
p-value - 0.0000 - 0.0000 - 0.0000 - 0.0015
Notes: Annual data at municipal level, between 1986 and 2014. The sample is restricted, in left panel, to municipalities that have
cities (according to the 2001 definition, which establishes 144 cities in a total of 121 municipalities) and in the right panel, to
municipalities that have a border with the ocean (59 municipalities). Investment Expenditure is defined as the year-on-year change
in local Investment Spending per capita, divided by the previous’ year mean private-sector wage (Current Expenditure is defined
analogously). Wage is the percentage change on the mean municipal private-sector wage. All estimated equations are population
weighted and include municipality fixed effects, municipal-specific time trends and a set of microeconomic, macroeconomic and
political controls. Standard errors, reported in brackets, are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered at the NUTSIII×year
level. Estimation is done by two-stage least-squares, using D.local_election as an instrumental variable, which is equal to one
in all local election years. Significance levels: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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